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EDITORIAL

SINCE our last issue was prepared for the press two books of unusual importance have appeared. The first is a sumptuous edition of the *Relics of Saint Cuthbert*, published for the Dean and Chapter of Durham by the Oxford University Press. It consists of studies by various authors edited with a historical introduction by C. F. Battiscombe. The edition is limited to 750 copies, and if the price (ten guineas—which is almost excessively moderate, considering the value received) puts it beyond the reach of most clerical pockets, it ought at least to be bought by all local libraries. We do not propose to discuss the book at length here as we hope to present a full review in a future number. All we would do now is to point out that the interest of the relics is by no means solely ecclesiastical. They have very great importance in any attempt to reconstruct the history of the art and culture of this country. The quite excellent illustrations in the book are an admirable instrument to this end.

The second book is of an entirely different character but is important to an even wider range of students and scholars. It is the new English edition of the Preuschen-Bauer *Lexicon of the New Testament and other Early Christian Literature*. This of course is a practically indispensable tool for anyone working in the sphere of Christian origins. Successive German editions have made it almost perfect: it has now been brought up to date with references to modern scholars as late as 1954. It has been published in U.S.A. by the Chicago University Press and has been subsidised by the Missouri Synod of the Lutheran Church. The translators and editors are W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich. Its scholarship is irreproachable, and when it enters the realm of controversy it preserves a masterly objectivity. We have tested it in a number of places and are amazed at the amount of information packed into the smallest possible compass. The price is five guineas, but it is worth much more.

The news that among its many other items of business the next Lambeth Conference is to consider the revision of the Kalendar, at least to the extent of commemorating some of our more modern

saints and leaders, has led an Irish correspondent to supply us with details of "St" Richard of Dundalk. He was a fourteenth-century Archbishop of Armagh who attacked the Friars and is said to have been poisoned by them. He died in Avignon, but was buried at Dundalk where his remains still lie in the parish church. In 1545 his then successor in the primatial see summoned a synod of the clergy and declared Richard a saint, naming 27 June as his day and duly arranging all the liturgical propers. It has been said that he is the only post-reformation saint in the Anglican communion. Against that it might be alleged that his recognition was never more than local. Even so there seems no reason why the precedent thus set should not be followed to-day. The infant church of New Guinea honours its martyrs and draws great strength from the commemoration. Other and older churches must have their own local worthies whom they would delight to honour. Perhaps if we made a start that way we might be led to a stage where we could name saints to be recognized by the whole Anglican communion. It is sometimes suggested that our party differences would make efforts at canonisation difficult. That might be a good thing. It would at least ensure a most careful scrutiny of any claims for the honour, and a little argument about the respective merits of our best and greatest men (and women) would be more edifying than some of the trifles over which we do argue. And what a splendid demonstration it would afford that the communion of saints is still a living and growing fellowship.

The Church Assembly is happily giving itself plenty of time to think over the report of its committee on central funds. Their proposals certainly need very careful appraisal. If the Church Assembly were a newly founded business, they would probably form an admirable basis for its organization. But it is much more difficult to reorganize an old-established business than to start a new one. It is not merely that vested interests have sprung up in all directions but that there has grown up a great deal of valuable experience which ought at almost any cost to be preserved. It is fatally easy to throw away the baby with the bath-water. Some measure of rationalization is certainly needed, but there is also need for considerable caution. How often in recent years has the Assembly been presented with reports of a highly idealistic character which would only be

practicable if one were starting with a clean slate and plenty of money. One remembers the reports on the theological colleges, on the conversion of England, on press and publications; and now this. The only occasion on which the Assembly was really drastic, so far as one remembers, in reliance on such reports was when it put an end to the missionary colleges. It is not only the overseas bishops who believe that in that solitary instance it was wrong. Quite likely, under the new proposals, the Assembly will be tempted to repeat that mistake in other directions. One instance that leaps to the mind is its propaganda. The Assembly has never been able to make up its mind whether it wants publicity or not. The general practice is to complain that it does not get enough and then to suggest cutting down the means of providing it. We must remember the age we live in. For good or evil, causes to-day are won or lost by propaganda. It would be an arguable thesis that it has always been so, but to-day we have been made keenly aware of the fact by the disastrous way in which Britain has lost through rival propaganda its position in the Middle East. We hope that, whatever reorganization takes place at Church House, it will lead to more, not less, attention being paid to the Church's publicity.

HISTORY AND RELIGION

A Reply to Dr P. Munz

T. A. ROBERTS

DR MUNZ'S interesting and lucid paper¹ on a topic whose importance—to judge from the increasing number of articles appearing on this subject—is being increasingly recognized deserves some comment. Dr Munz rightly stresses the need for a much more careful analysis of the claim, "Christianity is an historical religion", than it has received in the past; that this analysis should be based upon philosophical reflection, for no "kind of investigation of any known facts could shed any light on this problem"; and that such an analysis may lead to conclusions at variance with some statements and contentions of the Christian apologist. In what follows I wish to suggest two things. First that it is difficult to uphold his main conclusion as it stands, namely that "historical statements, including the verifiable historical statements about the life and death of Jesus are, as historical statements, of no consequence to religious belief".² Second, that while this main conclusion is valid if suitably modified and qualified, it has been derived from a misleading analysis of "historicity". I wish to suggest that a better analysis can be produced to support a modified form of Dr Munz's conclusion. I propose to deal first with the second point.

Dr Munz's analysis of the "meaning of history" rests on the view that historians must rely for their data on "reported fact", since "every fact we know of is always a reported fact (reported by myself or by someone else). . . . As soon as this is realized, it must follow that everything depends upon the attitude and aim of the reporter. If he is merely scientifically curious, he cannot tell us stories that are likely to become the fathers of our faith. If he has on the other hand adopted the attitude of faith he is himself in a state of faith when he perceives the events he is about to record."³

The criticism of this analysis lies in its suggestion that the criterion for the "facts" of history turns on the standpoint from which these facts have been reported, and not upon the truth of

the reported fact. Hence facts reported from a "scientific point of view" are accepted by the historian, whereas facts "perceived from the standpoint of faith" are not. Furthermore this criterion is ambiguously expressed. What is meant by the phrase, "seen from the standpoint of scientific curiosity" as used in the example which refers to the coronation of Charles I?⁴ Does "scientific" here mean careful, systematic, unbiased, or does it refer to the methods of the experimental sciences? Since there is a possibility that it is the latter which Dr Munz has in mind, and since further the experimental sciences enjoy (quite rightly) considerable prestige in our day, Dr Munz's distinction might be taken to cast discredit on "facts" which are outside the scope of scientific method. I do not want to suggest that Dr Munz intended this, but his statements are open to this disparaging interpretation. In any case it is doubtful whether his sharp distinction between the standpoint of faith and the standpoint of scientific curiosity is either useful or valid. This criticism must be supported by what I believe to be a sounder analysis of the meaning of "history" than the one put forward by Dr Munz. I propose merely to sketch the outlines of such an analysis since considerations of space clearly preclude a fuller and more adequate treatment. The starting point of this analysis must be the meaning of the word "history". It would be granted that in the common sense use of language there are three possible meanings.

I

There is first "history" to mean "all that happened in the past", where the word "history" is practically synonymous with the whole content of the past. Thus the Oxford Standard Dictionary gives this as one of the legitimate and recognized meanings of the word. Moreover in conversations, conducted at the commonsense level, phrases such as the following are by no means uncommon:

"There are secrets known only to history."

"History has never crushed the faith of the optimist."

In such sentences, the word "history" refers to the whole content of the past without specifying any particular period of the past. It is only necessary to ask the question: How can these statements be shown to be true or false? to realize that they do not refer to actual historical accounts which are verifiable. Historians do not hesitate to use "history" in this sense. Thus the distinguished historian, F. M. Powicke, maintains "history is the events themselves", and

sees "history" in this sense as a "lofty mountain, cold and stark" upon which the historian's mind plays like a gleam. When the gleam has gone, "history" is still there, and so naturally the historian "will know that his work is imperfect, his vision transient, and his goal still far away".⁵

There is one clear merit in supposing "history" to mean "everything that happened in the past". It certainly emphasizes the objectivity of history, or perhaps more strictly, the objectivity of the results of historical inquiry. Historians are rightly anxious to uphold their conviction that their work has objective reality. That is, with Professor G. C. Field, they wish to hold that "what happened in the past is absolutely independent of our thinking about it". Thus if "history" is identified with the whole content of the past, and if the task of the historian is to discover what that past is, his task is objective in the sense that he has to deal with material fashioned for him and not by him.

Whereas the meaning of "history" as "everything that has happened in the past" is admittedly used to buttress the historian's conviction of the objectivity of his work, this meaning may, paradoxically, lead to a thoroughgoing scepticism concerning the possibility of obtaining knowledge about the past. The argument runs something like this. The past can only be known through traces left for historians to discover and study. The available traces—or reported facts in Dr Munz's words—are extremely few relative to the vast amount of traces required if a full reconstruction of the past is to be at all possible. Because of this sheer lack of traces, it will ever remain impossible for the historian to reconstruct the past as it really happened. Not only is the historian unable to piece the jigsaw together because there are so many missing pieces, but even the pieces he does possess inadequately represent the past; and because of this, radically misrepresent it.

Clearly a similar scepticism would arise with regard to the claim that "Christianity is an historical religion" were the meaning of "historical" thus discussed given to the word in the foregoing phrase. For it may be argued, if the claims of the Christian religion are based on the "historical", then it follows that the specifically "historical" claims made for Christianity could not be vindicated since so little that happened in the past can definitely be established to have happened. All that one would be entitled to say would be: "Something obviously happened", but it would in practice be difficult to

specify to one's reasonable satisfaction what that "something" was and how it happened. And this would surely be the slenderest of grounds upon which to base the claims of any religion. A clear example of this type of scepticism is seen in Lowes Dickinson's *Religion, a Criticism and a Forecast*:

Those acquainted with the nature of historical enquiries, the uncertainty of testimony, the prejudice of witnesses, the doubtfulness of documents,—who have watched, in other religions than the Christian, the growth of myth and the creation of fictitious personalities, may easily assure themselves, without entering far into the laborious enquiry, that its results are bound to be in the highest degree tentative and uncertain, that scholars to the end of the chapter will continue to disagree and to dispute and that, in fact, there is not evidence sufficient in quality or in quantity to establish any unquestionable final truth. In an ordinary historical enquiry, this might be a matter of small moment, . . . But it is a very different matter when men are asked to stake their whole conception of life on the dubious result of enquiries so difficult. And a man who thinks about the issue at all, will, I believe, incline to set aside the whole controversy as irrelevant to whatever is really essential in religion, and seek elsewhere than in history, the basis on which to erect the fabric of his beliefs and conduct.⁶

Lowes Dickinson puts the position very clearly. The emphasis on "history" as "everything that happened in the past" leads, ironically, to a thoroughgoing scepticism concerning the possibilities of what can be achieved by the historian. The Christian apologist in claiming that "Christianity is an historical religion" would do well therefore to beware of using the word "historical" in the sense so far discussed; for in this sense, although designed to emphasize that Christian beliefs are somehow connected with the belief that certain events did occur, and that their occurrence is independent of thinking, here and now, that they did so occur, this Christian claim would invite the kind of scepticism which is evident in the thought of Lowes Dickinson.

Apart from the fact that historians themselves do not seem to share it, it is fortunately possible to show that such scepticism is entirely misplaced since it arises from a failure to realize that the phrase, "history is all that happened in the past", possesses certain logical characteristics which if not recognized lead us to expect answers to questions where no answers are possible; and this because of logical difficulties connected with the meaning of the

phrase. The failure to answer these questions is mistaken for a genuine failure, and hence scepticism about the possibility of historical knowledge arises. This logical characteristic is that in this phrase the word "everything" is logically unlimited. Thus in the sentence, "everything that happened between 1700 and 1800", it is impossible to specify what would count for the truth of this statement. This is due not only to the empirical difficulties involved in obtaining the kind of evidence which would satisfy the conditions of its truth, but also to the logical difficulty which arises from the fact that "everything" in this context is logically unlimited; for to any given description of what happened between 1700 and 1800 it is always logically correct to doubt whether that description covers *everything* that happened. Similarly with the phrase, "everything that happened in the past". However hard we try we could never (and this is a logical "could") discover "everything that happened". This logical impossibility has been mistaken for a practical difficulty, and this error lies at the root of the scepticism concerning the possibilities of historical knowledge. Since this phrase has its logical difficulty, it must be recognized that the meaning "everything that happened in the past" cannot be the most important meaning of "history".

2

Professor Galbraith once wrote that, "History is made by the historian".⁷ This statement is clearly not meaningless. What can "history" here mean? It would be agreed that it refers to the production of "accounts, written or spoken concerning the past of human beings". This is the more usual meaning of the word, as found in phrases such as "the professor of history", "Trevelyan's *Social History of England*". When these accounts are examined they are found invariably to refer to "sources" from which they have been compiled. In other words, the emphasis in this meaning is on what can be shown to be true about the past. The historian claims that his account is true because it is based upon reliable evidence which can, if need be, be shown to be sound. Thus in this sense of "historical" the claim that "x (a past or series of past events) is historical" becomes a claim that an account of x, based upon evidence whose reliability can be tested and vindicated, and upon inferences and judgements which are sound, can be produced. In other words, on this definition, the status of "history" relates to

(a) the possibility of devising and employing methods which can accurately assess the reliability of the traces bequeathed by the past, and (b) the possibility of making correct judgements and inferences on the basis of this evidence. For the present purpose, this distinction may be expressed by the terms, Historical Observation and Historical Interpretation.

It may be well to consider the characteristics of Historical Observation and Interpretation along the lines suggested by the distinguished historian, Marc Bloch, in his *The Historian's Craft*.⁸ Bloch points out that the primary task of historical observation is to establish the actuality of past events. For this the historian must start from historical information, that is, from the traces which the past has bequeathed. These traces may be as numerous as "the bones immured in Syrian fortifications, a word whose form or use reveals a custom, a narrative written by the witness of some scene, ancient or modern,—that is some perceptible mark to the senses which some phenomenon, in itself inaccessible, has left behind".⁹ Briefly three comments may be made here. First, the events of the past are never open to direct inspection. No modern historian has seen Napoleon "after the flesh". Secondly the data of the past are given. Some events have happened and left no trace whatsoever. "We shall never establish a statistical table of prices for the Merovingian epoch, for there are no documents which record these prices in sufficient number."¹⁰ Thus the historian must work with data bequeathed by the past—it is beyond his power to create them. Thirdly, as more varied data are examined, hitherto unknown techniques of investigation have been developed to deal with them. Thus there has arisen a kind of division of labour, in which different specialists deal with the various data bequeathed by the past, e.g. the specialist in pottery who looks for evidence of artistic achievement in the past. The ordinary historian, one who writes "The Reign of Queen Anne" or "The Rise of the Labour Party in England", relies on the assured conclusions established by such specialists.

But the ordinary historian is, in the first instance, particularly interested in the traces left by the past. These traces are mostly written documents, although inscriptions on coins, tombs, and so on, naturally fall within this category. They fall into two main groups: records written intentionally to record the past, and records not written specifically with that intention. The "intentional" records furnish the historian with invaluable data. In the first place

they are the only ones which furnish a chronological framework. Secondly, there exists a vast body of such records, whose authenticity no reasonable person would wish to question. Of course it is logically possible that someone, some malevolent demon, has produced these documents to deceive modern historians. If this were so, clearly all historical writing would be impossible. But the suggestion is so obviously absurd that no reasonable person is prepared to take it seriously. And it is reasonable enough for the historian to assume that royal court rolls, papal bulls, inscriptions on tombs, and so forth, are authentic data about the past. The few exceptions which upon examination prove to give false information about the past underline the truth that generally the authenticity of the vast majority of these records is self evident.

The second group, "non-intentional data", comprises records which were not written with the specific intention of informing posterity about the past. As a result of historical developments, the contemporary emphasis of historical research "has gradually been led to place more and more confidence in this second category of evidence, in the evidence of witnesses despite themselves. . . . We have only to compare the Roman history of Rollin or even that of Niebuhr with any of those short summaries read to-day. The former draw the heart of their matter from Livy, Suetonius, or Florus. The latter are constructed in large measure out of inscriptions, papyri, coins and so forth. Only in this way could whole sections of the past have been reconstructed. This is true of all pre-history, as well as of almost all economic history, and almost all history of social structures."¹¹ Bloch has some interesting general observations about this non-intentional data. First, this type of document is no less subject to falsehood than the intentional type of document. Business letters may be incorrect and false, but the falsehood is not deliberately designed to deceive posterity. Secondly the usefulness of this kind of data is not confined to filling in gaps in the narrative as constructed from intentional data. They help to correct the inevitable "prejudices, false inhibitions and myopias"¹² which plague the vision of the authors of the intentional document. Thirdly the variety of this kind of data is infinite. Everything said or written, everything made or touched which has survived from the past reveals something about the past. There is thus no one unique type of record which meets the demand for information about a specific past event. "On the contrary, the deeper the research, the more the

light of the evidence must converge from sources of many different kinds.”¹³

From these considerations we may conclude that the discovery of primary data, consisting of “intentional and non-intentional data”, forms a central part of Historical Observation. The next stage is to decide upon the authenticity or otherwise of the records. This must be obviously established because every witness cannot be taken at his word, manuscripts may be falsified as to date or authorship, and even physical traces may be faked.¹⁴ Again, some general observations may be made about this process. The first and most important is that scepticism on principle is self-defeating. To doubt all documents is to deny the possibility of historical knowledge. Secondly, the criticism of common sense is not alone sufficient to decide these problems. “Pretended common sense usually turns out to be nothing more than a compound of irrational postulates and hastily generalised experiences.”¹⁵ Looking at the world through contemporary eyes, common sense finds the attitudes of previous ages strange and odd, and tends to discredit what is no longer shared. Finally the elaboration of methods whereby documents could be systematically checked itself occurred at a particular point in time. “The year of the publication of the *De Re Diplomatica* (1681) marks the fact that the criticism of the documents of archives was definitely established.”¹⁶ These methods or techniques arose from the conviction that “rationally conducted, doubt can become an instrument of knowledge”.¹⁷ When well applied they aim at establishing conclusions where refutation is possible and easy, for the value of a science is proportionate to its willingness to make refutation easy. They seek to spot the degree (if any) of fraud, error, and deception in the records. There is no need to elaborate here on the variety of frauds and error which the historian is able to spot.

Once the discovery and reliability of records have been established, the historian is able to proceed to the next stage, Historical Interpretation and Explanation, that is, determining whether the events happened in the way described and explaining their causation. It is important to recognize the assumptions underlying historical interpretation. First comes the principle of noting “the similarity which vindicates and the differences which discredit”.¹⁸ As Bloch maintains, “in fact we can never verify a date, we can never verify and interpret a document except by inserting it into a chronological series or a synchronous whole. At the bottom of nearly

all criticism is the problem of comparison.”¹⁹ Thus the charter which claims to be of the twelfth century is written on paper whereas all the originals of that period hitherto recovered are on parchment; the language is quite different from that of the originals. Noting these and other differences, the historian concludes that the charter is later than it purports to be. This kind of decision is based upon the acknowledged fact, based upon much observation, that “with a single generation of the same society there prevails a similarity of custom and technique too strong to permit any person to deviate sensibly from the common practice”.²⁰ This principle of noting “the similarities which vindicate and the differences which discredit” arises from the limit to coincidence. In other words, “we estimate that the universe and society possess sufficient uniformity to exclude the possibility of overtly pronounced deviation. . . . This uniformity is confined to some very general characteristics. It includes . . . a number of possible combinations so nearly infinite that their spontaneous repetition is inconceivable.”²¹

Another factor in deciding whether an event did in fact happen is its degree of probability. The uncertainty exists not in the event itself (if it happened, it happened) but in the testimony of witnesses, and in the historian’s assessment of that testimony. Thus, in contradistinction to Dr Munz, “facts” are not complex. It is the description of “facts”, and the subsequent relations between different types of fact-stating propositions, which are complex. The question facing the historian is: Did what is reported happen? and not: From what standpoint is the “fact” reported? Judging an event’s probability is for the historian the attempt to decide whether in the period of the alleged event it could have happened. The impossible physical event is nothing but an event whose probability is infinitely small. In this realm, the historian cannot establish absolute, but only practical, certainties. Like other empirical disciplines, historical criticism attempts to assess probabilities, though it undoubtedly deals with a “more subtle gradation of degrees of probability”.²² Underlying this attempt, the historian’s major assumption is that the universe and society possess sufficient uniformity to exclude the possibility of overt deviation. Since this is the case, the historian accepts as his guide of what could have happened in the past modern scientific knowledge about the world. The growing body of scientific knowledge has contributed to the gradual evolution of the idea of the world governed by natural laws. The historian assumes

that these laws applied equally to bygone times, which allows him to sweep aside as fictitious marvels so many of the accounts of alleged events which the past has bequeathed. The steadiest and greatest minds of the past could not escape the common beliefs and prejudices of their time. What the ancients narrated about showers of blood Montaigne read and believed. That he sincerely believed there to have occurred showers of blood does not rescue this particular belief from the historian's inevitable verdict of it as preposterous.

This brings us to the final topic of historical interpretation. Historians, despite the attempt to elevate Ranke's motto—to describe things as they really happened—into a golden rule of historical methodology, are as much interested in the causation as the actuality of past events. Three brief comments on historical explanation may be admissible here. Unlike explanations in the experimental sciences, historical explanations are usually couched in ordinary, non-technical language. Like common-sense explanations, they are often content to allow the most constant and general antecedents of a causal explanation to remain implicit. The historian seeks "the most specific antecedent, the one which somehow represents the differentiating element in the compound of generative influences, which is accorded the name of cause".²³ What the historian will regard as the "most specific antecedent" will vary with the level of generality with which he is specifically concerned. Finally, the historian is asked to explain human behaviour, so that his explanations must be in terms of the inclinations, desires, ambitions, and so forth, of human beings. It is clearly at this point that subjective factors are most likely to appear—the historian's own upbringing and education, the age and civilization with their attendant values and standards to which he belongs—factors which some are tempted to think prevent historical writing from becoming anything but a purely personal impression and reaction to the records of the past.

To sum up: to say, in this second sense of "historical" that "x is historical" amounts to a claim that there exists evidence for x; methods of testing the reliability of that evidence; and by making certain assumptions, possibilities of interpreting that evidence.

3

There is yet another meaning of "history", expressed in such phrases as, "history has a meaning", "history everywhere reveals the hand of God at work". Such phrases express the conviction that when all historical (sense 2) knowledge is surveyed, some unifying factor running through it all like a thread is discernible. Such convictions are outlined at length in what have become nowadays slightly old-fashioned philosophies of history, associated with such names as those of Kant, Hegel, Marx, and in our own day, Toynbee. These have embarked upon the philosophical—or at least meta-historical—task of discovering the laws, movements, or trends or large patterns of regularities revealed when a synoptic view is taken of the results of historical inquiry. Such "interpretations" of history, far from being entirely divorced from historical writing, are dependent upon it. Some knowledge of "history" is essential before one can hope to produce an acceptable philosophy of history. Thus the Christian philosophy of history (sense 3) sees in the historical (sense 2) events of the Israelite people that progressive self-revelation of God which culminates in the Incarnation, an event, on this view, so tremendous in its significance that, as Dr Munz rightly maintains, it is seen to divide all history (sense 1) into a before and after the Incarnation. But it is of some material concern on this view, whether what are claimed to be the crucial events (e.g. Exodus, Exile) in the history of Israel did in fact take place, and this latter task belongs to the field of the (biblical) historian. On the other hand philosophies of history differ in one important regard from historical accounts in that they aim to provide the basis for predictions about the future course of "history". Thus, "the march of History is the march towards universal Progress". Frequently such predictions cannot be proved or disproved because they are expressed in such general terms and refer to very distant future events. Since no one is prepared to indicate a date for the "ultimate triumph of Universal Progress" (or for the Second Coming), it is always possible at any one time, however bleak and hopeless the prospect, to affirm that such an event is "just round the corner". The more specific the prediction, the easier its verification and refutation. Hence the refutation of Marx's prediction that the condition of the working classes in England would steadily deteriorate. Such refutation often becomes possible on the basis of the results of historical inquiry into the subsequent course of events. There are thus important relations

between historical accounts and the formulation of philosophies of history, though historical accounts cannot provide the complete basis for the acceptance or refutation of a particular philosophy of history.

4

In the light of the above discussion it is possible to return to the problem posed by Dr Munz, the analysis of the phrase, "Christianity is an historical religion". It should be clear that the answer is by no means simple and clear cut. It should also be clear that it is dangerous for the Christian apologist constantly to use this phrase without specifying what he means by it, or indeed without being quite clear what he should mean by it. Apart from the confusion and argument at cross purposes thus generated, it arouses the suspicion that he is attempting to justify the claims of the Christian religion by appealing to the authority of History, substituting perhaps that authority for the former authorities of Infallible Scripture and the Infallible Church. Dr Munz overstates his case by suggesting that there can be no such appeal to historical authority, but the subsequent application of the conclusions of the foregoing discussion will suggest that there is considerably less justification for this appeal than is frequently supposed.

To say in sense 1 of "historical" (that is, "something has happened, we know not what") "Christianity is an historical religion", would merely be to express a vague conviction that the Christian religion originated in time. This would be true but hardly remarkable since most, if not all, religions can claim an origin in time.

To say that "Christianity is an historical religion" in the more usual and more important sense 2 of "historical", would imply that the beliefs of Christianity are related in an important sense to the historical life of Jesus, and that further it is possible to produce an account of his life based upon evidence which, when subjected to the techniques and methods of historical criticism, can claim to be authentic. This, it would appear, is what Christians seem to wish to claim when they maintain that Christianity is essentially about something which happened "*sub Pontio Pilato*". It is precisely at this point that one must beware of overplaying the legitimate appeal to history in this sense which can be made at this point. Whether Christianity is an historical religion is a matter of degree, and it is essential to be able, as far as possible, to determine the precise

degree. The student of the historical records about the life of Jesus is aware that these records are not numerous. There is not in this case the abundance of intentional and non-intentional data available to the historian of the life of Napoleon. Indeed a moment's reflection shows how difficult it is to decide whether the Gospels fall into the intentional or non-intentional class. F. C. Burkitt²⁴ could say in 1906 that the author of St Mark deliberately set out to give a plain historical tale of the life of his Lord. Scholarly opinion is to-day less dogmatic on this point. There is a growing awareness that the Gospels may not have been designed to answer the "historical" questions which so intrigue our day and age. Be this as it may, in claiming that Christianity is an historical religion it is possible that the impression unwittingly conveyed is that the evidence for the life of Jesus is as abundant and as well authenticated as that available for the great figures of more recent historical times. Once however it is realized that whilst the concrete evidence for the life of Jesus is considerably greater than that available for the life of Ramses II (or many another figure of classical antiquity) it nevertheless falls far short of the super-abundance of supporting evidence for the life of Richelieu or Napoleon, the claim that "Christianity is an historical religion" begins to fall into proper perspective, and the degree of historical authority to which proper appeal may be made is not exaggerated.

Another implication of understanding the phrase with the more important meaning of "historical" in mind is this. Appeal is then being made directly or indirectly to evidence which can be shown to be valid according to the canons of historical criticism. There is however much in the N.T. accounts about Jesus which falls outside the proper scope of historical criticism. Dr Munz refers to these accounts as those of the "miraculous", which for him have been reported from the standpoint of faith, and not from that of scientific curiosity which would be incapable of producing such accounts. A valid criticism of his paper is that he assumes his readers know what he understands by this distinction. Another is his reference to historical facts as reported facts. This is true of intentional records, but as Bloch stresses, the historian makes important deductions of fact from (non-intentional) accounts which were never consciously written to convey the information the historian is able to extract from them. In any case, the standpoint from which facts are reported is in an important sense irrelevant.

What is vitally important is to be able to show that what is reported as fact is true. When a man known to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs reports seeing a flying saucer, the fact that he was at the time under the influence of alcohol or drugs is irrelevant if, upon further examination, evidence turns up to show that what he reports is truly reported. It is when such corroborating evidence fails to appear that we are justified in taking the man's condition as reasonable ground for treating his report sceptically. Thus when the N.T. accounts of the Resurrection are considered, the important question is not one about the standpoint—be it scientific or otherwise—from which they have been made, but one of establishing the truth of what is reported. And it is precisely at this point that the canons of historical criticism are inadequate to test the truth or otherwise of what is reported. Faced with medieval accounts of such phenomena as raining blood, the historian rejects them as fictitious inventions on general grounds of probability and on his major assumption that the universe of the past is consistent with the universe of his own experience. But it is just these assumptions which place the N.T. accounts of the Resurrection outside the jurisdiction of the historian, for *qua* historian he has no competence to judge their validity. For on Christian assumptions the historian is faced with the accounts of the unique Son of God, and since further, on these same assumptions, there has only appeared one such figure in history, the historian's sharpest critical tool—estimating the degree of probability—proves utterly useless. For the historian to be able to test the truth of Gospel Resurrection accounts there must have occurred more than one such Resurrection; for Christians, this is impossible.

The upshot of this seems to be this. The Gospel accounts of the "miraculous", of the Resurrection, are not "historical", if by "historical" is meant "capable of being shown to be true according to the canons of historical criticism". Yet in claiming that Christianity is an historical religion there is often the concealed suggestion that all the Gospel accounts can in principle successfully survive historical scrutiny, and hence the exaggerated, misleading, and misplaced appeal to the authority of history. This of course is not to say that the Resurrection accounts are "unhistorical", for this would imply that they have failed to pass the tests of historical criticism. The Christian is entitled to claim that these accounts are "historical", but he should give clear notice that he is using

historical in a very special sense. This is the force of the point expressed thus: "What the Apostles report is truly reported, and if their report does not conform to our experience, they are entitled to retort that it conforms to their experience."²⁵ This may indeed be true, but if this discussion is on the right lines, we must conclude that no techniques have yet been devised to verify this contention. Perhaps *Psychical Research* will develop such techniques; on the present analysis, historical criticism never will.

Finally, by the phrase, "Christianity is an historical religion", we may wish to draw attention to the Christian philosophy of history, expressed in some such statement as: "The Incarnation marks the great dividing point of all history." Since this latter statement refers to events which the future will unroll, it cannot be substantiated by merely appealing to historical knowledge. On the other hand there is in this statement a reference, however oblique, to past events. The belief that "Jesus was the Incarnate Son of God whose coming divided all history" is false if historical criticism can show that as a matter of fact no such person as Jesus existed. Moreover the Gospel accounts contain much which is capable, in principle, of standing judgement at the bar of historical criticism. Dr Munz rightly emphasizes that statements verified by historical criticism cannot "prove" the truth of the religious statement, "Jesus was the Son of God". Historical and religious statements are logically distinct. Yet it is clear that some historical statements are relevant to the truth of the religious statement, "Jesus was the Son of God". Hence Professor Manson and others are rightly alarmed at attempts to cut Christianity adrift from its historical roots.²⁶ It is true that such historical statements form only one of the many factors providing the grounds for the truth of religious statements. And it is possible that hitherto Christian apologists have tended to suggest that historical statements alone can provide the complete justification for assertions about the divinity of Jesus. But Dr Munz is equally in error in asserting that historical statements have no significance in assessing the truth of some religious statements.

¹ "History and Religion", *Church Quarterly Review*, No. 324, Vol. CLVII, pp. 297-308.

² *Ibid.*, p. 297.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 306.

⁵ F. M. Powicke, *History, Freedom and Religion*, p. 8.

⁶ G. Lowes Dickinson, *Religion, a Criticism and a Forecast*, pp. 37-8, quoted by H. G. Wood, *Belief and Unbelief since 1850*, Cambridge 1955, pp. 72-3.

⁷ V. H. Galbraith, *Why we Study History*, p. 131.

⁸ M. Bloch: *The Historian's Craft*, Manchester University Press, E.T. by Peter Putnam, 1954. Of this work Professor Asa Briggs of Leeds recently wrote: "One of the finest and most powerful little books on history as the twentieth century historian sees it is that written by Marc Bloch, the great French historian, during the Second World War. It has the modest title, *The Historian's Craft*". (*Universities Quarterly*, Vol. II, Nov. 1956, p. 63.)

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁴ For a recent case, cf. the Piltdown forgery.

¹⁵ Bloch, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 133.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 192. Cf. here Gardiner, *The Nature of Historical Explanation*, Oxford 1952, pp. 10-12.

²⁴ F. C. Burkitt, *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, T. & T. Clark 1906, pp. 102-3.

²⁵ Cf. Robert Leaney, "Mythology and the Incarnation", *Church Quarterly Review*, No. 318, Vol. CLVI, pp. 53-4.

²⁶ Cf. Munz's reference to Professor Manson, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

E. C. HOSKYNs : THE SUNDERLAND CURATE

J. O. COBHAM

IN THAT much publicized book by members of Westcott House, *The Historic Episcopate* (1954), Dr J. A. T. Robinson wrote (p. 13) that in the discussions of the forties, the question of South India was debated by Catholic and Evangelical alike almost entirely on the Anglo-Catholic priority. . . . In this rather depressing situation the most significant new factor has been the revival in biblical theology, of which in this field the Bishop of Durham's *The Gospel and the Catholic Church* was the harbinger. . . . Its most immediate and obvious consequence was to confound the Liberals. It convicted them of having pitched their doctrine alike of the Kingdom, the Church and the Ministry too low. The work of Sir Edwyn Hoskyns and his school was welcomed as grist to the Anglo-Catholic mill.

I have quoted from Dr Robinson's essay at sufficient length to make it quite clear that it is within a specific context that he describes Dr A. M. Ramsey's book as "the harbinger" of "the revival in biblical theology" and dismisses the work of Sir Edwyn Hoskyns as no more than "grist to the Anglo-Catholic mill", which I think we have to translate as "propaganda". The particular context within which these judgements are passed is the problem of the Church of South India and the doctrines of the Kingdom, the Church, and the Ministry. Dr Ramsey¹ is primarily a dogmatic theologian, whereas Sir Edwyn Hoskyns was almost exclusively a New Testament theologian. So much we may allow Dr Robinson. But the revival in biblical theology had to take place first of all within the field of New Testament studies before the implications of that revival could be applied to the field of doctrine. Dr Robinson has welcomed the application—as indeed it deserves to be welcomed. He has however done very much less than justice to Sir Edwyn Hoskyns' pioneer work in this country in the field of the theology of the New Testament.

¹ This article was written before Dr Ramsey's translation to York.

To begin with Dr Robinson has been guilty of confounding the generations. Sir Edwyn Hoskyns was lecturing in Cambridge on *The Theology and Ethics of the New Testament* when Dr A. M. Ramsey was still an undergraduate. Dr Ramsey attended those lectures. And, if Hoskyns always consciously wrote and spoke as a Catholic, his essay on "The Christ of the Synoptic Gospels", in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, which was published in 1926, was by no means simply "welcomed as grist to the Anglo-Catholic mill". That essay showed Hoskyns refusing to be limited by the appeal to religious experience so prominent in the essays of A. E. Taylor, A. E. J. Rawlinson and W. L. Knox, E. J. Bicknell, and W. Spens. It was not Hoskyns who wrote (p. 107):

The orthodox Church proved the truth of its teaching by its survival : the falsehood of rival forms of teaching was proved by their disappearance.

It was Hoskyns who wrote (p. 178):

The religion of the New Testament provides . . . a standard by which the Catholicism of succeeding generations must be tested, and which it must endeavour to maintain.

In that sentence is expressed the fundamental affirmation of the revival in biblical theology. The New Testament is not only the source of Catholicism but also its judge. Hoskyns was confident that Catholicism could face the most rigorous application of this test. And he was prepared to apply the test rigorously. That was where he diverged from the other contributors to *Essays Catholic and Critical*. For him the final court of appeal was always the theology of the New Testament. The discerning, and not least the other contributors to *Essays Catholic and Critical*, noted this divergence at the time. It was to become more marked later. *Mysterium Christi*, with Hoskyns' essay on "Jesus the Messiah", was published in 1930. *The Riddle of the New Testament*, written in collaboration with the Reverend F. N. Davey, was published in 1931. The translation of Barth's *Commentary on Romans* appeared in 1933. Hoskyns always wrote and spoke as a Catholic, but it would be hard to maintain that this translation "was welcomed as grist to the Anglo-Catholic mill"! The significance of that translation for the revival in biblical theology was, however, very great indeed. And Dr Ramsey's *The Gospel and the Catholic Church* was not published until 1936, the year before Hoskyns died. The book was significant as demonstrating an Evangelical Catholicism. It made clear to many who had been

disturbed by Hoskyns' apparent dual allegiance, the fundamental unity of thought that underlay this Evangelical Catholicism. And I have little doubt that Dr Ramsey's book made a deep impression on Dr Robinson, who entered Jesus College, Cambridge, as an Exhibitioner in 1938. In the history of the revival in biblical theology in this country *The Gospel and the Catholic Church* is indeed an important book. But it was not the harbinger of that revival. The pioneer work had already been done by Sir Edwyn Hoskyns.

But how did Hoskyns come to be the pioneer in this country of the revival in biblical theology? Canon Charles Smyth in his introduction to Hoskyns' *Cambridge Sermons* has written a very just account of Hoskyns' life and work. But Canon Smyth rightly concentrated on Hoskyns' work in Cambridge from 1919, when he became Dean of Chapel of Corpus Christi College, until his death in 1937. Canon Smyth certainly mentioned that Hoskyns had studied under Harnack in Berlin and that he had been curate at St Ignatius, Sunderland. But no one has so far attempted to investigate in any detail Hoskyns' early development, or to show how or when he reached the positions it was his life's work to expound.

It was to the title of St Ignatius, Hendon, Sunderland, or, as the church is more correctly named, St Ignatius, Bishopwearmouth, that Hoskyns was ordained in 1908.

This fine modern church had been consecrated by Bishop Lightfoot on 2 July 1889, the dedication being to St Ignatius of Antioch, a dedication prompted by Lightfoot's great work on *The Apostolic Fathers*. And Hoskyns remained on the staff of this parish until 1912, when he became Warden of the Church Hostel in the University of Sheffield.

There are still one or two members of the congregation of St Ignatius who remember Hoskyns when he was a curate there: and the present Bishop of Jarrow (the Right Reverend J. A. Ramsbotham) remembers how on Sunday evenings Clement Hoskyns would come out to his father's vicarage at New Seaham to sing Schubert and Wolf and Brahms—discoveries during the time in Germany—and to pick his father's brain on the contrast between Classical and New Testament Greek. The Bishop of Jarrow's father, the Reverend Alexander Ramsbotham (Exeter College, Oxford) had read Greats at Oxford, and was later one of the assistant editors of Dr H. J. White's edition of the Vulgate. Mr Ramsbotham had been ordained

in 1894 to the title of St Mary, Tyne Dock, and was Vicar of New Seaham from 1899 to 1912.

Amongst the papers that Hoskyns has left are some which belong to this period when he was curate of St Ignatius, Sunderland. Unfortunately he had not the habit of noting on his papers when or to whom he delivered them. The dating has therefore to be deduced from topical allusions in the papers themselves. The most important of these, a critique of George Tyrrell's *Christianity at the Cross Roads*, can be dated with considerable precision as having been written in 1910. George Tyrrell died in 1909, the proofs of *Christianity at the Cross Roads* being on his desk when he died. The book appeared in 1910. Hoskyns' paper opens :

Tyrrell's book is a book for the moment, not a book that will last; it springs out of the modern historical problems of to-day, it is a twig on a tree, not an independent growth.

This does not make the book less important; but it means that to understand the book, we must understand what has led up to it. The book could not have been written ten years ago, and, even had the writer lived, would not, I think, be written in ten years' time.

The task I have set myself in this paper is to try and place the book in its proper surroundings, and then emphasize Tyrrell's contribution, which is all his own.

Hoskyns' paper, then, is a paper on the book of the moment written shortly after its publication and the death of the author.

But there is a second way in which we can check the date of Hoskyns' paper. In the course of it he wrote :

Albert Schweitzer, a licentiate of Theology in the university of Strassburg, is now 35 years old.

Schweitzer was born in 1875, and would therefore have been 35 in 1910.

There is a second paper in German, addressed apparently to a German academic audience on the subject of *Die Oxforde Bewegung*—The Oxford Movement—which, despite its remarkable maturity of address and judgement, bears all the marks of having been delivered at about the same time.

In *Cambridge Sermons*, p. ix, Canon Smyth says that "at a later period he had the honour of lecturing before the University of Tübingen". Canon Smyth had clearly read the lecture on the Oxford Movement, for he uses some of its autobiographical material in his introduction. I think that he assumed that this was the Tübingen

lecture. But, while I am unable to give a precise date or occasion for the lecture on the Oxford Movement, I am of the opinion that it was delivered in Germany before the 1914-18 war, and while Hoskyns was on the staff of the parish of St Ignatius, Sunderland.

My reasons for this judgement are as follows.

First, Hoskyns begins his lecture from the assumption that both he and his audience desire a true friendship between Germany and England. It would be as natural to express that desire in 1930 as in 1910 or 1911. But I think that in 1930 there would have been some allusion to the fact that Germany and England had fought each other in a great war. The expression of the desire for friendship shows that friendship between the two countries was precarious. But I do not think that they had actually fought when this paper was read.

Secondly, in this same opening to the lecture, Hoskyns gives a list of German theologians to whom the clergy of the Church of England were indebted, and this list concludes: "And last, and in my opinion at the present time the most important of all, Albert Schweitzer." In other words, the theological situation is the same as when the paper on George Tyrrell's book *Christianity at the Cross Roads* was written. Schweitzer was the last great German theologian to have spoken. It was the situation in 1910 or 1911.

Thirdly, Hoskyns gives, as an illustration of the influence of the Oxford Movement on what was done in English parish churches, the hours of the services "in the church in which I serve." The present incumbent of St Ignatius, Sunderland, has not been able to produce parish magazines or service books of the period 1910-11 which would show whether the services in St Ignatius were precisely as Hoskyns states. But I do not think Hoskyns could have used the precise phrase "in the church in which I serve" either when he was Warden of the Church Hostel in the University of Sheffield or later when he was Dean of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. I conclude therefore that this paper must have been written while Hoskyns was on the staff of St Ignatius, Sunderland, and therefore not later than 1912.

Fourthly, this lecture comes from a large envelope which contains papers that appear to belong to his Sunderland period—papers on (1) *Bach's Cantatas*; (2) *Comparative Religion, its scope and use*; (3) *The Bible—Bibliography with short introduction*; (4) *Ascension Day sermon—The Kingship of the Ascended Christ*; (5) *Genesis 1*

and Inspiration; (6) *The Worship of Heaven*—Rev. 4 and 5. But in the same envelope there is also a group of addresses all written on the same kind of paper—thin loose-leaf with rounded corners 8" × 6½". On this kind of paper has been written (a) *Die Oxforde Bewegung*; (b) *Christianity at the Crossroads*; (c) *Ezekiel*; (d) *God and Caesar*—notes of sermon on Gospel for Trinity XXIII; (e) *Eschatology of Paul*; (f) *Finance Scheme for Parish*; (g) *Church Institutes*. The comment of the present vicar of St Ignatius (the Reverend G. H. Marshall) on the last of these, the paper on *Church Institutes*,¹ was: "That sounds like St Ignatius, Sunderland."

I do not suggest that this evidence is conclusive as to date: but I do suggest that the case for the paper *Die Oxforde Bewegung* having been given while Hoskyns was on the staff of St Ignatius rests upon evidence that accumulatively constitutes a high degree of probability.

We come now to the lectures themselves. Dr Robinson wrote: "The work of Sir Edwyn Hoskyns and his school was welcomed as grist to the Anglo-Catholic mill." What do these two papers tell us, first of the young Hoskyns' attitude to Anglo-Catholicism, and secondly of his attitude to Biblical theology?

The two papers were, we have argued, written at about the same time. It is possible that the critique of Tyrrell was written first. But the lecture on the Oxford Movement deals more directly with the Tractarian tradition, and for this reason I propose to consider it first.

Some of us, when lecturing to a German audience, find it convenient to write our lecture in English, and then have it translated into German. Hoskyns' lecture does not seem to have been prepared in this way. It bears all the marks of having been composed in German. Some of the corrections are due to a questing for the right word or the right idiom—but not many. Most of the corrections are, like the corrections in the MSS. of his later sermons, concerned mainly with what he would say rather than how he would say it.

And it is interesting to note how the young Sunderland curate sought to secure the ear of his German audience. The period, let us remember, was before the 1914-18 war. He opened:

¹ Particularly the sentence: "Nor are we ordained to fill up places in the football team when they are short because one of the team wants to watch Sunderland play."

A genuine friendship exists only where there is a mutual giving. This is the case, not only in the relations between individuals, but also in the relations between nation and nation.

We wish to see a genuine friendship between Germany and England. First then we must learn to understand each other in every field, in the field of politics, of industry, of literature and so on: but especially in the field of religion . . .

We clergy of the Anglican Church are overwhelmingly in debt to German scholars. It is not that we agree in all cases with the results of their research, but that their thoroughness, their zeal, and the deep genuine religion that finds expression in their books, have exercised a powerful influence upon us. I think of men like Wellhausen, Holtzmann, Wernle, Harnack, of Rade and the contributors to *Die Christliche Welt*, and last, and in my opinion at the present time the most important of all, Albert Schweitzer. From them one learns to stand on one's own feet. From them one gains an independence of thought. For that we thank them.

Two points here emerge. Most of the theologians Hoskyns named were New Testament, or at least Biblical, theologians. And secondly, in both these papers Hoskyns stresses the fact that it was in Germany that he learnt independence of judgement. It was to that independence of judgement, rather than to his technical scholarship—though his technical scholarship certainly should not be underestimated—that he owed the place he was later to take in English theology. He continued:

But on the other side, when we read about the Church in Germany, we always have the feeling that we for our part have something to give to German Christianity. For criticism, for philosophy, for independent thinking, one must travel to Germany.

Hoskyns was later to encourage many of his pupils—Charles Smyth, Christopher Evans, Richard Gutteridge, Reginald Fuller, myself, and others—to spend a year in a German University—Marburg or Tübingen—after taking their tripos. He was convinced that there they would receive a stimulus that Cambridge could not give. He also desired that they should be able to read German theological literature. If we are to write of "Sir Edwyn Hoskyns and his school" it is important to recognize how far openness to the impact of German theological work and personal contact with German theologians was one of the characteristics of this school. Hoskyns did not tie his pupils to himself. Rather he sent them out to undergo the experience he had undergone. To those who went, it is interest-

ing to discover at how early a date he expressed his conviction of the value of this experience.

In his lecture he continued :

But he who would gain a sense for the Church—he rather remains in England.

Implicit in this is the conviction that the New Testament implies the Church, and that the work of German theologians was impaired because they did not sufficiently write out of the context of a rich Church life, in which the sacraments took a place that corresponded to their place in the New Testament itself.

After this introduction Hoskyns proceeded to show how little effort had been made by German theologians or historians to understand the Church of England. For them it was the State Church, or one of the Protestant sects, or a feeble imitation of Rome. Then he said :

Personally I am convinced that in the Oxford Movement lies the key to the understanding of our Church.

The rest of the lecture is an elaboration of this point. And Hoskyns did this, first by giving a brilliant outline sketch of the history of the Oxford Movement, and secondly by showing how profoundly the Oxford Movement had influenced the whole life and outlook of the Church of England.

Hoskyns began his outline sketch by showing how, in the post-Napoleonic period, the Church of England was threatened by the rise of modern Liberalism, the Parliamentary Liberalism of 1832 that was prepared to suppress seven Irish bishoprics and itself to revise the Book of Common Prayer. Against this threat the conservative High Churchmen, the Evangelicals, and the Liberal Churchmen were all in different ways equally impotent. Three or four Oxford dons, by means of Tracts, reminded the clergy that the Church of England was not a creation of the State, that the contemporary Church was continuous with the Church of the Apostles, that they themselves stood in an Apostolic Succession, that they had been ordained as priests.

In his second section Hoskyns showed the consequences of the Oxford Movement. It had changed our churches from auditoriums for a preacher into houses of prayer. It had recovered Holy Communion as the centre of the religious life of the Church. It had, as a later development, introduced ritualism as a useful means

towards the winning of the common people. It had given us open churches, instead of churches that were locked from one Sunday to the next. It had put the clergy under discipline. It had recovered the observance of the Church's Year. It had introduced Gothic architecture. Without separating Church and State, it had ensured the independence of the Church from the State.

In thus listing the consequences of the Oxford Movement for the life of the Church of England, Hoskyns was incidentally revealing what the Evangelical Churches in Germany, as they existed before 1914, lacked. They had had no Oxford Movement. Here was something that the Church of England had to give them, if only they were open to receive it. But he did not make this point explicitly. It was enough to show what the Oxford Movement had done for the Church of England.

But, for our understanding of Hoskyn's position in 1910, two points stand out clearly from this lecture. In the first place, he knew that he stood in the tradition of the Tractarians. In the second place, he regarded Liberalism as the enemy. It might be that the Church was no longer threatened by Liberalism as a political pressure from without: but Liberalism was even more dangerous as a subtle and all-pervading undermining of belief and proclamation from within.

I turn now to Hoskyns' second paper, the critique of George Tyrrell's *Christianity at the Cross Roads*. I have already quoted the first three paragraphs of this paper. A little later Hoskyns wrote:

The two typical books which represent the struggle going on in Germany are Harnack's *What is Christianity?* and Schweitzer's *The Quest for the Historic Jesus*.

I want to show that Tyrrell has used the latter to demolish the former and then on the ruins has raised an apology for Catholicism. Hoskyns' account of Harnack opens with a vivid eye-witness account of the great scholar.

Harnack, Professor of Church History in the university of Berlin, descended from his research work in 1899 and did what was then a new thing for a German professor of his standing—addressed the lay people—in a series of lectures with the title "What is Christianity?" The great lecture room in the university was packed from end to end. He was listened to with almost breathless excitement, such was his grasp of his subject, his power of speech (so rare in a German Theologian) and his own quiet suppressed enthusiasm. The lectures

were published and have influenced almost the whole Christian world directly or indirectly.

This book is valuable because the form of Christianity which it represents and describes has practically captured the Lutheran church, and is making fast progress in our own country, where it often sails however under more orthodox colours than it does in Germany.

The book is not an apology for Christianity. Harnack claims not to be writing to defend. Still less is he a philosopher. He is writing purely as a historian. He has set himself the task of finding the historic Jesus, what he was and what he taught. Harnack claims to have found him.

There would seem to be little point at this late date in quoting at any length Hoskyns' analysis of Harnack's book. And yet that analysis is interesting because we here find Hoskyns adopting in this paper of 1910 a technique he was later to use with great effect in his essay on "The Christ of the Synoptic Gospels" in *Essays Catholic and Critical*. Here is a first draft of what was to become his famous statement of "The Liberal Protestant Solution" in that essay.

And for that reason a few quotations may perhaps be permitted. Hoskyns wrote :

As shortly as possible then, what is the Gospel according to Harnack? It centres round three things—The Kingdom—The Fatherhood of God—and the true righteousness.

The Kingdom—is the rule of God in the soul of the individual. Where that rule is—there is the kingdom. Religion is God and the individual soul—the kingdom of God is within you . . .

The second great feature in the Gospel is the "Fatherhood of God". He taught men, as no one else before him, to say "my Father" to God, and then if God is the Father all men must be his sons. . . .

Then the third point—*the true righteousness*—which as our Lord teaches lies not in actions, not in works or anything external, but in the motive which lies behind, and the only *true* motive is love. Love is the basis of all Ethics. . . .

The Gospel then becomes with Harnack—Love of God : Love of your neighbour; and where that is there is the Kingdom.

From this basis he goes on to show that the Gospel is non-political, is truly socialistic in that it emphasizes the value of every individual in God's eyes, but it is not politically socialistic: it is never revolutionary. . . .

And then—on this point we must lay emphasis—in a comparatively short chapter Harnack discusses the relation of the person of Jesus to his own Gospel. He is the supreme prophet who taught

with authority. He lived the life and must always remain the great example character. . . .

Harnack can separate the person of our Lord from the Gospel. He can talk about the Gospel and the person of Christ.

With this definition and conception of the Gospel Harnack turns to History, and finds almost at once this pure Gospel is perverted everywhere. As soon as he begins to study church history he finds a "growing catholicism" springing up everywhere, centering round sacraments, a priesthood with superhuman powers, a visible church, and in the centre of all the person of Christ, ascended, sitting on the right hand of power and himself—God.

This catholicism grows worse and worse as the centuries go on. But such is the power of the Gospel that even in spite of this mass of thistles which grow up round it, it managed to shine through. It nearly failed however just before the Reformation. Luther saved it: and since his day it has shone clearer and clearer, till now at last we have got back to the historic Jesus, and see him as he was unspoilt by catholicism—rescued by the liberal protestant critical school of modern Germany.

At this point Hoskyns, the Sunderland curate, puts a question that is in fact the central question of his later book *The Riddle of the New Testament*. Hoskyns wrote:

There we have reached the problem which the liberal church historian has to solve. How was it that in the 1st century Christianity took the form it did?

The liberal school in Germany have explained it in various ways: The Church's christology is due to the influence of Greek philosophy coming from Alexandria—so said the old school under Ferdinand Christian Bauer. It is due to the deliberate action of the early Christians at Jerusalem: Christianity as we know it was made by the apostles and their friends—so said Wrede. Or it was St Paul: he was the founder of catholicized Christianity—this is held by a large section of German professors. Or—and this is perhaps the latest—it was the influence of the surrounding eastern religions with their sacramentalism and their priests and their ideas of an incarnation.

The interesting thing to notice is that the critics are being forced back and back till they have to grant that the pure gospel became catholicized very much earlier than critics had thought, and Bousset now tells us that the change took place between the death of Jesus and the first appearance of St Paul as a Christian.

The truth however is that this problem they absolutely fail to solve. Harnack is honest enough to own it. In his little book on the Acts of the Apostles there occurs this extraordinary passage. He is talking

about the differences in the accounts of the Ascension given in St Luke's Gospel and that given in the Acts, the account in the Acts being much fuller. Here, he says, we seem to see legend in the making. The first account in the Gospel is quite simple. In the Acts however the exact number of days is mentioned, angels appear and a conversation is recorded. And then he adds: "The problem of the two accounts of the Ascension is however nothing compared with the St Mark problem—that is how in the early Church, during the first thirty years, there grew up the legendary account of Christ himself under the very eyes of the eyewitnesses who had lived with him."

Harnack and the rest of his school cannot explain how their Gospel of the love of God and your neighbour preached by a great prophet became a sacramental mystical religion centering round their prophet as God.

They claim to be church historians. They hold fast to their conception of the Gospel and yet leave this revolution in church history absolutely unexplained, and they own it. They will talk still about "growing catholicism" without giving the vaguest explanation how or why it should grow. This glaring defect in the Liberal Protestant position could not long be left unattacked.

I have quoted this long passage in full because it is exceedingly interesting to see Hoskyns already in 1910 stating the problem he was to re-state in "The Christ of the Synoptic Gospels" and particularly in *The Riddle of the New Testament* (1st ed., p. 14):

There is a riddle in the New Testament. . . . The riddle is a theological riddle, which is insoluble apart from the solution of an historical problem. What was the relation of Jesus of Nazareth and the Primitive Christian Church? That is the riddle.

But in the 1910 paper, before he went on to speak of the attack on the defect in the Liberal Protestant position, Hoskyns paused to pay a tribute to Harnack.

For a whole year I sat under him at Berlin, and owe more to him than perhaps to anyone else. Never before had one realised the greatness of our Lord's character than when Harnack talked of him. No one could speak of our Lord with more reverence and personal devotion than he did.

And again, Harnack taught one to try and think things out for oneself. Cambridge never taught one that.

Harnack was never a scoffer. There was in him no touch of blasphemy: and one will always go back to his "What is Christianity?" with the greatest possible pleasure for it is a wonderful book.

I turn now to Hoskyns' account of the attack on the Liberal Protestant position. Hoskyns wrote :

The attack on the Liberal Protestant position was bound to come. A preliminary alarm was given by Johannes Weiss' book, "The preaching of Jesus about the Kingdom of God", but since that Weiss has slipped back and joined the rest of the liberals : and the field was left open. And Schweitzer has stepped into his place.

There follows a brief biography of Schweitzer to date—"He is now 35 years old." Then Hoskyns wrote of Schweitzer :

Profoundly dissatisfied with the results of liberal criticism, he saw that the error lay, not in their inability to explain the rise of Catholicism, but in their inability to define what the Gospel was, and it is against Harnack's so called "Gospel" that he levels his attack, and founds the eschatological apocalyptic school in opposition to the liberal historical critical school.

There follows an account of Schweitzer's position which there is no point in repeating. Then Hoskyns continued :

It seems to me that the articles which have appeared in the Guardian and elsewhere against Schweitzer have missed his real point. They never get beyond the apocalyptic side. But the real value of his book is his throwing back the sacramentalism and christology of the early Church on to our Lord himself. He shows that our Lord is really the founder of Christianity—not the apostles, or St Paul, or Alexandrian philosophy or anything else.

The early Church did never fall from a pure Gospel of love of God and love of your neighbour, because that was never the Gospel. The Gospel was a heavenly kingdom and our Lord as he who was coming as king and judge. Hence St Peter does not preach a mere religious morality, but Christ ascended and ruling, and also the nearness of the end, and in doing this he was no innovator, but he carried on the teaching of Jesus.

Here Hoskyns simply states the position it was his later work to elaborate. But Hoskyns was not just an apologist. He was a New Testament theologian. By 1910 he had arrived at the conviction that this was what the faith of the New Testament truly involved. In his 1910 paper, however, Hoskyns continued :

Before going on and leaving Schweitzer, I must exculpate him from any wish to defend Catholicism. In his book he is purely a critic. He is an absolute free lance. He hates Catholicism. He told me he wanted to send the young German theological students as missionaries to Austria and Belgium to counteract the influence of Rome, instead of

their remaining in Germany and hoping to become part of the vast herd of German professors (for every German student wants to be a professor).

But it is his personal unorthodoxy which makes him so important. Were he an apologist his book would be worthless; but he is merely a critic.

It was only after this lengthy introduction that Hoskyns reached the subject of his paper, George Tyrrell's *Christianity at the Cross Roads*.

Tyrrell saw perfectly clearly that here in this eschatological school of criticism lay the defence of catholicism—that is of historic Christianity (for Tyrrell's Catholicism is certainly not Roman).

Tyrrell unlike Schweitzer and Harnack is no critic, but an apologist. He is writing to defend Catholicism against Harnack and his friends and he sees that Schweitzer has given him the key, and so he proceeds against Harnack on exactly the lines of "What is Christianity?" He first asks, What was the Gospel? and then goes on to see how that Gospel has been preserved in History.

His definition of the Gospel he takes almost word for word from Schweitzer. . . . I need not repeat it all.

Now comes Tyrrell's conclusion to it all which is his own: If this was the Gospel, if this was the historic Jesus, then in history the Gospel is only preserved intact in Catholicism and Catholicism = Christianity—precisely the opposite conclusion to that which Harnack arrived at.

And, after expanding this, Hoskyns concluded:

If this paper has done anything to explain the circumstances under which Tyrrell wrote his book, it will not have failed in its object. Tyrrell's book seems to me meaningless unless we know the enemy he is attacking and also unless we realise whence he got the weapons he uses.

It is a fault in Tyrrell's book that he has never acknowledged Schweitzer by name for he owes everything to him.

So, with a brief mention of aspects of Tyrrell's book with which he does not feel competent to deal, Hoskyns ends his paper.

The importance of these two papers of Hoskyns depends almost entirely upon the date when they were written. If I am right in dating them both about 1910 they show Hoskyns, two years after his ordination to the diaconate, singularly mature as a theologian. He knew Harnack and Schweitzer and other German theologians personally. He understood how the Germans thought. But he was

not simply a disciple. He had very little use for the mere apologist. His admiration was for New Testament critics, on the condition that they were consistent in their criticism. Most important of all, he had already detected the Achilles' heel of Liberal Protestantism.

It was these qualities that so well fitted him to become Dean of Chapel of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, in 1919. The popular theology of the day was Liberal Protestantism. It dominated the Faculty of Divinity through the personal influence of the Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, Dr Bethune Baker. It profoundly influenced the undergraduate through the Student Christian Movement, whose Press had just published Dr T. R. Glover's *Jesus of History*—a book that was being read in every Study Circle. Against all this Hoskyns stood out. In one of his sermons in the Chapel of Corpus Christi College, he said (*Cambridge Sermons*, pp. 34-5):

The Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity recently defined the immediate task of Christian theology to be the re-expression of Christian faith in terms of evolution. I would venture to suggest that the task of the Christian theologian is rather to preserve the Christian doctrine of God from the corrupting influence of the dogma of evolution, at least as that doctrine is popularly understood.

In addressing undergraduates—most of whom would remain laymen all their lives—he was very conscious of his own responsibility as a theologian (*Cambridge Sermons*, p. 114):

The interpretation of the Bible and of Christian doctrine is largely a technical matter, and you [that is, you laymen] are very much dependent upon those who have devoted their lives to such subjects. Indeed, for this very reason among others, you require a technically trained clergy.

In all this Hoskyns received the support of a College of which Sir Will Spens was first Tutor and then Master. While other scholars contributed to the volume, *Essays Catholic and Critical* was to some extent planned as a manifesto of the Corpus school. It was planned to do for the post 1914-18 war world what *Lux Mundi* had done for an earlier generation. Its apologia for Catholicism was to owe not a little to George Tyrrell and the Modernists in the Roman Church.

The two early papers we have considered provide ample reason why Hoskyns should fit happily into this plan. And so he did up to a point. Yet his essay on the "Christ of the Synoptic Gospels" was no longer finding the final authority in the validity of religious experience. Later came the influence of Karl Barth. Later still came

that of Kittel and the *Wörterbuch*. Hoskyns' integrity as a New Testament scholar made it impossible for him to be simply an apologist. He went his own way even amongst his friends : and some of them distrusted the direction in which he was moving. He was in fact discovering biblical theology. He remained convinced that the theology of the New Testament inevitably issued in Catholicism. But he also held that Catholicism stood under the judgement of the theology of the New Testament. That theology had the right and the duty to say what were and what were not valid developments of Catholicism. A Catholic Modernism that acknowledged only the religious experience of the Catholic Church acknowledged no such discipline. So Hoskyns found himself theologically isolated even amongst his friends. It was his pupils who saw whither he was going and followed. Yet even they often had the experience of finding that by the time they understood what Hoskyns was working at, he had already moved on to a new problem.

I have written this because Dr Robinson's sentence, "The work of Sir Edwyn Hoskyns and his school was welcomed as grist to the Anglo-Catholic mill", shows a singular lack of understanding of what really happened. But then Dr Robinson did not go up to Jesus College until the year after Sir Edwyn Hoskyns died.

In a second article I propose to show, by quotations from a course of sermons on the XXXIX Articles, delivered while he was Dean of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, how deep was his understanding of the doctrinal standards of the Church of England, as represented by the not always fully appreciated XXXIX Articles.

THE RESURRECTION BODY

P. HADFIELD

ISA. 26. 19 represents the earliest Old Testament reference to a belief in the resurrection. The date of the passage is probably about 334 B.C. The writer depicts the city which was to be built, and describes the righteous dead as its inhabitants (26. 1f.). This theory is incomplete in that the dead dwell in Sheol until the coming of the Messianic Kingdom. Citizenship will be limited to the faithful because they have communion with God. This means that the doctrine only allows for the resurrection of the righteous.

Another source of the conception of the resurrection is found in Ezek. 37. Ezekiel describes the restoration of the nation; but an essential condition of this will be the fitness of each individual. They will be restored in order to become God's people and to obey his commands. This will enable God to dwell among them. Both in Isa. 26 and Ezek. 37 there is the idea of a resurrection of the righteous dead to a community of God's people whose members will have communion with God.

In Dan. 12. 2 a further development has taken place in the doctrine of the resurrection. In Isaiah it was a privilege limited to the righteous; whereas Daniel teaches that it includes both the righteous and the wicked. This suggests that a considerable time had elapsed since Isaiah's teaching, because according to his view the purpose of the resurrection was to restore the righteous to enable them to become members of the Messianic Kingdom. In Daniel this idea has completely disappeared. We are now confronted with a theory of the resurrection as being a means of reviving the dead, whether good or evil, in bodily form for judgement in God's presence. Daniel appears to have accepted the older belief in Sheol as the abode of the departed. This place, however, was beyond the territory over which Jehovah had control (Isa. 38. 18). Hence, in order to reward the righteous and punish the wicked they must be restored to earth where Jehovah governs.

The writer of Enoch 83—90 made a departure from the older view of the Messianic Kingdom as established on the earth. In his opinion

this world was not a suitable place for the eternal kingdom. Nothing material was fitting. God, who was coming to dwell among his people, was worthy of something much better. His eternal kingdom could only be in some spiritual sphere. Hence, the writer fixed his attention on a heavenly Jerusalem, which would be the spiritual counterpart of the earthly City; but only the righteous would be raised for citizenship.

According to the writer of *Enoch* 1—36, who wrote about 150 B.C., there would be a resurrection of the righteous and the wicked; but for the wicked it would take place simply so that they could be transferred from Sheol to Gehenna for everlasting punishment (22. 13). This implies that the wicked will remain disembodied spirits at the resurrection. The righteous, however, will rise with their bodies and will enjoy patriarchal lives on a purified earth with Jerusalem as its centre (25. 4-7).

Enoch chapters 91 to 104 were written between 104 and 95 B.C. Previous writers had taught that the resurrection would take place at the advent of the Messianic Kingdom. All, except the writer of *Enoch* 83—90, had maintained that it would be an everlasting kingdom on earth. In chapters 91 to 104, however, the Messianic Kingdom is regarded as being of temporary duration, and the resurrection is placed at its close. The righteous rise to a heavenly life, and as they enter heaven they are assured "that all goodness and joy and glory are prepared for them". Moreover, they are told that they will be rewarded for their labours (1. 12-17, 103. 3), and will share in a life of bliss with the angels (104. 4).

The Psalms of Solomon (70 to 40 B.C.) teach that the dead will rise at the end of the Messianic Kingdom, which will be of a temporary duration. In 3. 16 we read: "They that fear the Lord shall arise unto life eternal." There is, however, no mention of a bodily resurrection.

The theory of the resurrection taught in 2 Maccabees (60 B.C.) is similar to that which was prevalent in the second century B.C. The righteous were to be raised bodily to an eternal life on earth.

This theory had been abandoned by the other writers of the first century B.C., and two more developed views were widely accepted. The righteous will rise either direct to heaven or to partake of a life in an eternal kingdom of a new heaven and a new earth. Thus, the older conception of a material body was no longer necessary. Two different ideas were adopted to replace this. One view was that there

was no bodily resurrection, but only that of the spirit. This teaching is found in Enoch 91—104, and in the Psalms of Solomon. The second theory was that the righteous would be given a spiritual body. In the book of Enoch this body is described as a garment of light and of glory (62. 15f.).

The teaching on the resurrection in the Apocalypse of Baruch is of great interest. It is given in detail in answer to a question put to God by Baruch: "In what shape will these live in thy day?" (4. 2). In answering this question God makes it quite clear to Baruch that the dead will be raised to life. Moreover, they will rise in possession of their respective distinguishing characteristics or deformities by which their friends will be able to recognize them again (50. 2-4). When they have been restored to their friends the risen dead will be transformed and adapted to a spiritual existence (51. 3-10).

Baruch chapters 50 and 51, which are quoted at the end of this article, represent the source from which many Jewish and Christian conceptions of the resurrection were developed, and in some cases they were grossly perverted. We have an example of this in the Talmud, Sanhedrin 90b, where it states that at the resurrection the dead will be raised in the same clothes in which they were buried.

The teaching in the book of Baruch closely resembles the Iranian conception of the resurrection as expounded in the Bundahish¹. This book gives a detailed account of the doctrine. It teaches that it will be the work of the Saoshyant to raise the dead to life (30. 4). This statement is immediately followed by the question: "What will be the nature of the resurrection body?" After death the physical body resolves itself into the elements from which it was composed. The problem for the Mazdean, as for all who accept the view of the resurrection of the material body, was how could a man possibly have his physical body restored to him when it had completely disintegrated?

The writer of the Bundahish answers this by telling the believer to examine his own material body. He must pause to consider the mystery and miracle of conception, birth, and growth of the human body. He must meditate upon the superhuman intelligence required to produce sight, hearing, and the marvellous members of the human body. The writer reminds them that Ahura Mazdan, the Creator, had a much more difficult task in hand to produce these wonders from nothing than to restore what had already existed. The writer, aware that the body would disintegrate in the grave and return to

its constituent elements, nevertheless avers that Ahura will collect the material particles and from them form the resurrection body (30. 5f.).

Having answered this question the author describes the resurrection itself. Everybody will participate in the resurrection; both the righteous and the wicked (30. 7f.). The risen body will not be subject to old age or infirmity. None will be deformed or without faculties; but all will continue to advance from glory to glory for ever (30. 26).

The accounts of the resurrection in the Apocalypse of Baruch and the Bundahish bear striking resemblances to each other. They both stress similar features, and in each account the sequence of events is the same. In each narrative there is: (a) the question of the nature of the resurrection body; (b) some idea of the preservation of an essential element of the body in the earth; (c) the body raised will be identical with the material body; (d) men will have no difficulty in recognizing their friends and loved ones; (e) the righteous will be rewarded with the joys of heaven and pass from glory to glory; (f) and, as a special characteristic in both accounts it is taught that the laws of this material world no longer exist for the righteous, for "time shall no longer age them"; (g) the wicked, however, will be punished. As the Persian and Jewish books both bring out the features numerated above in the same order there seems to be only one explanation for it. The accounts must either be from a common source or else one is dependent upon the other.

There are only a few references to the resurrection in the Gospels. The reason for this may be due to three factors. First, the Jews already had a wide knowledge of the subject from the apocalyptic writers, and there existed several popular conceptions. Secondly, our Lord's resurrection profoundly influenced his followers, and their teaching and interest tended to centre on the fact. Thirdly, as they expected our Lord's speedy return there was no need for any further detailed instruction regarding the resurrection.

Apart from the above suggestions to account for the silence of the Evangelists, however, it appears that Jesus was purposely reticent on the subject. He accepted the fact; but refused to be drawn into any argument regarding it.

The Pharisees accepted the doctrine of the resurrection, but the Sadducees rejected it: "For the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angels nor spirits: but the Pharisees confess

both" (Acts 23. 8). The belief of the Sadducees in a cold, cheerless existence in Sheol after death had no attraction for the common people who clung to the vivid apocalyptic hopes as expounded by the Pharisees.

It was a Sadducee who tried to baffle our Lord by asking, what he believed to be, an unanswerable question. A woman had had seven husbands, and his query was: "In the resurrection whose wife shall she be of them?" (Mark 12. 23). The man's question suggests that the theory found in the Apocalypse of Baruch was widely accepted at the time, namely, that at the resurrection a man will be restored to his wife and family. Hence, the Sadducees, who rejected the doctrine, tried to make a mockery of it. It is interesting to notice that Jesus answered the man in terms of Jewish thought, which, however, he spiritualized: "For when they shall rise from the dead, they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as the angels which are in heaven" (Mark 12. 25).

The doctrine of the resurrection, however, was profoundly modified, enriched, and established in the faith of the Early Church by our Lord's own resurrection. His victory over death gave to Christians the assurance that they too would triumph over the grave.

For most of our teaching about the resurrection in the New Testament we are indebted to the Pauline Epistles. St Paul proclaims the resurrection of Jesus as the pledge of the resurrection of the believer, which will take place at our Lord's Second Coming: "But now hath Christ been raised from the dead . . . For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive" (1 Cor. 15. 20f.). St Paul had been educated in the strict Pharisaic School, so that he had absorbed its teaching of the resurrection. These views, however, were profoundly modified by his experience on the Damascus road, and his conviction of our Lord's resurrection.

St Paul was asked the same perplexing question as was put to the writer of the Bundahish and the writer of the Apocalypse of Baruch. The Apostle's answer, and the sequence of the events he described, lead us to assume that he based it on a similar tradition to that found in the Apocalypse of Baruch. He discarded the materialistic elements, however, and enriched the doctrine by spiritualizing it. The Jews generally believed that the resurrection would be of the physical body. St Paul denied this theory, and spoke of a spiritual

body. He made it quite clear in 1 Corinthians that it would not be the material body which would be raised; but at the resurrection each individual would be in possession of a spiritual body. In describing the nature of the resurrection body he introduced a metaphor. He tried to elucidate the difficult problem by his famous analogy of the sowing of the seed. When a seed is sown, the material particles which have been part of the living organism, decay. This causes the germ of life in the seed to operate, and it feeds on the substance which has decayed. The new organism is not the old one, but the two are closely connected; for "that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die: and that which thou sowest, thou sowest not the body that shall be, but a bare grain" (1 Cor. 15. 36f.). It seems that at this point St Paul's analogy broke down completely, and he had to admit that the resurrection is a mystery. God, however, "giveth it a body, as it pleaseth him" (v. 38).

It is possible that the Apostle borrowed the metaphor of the seed from Sanhedrin 90b, where we read: "The corn of wheat is entrusted naked to the earth, and comes again to life with a multitude of clothing; shall the pious who are buried in their garments not also rise clothed?" It is also interesting to notice that in the Bundahish, in the section dealing with the resurrection, there is reference to the growth of a seed. Immediately after the question: "And how does the resurrection occur . . .?", we read: "Ahura Mazda answered thus, . . . when by me corn was created so that, scattered about the earth, it grew again with increase" (30. 4f.). This is followed by the writer readily acknowledging Ahura Mazda's supreme power: "When that which was not was produced, why is it not possible to produce again that which was?" (v. 6).

St Paul made a distinction between the natural body of flesh and blood and the spiritual body of the future life (1 Cor. 15. 44). By the title "natural" body the Apostle meant one which was adapted to a material existence on earth. Hence, the "spiritual" body was one which would be adapted to life in a spiritual sphere.

In Greek the two words "soul" and "spirit" are often used in contrast to each other. The former is used to describe the life which we share with the animal creation; while the latter term is used for the life of the higher faculties. The natural body is adapted to an earthly existence and the requirements of such a life are those we share with the animal creation. The faculties possessed by the spiritual body are those needed for life in a spiritual environment.

Hence, our physical body is fitted for a material existence. It follows that when man is raised to a spiritual sphere he will require a body suitable for a life in his new environment.

St Paul taught that the spiritual body will be related to the material body; but, unlike its physical counterpart, the spiritual body will be incorruptible: "It is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption" (1 Cor. 15. 42). The substance of the new body will be drawn from the spiritual environment: "Thou sowest not the body that shall be . . . God giveth it a body" (1 Cor. 15. 37f.).

The traditional view of Christians, at the time the Pauline Epistles were written, regarding the resurrection was influenced considerably by the belief in the nearness of the Parousia. How deeply St Paul was influenced by the idea is shown in his earlier epistles: ". . . and the dead in Christ shall rise first: then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord" (1 Thess. 4. 16f.).

This idea was not accepted by the writer of the Revelation. He taught that there would be two resurrections. The first would be of martyrs as a reward for martyrdom. This would take place to enable them to share in the temporary Messianic Kingdom on earth. These martyrs who will be rewarded by sharing the Messianic Kingdom will not be subject to the second death nor will they appear for judgement at its end.

In Rev. 20. 11-15 we are told that the second resurrection will be for the righteous and the wicked. They will all be judged, and the righteous will receive their spiritual bodies and the wicked will remain disembodied.

In conclusion, we find that the resurrection body is described as a "white robe or garment", in the book of Enoch and in the Revelation. Moreover, St Paul has a similar conception, but uses different terms to express it. In Enoch 72. 16, the resurrection body is described as a garment of glory: "And they shall have been clothed with garments of glory." In 2 Cor. 5. 1, St Paul describes the spiritual body as a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. In Phil. 3. 21, he speaks of this body of our humiliation which will be fashioned anew so as to become like the body of Christ's glory.

Moreover, in 2 Cor. 5. 1-5, the Apostle stresses the idea that the spiritual body is the gift of God; but that it can become better fitted

for the future life if a man lives in fellowship with Christ during his earthly life. The same idea underlies Rev. 16. 15, where we read: "Blessed is he that watcheth and keepeth his garments, lest he walk naked . . . but the faithful will walk with Christ in white." Every Christian already possesses this spiritual body, but it depends upon him whether it is defiled and thus rendered unsuitable for a spiritual life or else purified and enriched by a full Christian life, and thus made ready for its new environment in the spiritual sphere.

To illustrate the resurrection, but only very inadequately, let us make an analogy derived from the observations of naturalists. Is it possible to imagine anything more unlike the gnat flying and hovering in the air than its larva which passes its existence in water? The organs and the body of the larva of the gnat are adapted to an aquatic existence; but during that life it is gradually acquiring the organs suitable for its life in the air, and when the time comes for the insect to rise to its new and entirely different kind of life it sheds its case or shell, which enabled it to live in the water, and spreading out the wings, which had been developing, it assumes life in a new environment with a body completely fitted to its new life.

From St Paul's teaching, and being guided by our Lords' triumph over death, we may safely assume as Christians that by serving Christ faithfully we are now developing our spiritual bodies, and that when God takes us from this material existence our spiritual bodies will be ready and fit to rise to a life in the spiritual sphere: "For we know that if our tent—the earthly body which is now our home—is taken down, we have a house of God's building, a home (a body) not made by hands, imperishable, in Heaven" (2 Cor. 5. 1).

¹ The collection of Iranian sacred writings is called the Avesta. The Gathas, hymns or psalms, which are believed to have been written by the prophet Zoroaster himself, are regarded as the oldest part of the Avesta. In all probability they were written not later than the seventh century B.C. The Gathas chiefly deal with eschatological subjects. The later books of the Avesta elaborate this teaching, and these are divided into four sections: the Yasna or sacrificial worship, the Vispered or the book of invocations, the Yashts or worship by laudation, and the Vendidad or law against demons. These later books are believed to have been written between 558 B.C. and 323 B.C.

The Bundahish is a sacred book of the Parsees which was written in the Pahlavi language (an ancient west Iranian idiom). This book is an important

source of Mazdean beliefs as it incorporates ancient ideas, although it was written at a later date than the Avesta.

Translations of the Iranian sacred books have been made by Dermesteter and West in *Sacred Books of the East*, vols. 4, 23, and 31.

2. Translations of the Jewish Apocalyptic literature referred to in this article are given by R. H. Charles in *The Apocrypha and Pseudopigrapha of the Old Testament* (2 vols.).

³ The teaching on the resurrection in the Apocalypse of Baruch. The question put by Baruch to God:

ch. 4, v. 2. In what shape will those live who live in thy day? . . .

3. Will they then resume this form of the present and put on their entrammelling members . . . or wilt Thou perchance change these things [viz., physical parts of the body], which have been in the world, as also the world?

And God answers:

ch. 50, v. 2. For the earth will then assuredly restore the dead, which it now receives, in order to preserve them, but, as it has received, so will it restore them. 3. For then it will be necessary to show to the living that the dead have come to life again, and that those who have departed have returned. 4. And it shall come to pass, when they have severally recognized those whom they now know, then judgement will grow strong, and those things which before were spoken of will come.

This is followed by a description of the transformation which will take place:

ch. 51, v. 3. As for the glory of those who have now been justified in my law . . . then their splendour will be glorified in changes, and the form of their face will be turned into the light of their beauty, that they may be able to acquire and receive the world which does not die . . . 8. For they will behold the world which is now invisible to them, and they will behold the time which is now hidden from them. And again time will not age them. 10 . . . and they shall be made like unto the angels, and be made equal to the stars, and they shall be changed into every form they desire, from beauty into loveliness, and from light into splendour of glory.

⁴ The Iranian conception of the resurrection as given in the Bundahish. The question is put by the writer to Ahura Mazda:

ch. 30, v. 5. What will be the nature of the resurrection body?

And Ahura Mazda answers:

ch. 30, v. 5. When by me a son was created and fashioned in the womb of a mother, and the structure severally of the skin, nails, blood, feet, eyes, ears, and other things was produced . . . each of them, when created by me was herein more difficult than causing the resurrection, for it is an assistance to me in the resurrection that they exist . . . Observe, that when that which was not was then produced, why is it not possible to produce again that which was? 6. For at that time one will demand the bone from the spirit of the earth, the blood from water, the hair from the plants, and life from fire.

Having answered this question the writer describes the resurrection itself:

ch. 30, v. 7 . . . every human creature, they raise up from the spot where its life departs. Afterwards when all the material beings assume again their bodies and forms, then they assign them a single class. 8. Then will take place the great assembly where the good and the evil actions of each

man will be made visible . . . 11. The righteous man who has neglected to check his friend who acted sinfully, will reap great shame for his negligence. 12. Afterwards they set the righteous apart from the wicked . . . 27. . . . (the) Saoshyant, and his assistants, . . . give every man the reward and recompense suitable to his deeds; this is even the righteous existence where it is said that they convey him to paradise . . . (where) he continually advances for ever and ever.

⁵ The three accounts of the resurrection (the Iranian, Jewish, and Christian), briefly compared:

BUNDAHISH

BARUCH

ST PAUL

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| a. Saoshyant will raise the dead (30. 4). | God will raise the dead (49. 2). | Christ will raise the dead (1 Cor. 15. 22). |
| b. Question <i>re</i> nature of Resurrection body (v. 5f.). | Question <i>re</i> nature of resurr. body (49. 2f). | Question <i>re</i> nature (15. 36-49). |
| c. Body raised same as physical body (30. 6). | Body raised same as physical body (49. 3). | Body raised will not be same as physical one. |
| d. A change in the body takes place. No longer subject to old age (30. 27.) | Not subject to old age. A change takes place in body (51. 8f.). | Spiritual body incorruptible (15. 42). |

THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SERIALISM

RAYMOND CHAPMAN

CHRISTIANITY is a religion of paradoxes. It confronts the inquirer with an apparent conflict between the eternal and the temporary, the divine and the human, defeat and victory. The earliest history of Christian theology shows the struggle of orthodox reconciliation against the heresies which flew to one or the other extreme in an attempt to resolve the dilemma. The believer may come to accept the resolution of these paradoxes within his own religious experience. In this acceptance, he is departing from the ordinary idea of Time. He is now in a state of mind where this factor cannot be thought of in the usual way.

Most of us would, I think, be prepared to attempt an expression of our concept of time in spatial terms. We should make a line, or a series of dots, on a sheet of paper, calling the left-hand side of the paper "past" and the right-hand side "future". After a little more thought, we might try to construct a more elaborate model—perhaps a thin strip of paper moving across a slit which we would label "present". At last, however, we should be forced to admit that these devices were unsatisfactory. They make us think either of a continuing past and a predetermined future, or of a strange, immeasurable entity called the "present" which in some way confers "reality" on events which did not already possess that quality. As I hope to show, we must accept all these ideas to some extent. For the moment, let us agree that time is not explicable in spatial terms. We have to fall back on the idea of a second time-sequence to measure the first, a third to measure the second, and so on into an infinite regress.

To embark on an infinite regress is one of the abiding fears of the classical philosopher. To move continually away from reality in the attempt to observe, might indeed seem to be an alarming prospect. Fortunately, there is reason to believe that the series is in fact convergent and that there is an ultimate Observer, known to theists of all kinds as God. That was the conclusion reached by J. W. Dunne,

whose investigations of the nature of time were published under the name of Serialism. In examining some of the theological implications of what Dunne wrote, I do not profess complete acceptance of his theory. The mathematical part of it is largely beyond my comprehension. During the war, he wrote to me in a letter that he had succeeded in working out the regress of space; but his death in 1947 prevented him from making public his conclusions on the physical aspect of Serialism. I do believe, however, that Dunne's theory has things in it which no Christian can afford to ignore, and which may help towards the resolution of many difficulties. Dunne himself did not, I think, ever become a fully-committed Christian. He did regard his theory as of theological import and he used it at some length to combat the growth of materialistic thinking. It was apparently his decision that all things are immortal which led him to look more deeply into the mystery of existence.

Dunne's Serialism covers several books, and the outline of it given here must necessarily be only the shadow of a shade. It is held that time is not flowing "like an ever-rolling stream" but that all states of existence are eternally "present". If there were some special "reality" about what we commonly know as the "present moment" we should be faced with our difficulty about the narrow slit that could confer the quality of "reality" on things that were in some way "unreal". The confusion arises because the human observer fails to distinguish properly between the external world and his observation of it. All observation consists in making an abstraction from totality: the brain which receives sensory phenomena is as much a measuring-instrument as a ruler or a thermometer held in the hand. We are confused by trying to fit both the thing observed and the means of observation into the same framework. Human personality is the intersection of the brain's attention with the total world. In order to abstract a clear picture that can be interpreted, this attention must be given the fullest concentration. The energy of the personality is therefore devoted entirely to the momentary abstraction made by the brain, which we call the "present". All other states of existence are consequently excluded from attention and seem to be "unreal". The analogy suggested by Dunne is that of a reader whose attention is concentrated on the meaning of what he reads, to the exclusion of sounds, temperature, pressure and so on, which are nevertheless concurrently producing sense-data to which he might choose to attend.

Dunne was first drawn to the consideration of time-problems by a number of dreams which seemed to include future events. Later, when the Serialist theory was developed, he suggested that the dream-state results from the withdrawal of normal concentration. The mind is no longer limited to the immediate perceptions of the brain, but is able to move freely in all states of experience without reference to "present", "past", or "future". Since the mind has become accustomed to its physical limitations, the dreamer is unable to control his experience and the result is usually chaotic and senseless. Sometimes, however, he is able to recognize episodes which belong to his waking "past" or are contained in his waking "future". Actually these words are meaningless, having reference only to the state of concentration at the waking moment when the dream-episodes are *recollected*. Memory is different from the reliving of an experience. It is possible for attention to be withdrawn in the waking-state from its normal focus and for the total picture to be observed.

The question may well be asked: What then is objective reality; is there nothing more in the Universe than a multitude of foci of attention? It would seem to be impossible to withdraw attention altogether, since every step back, so to speak, involves a fresh view of the observing self. The real You can never truly stand apart from its own measuring-instrument. Dunne's reply was that all the series of individual world-pictures led back to the ultimate Observer, whose attention held continually the whole range of that which Is. In fact we are offered, though with a difference, the problem of Berkeley, as summed up in the two famous limericks about the young man, the tree in the quad, and God.

Without suggesting that Serialism is to be grasped with both hands as the answer to all our questions (and still less claiming that the foregoing remarks have done anything like justice to it), let us consider where it may lead us in our Christian problems. The whole of what we understand by Revelation rests on the two factors of eternal duration and temporary event. The Son is co-eternal with the Father; Jesus is incarnate in a known period of history. On this irruption of the timeless into time, we depend for the uniqueness of our faith. The Son took upon himself the limits of human momentary consciousness, so that direct communication could be made. Thereafter, human limitations are sanctified, known to be one possible presentation of the Divine. But what is meant by "there-

after"? Was the God-Man relationship changed by something that can be described in human terms? To say this would be the equivalent of our imaginary "now" conferring reality on the unreal.

The Incarnation is the interference of the Divine Observer across all human time-lines. Some few were chosen to have their attention specially concentrated on the time-line of one whom they knew as Jesus of Nazareth; but the interference was effective for all. God was born and suffered death to redeem all humanity and all human history, not to draw a neat dividing-line across a time-scale which men had devised for their own convenience. Redemption is *not* in anything that we understand by time. It is an eternal verity, which has found one of its infinite modes of expression in a form that we can comprehend.

The Son, the creating, energizing Person, thus used one ordinary human brain as the link between the eternal Trinity and the phenomenal world known to men. The Incarnation is a fact, conceived by human understanding as an event. Seen thus, it assures us of more than divine condescension to suffering and death, more than a triumph of spirit over flesh. It means that one of the countless time-lines which make up human history is in fact a deliberate concentration of divine attention through a human focus. Even that which limits our comprehension gives us a channel of communication.

All our worship supposes a Being outside what we call time. Any religion but the crudest anthropomorphism would acknowledge this. What is not always fully stressed, however, is that our own time-sequence is continually being transcended. Worship does not set up a new, temporary relationship with God: it affirms the relationship that exists without time. We do not have to "call up" God in prayer, or wait for a favourable moment to begin the liturgical words. The attention of God, the ultimate Observer, is not concentrated here or there, at this moment or that. It contains all things, and all we have to do is to acknowledge that we are in fact within it. In a sense, therefore, it is a mistake to talk about concentrating on our acts of worship. What we have to do is to withdraw concentration, since it is concentration which limits us to the "now" of clocks and watches. When no external phenomenon occupies attention, we are indeed with God. That is the root of mysticism, and most of us are far from its attainment. In waking life we are unlikely to withdraw concentration altogether. Therefore we create, for our churches and

private places of worship, those sense-data which symbolize as closely as possible what we understand of God, and which may help to free us from our customary preoccupation with passage along the time-scale.

Our reaching out to God is parallel to his reaching out to us. All our acts of worship and sacrifice are facts, not events. We can offer nothing that is our own, but we can allow the divine attention to hold us completely and thus give some symbolic token of our submission. We can do this only within time as we understand it, but the act has no reference to time. It is true that the hands on the church-clock will move in a certain direction between what we call the beginning and the end of the service, but this is because we have not learned to express ourselves in any way but a series of momentary concentrations. We cannot help regarding acts of worship as events, among others on our individual time-scales, and we are presumably not wrong in doing so. What we must try hard not to do is to regard the reference of our worship as subject to the same kind of scale. We may come out of church saying that we are an hour older, or an hour nearer dinner; but we ought not to say that we are an hour farther from Christ's Passion or an hour nearer the Judgement.

The Christian consideration of time has always been associated with the idea of Judgement, both individual and universal. Probably most Christians have had some uneasy thoughts about the life everlasting, quite apart from legalistic considerations about whether it was to be spent in Heaven or Hell. Few people to-day believe that God inflicts unceasing torment on souls of his creation. Most theologians would say that Hell is withdrawal from God through persistent assertion of rebellious free-will. Yet, however much we trust in the infinite mercy, we tend sometimes to feel a little alarmed. Simply to go on for ever, with one event following another, however delectable, is a formidable proposition. The great mystics assure us that, in perfect contemplation of God, there is no time that passes. We accept their assurance uneasily. We are creatures whose personalities have developed within the time-sequence: can we remain individuals without it?

Such speculations are perhaps unprofitable and are best left to faith. But Dunne had a number of things to say about immortality. This part of his theory is in some ways the most stimulating and also the least satisfactory. It may, however, be worth examining. In

the Serialist view, as Dunne entitled one of his books, "Nothing Dies". Everything which exists does so for ever, because there is no special reality about any particular "moment". While we are limited to the perceptions of the human brain, we inevitably regard everything as transitory. Those who believe in immortality tend to regard it as an infinite prolongation of the time-sequence—one new event following another. According to Dunne, it is no such thing. When the real Self is dissociated from the material body, the whole range of experience is open. We make our own eternal life out of the life we have lived on earth. The analogy which he gives us is the comparison of a human life with the keyboard of a piano. The living percipient, able to encounter only one key at a time, moves on in a regular sequence of single notes. When he falls asleep and dreams, he no longer concentrates on what seems to be the immediate key, but can move in any direction. But, unaccustomed to this freedom, he produces only discord and is glad to wake. After bodily death, however, he has the freedom of the keyboard with complete understanding, and can produce music of the greatest beauty and complexity. A similar analogy can be drawn from the keyboard of a typewriter.

Dunne does not seem to have discussed the bearing of this theory on Christian ideas of judgement and redemption. In many ways, it is a belief which orthodoxy could well accept. It allows for man's duty to merit salvation by his conduct in this life, and also shows how he may undergo purification after death. Perhaps the judgement on each one of us is that we must construct our own after-life from the experiences through which we have lived. Our salvation then will be the grace to construct a joyful, worshipping synthesis and to omit all that is evil. Therefore the man who has tried to live well and in charity, who has sought the means of salvation through the Church, will have a rich and splendid instrument from which to make a synthesis acceptable to God.

The theory is, of course, not entirely satisfactory. It is hard to believe that the experiences of this world make it possible for the individual soul to join in the highest worship of God. We surely expect some spiritual growth after bodily death. Yet the piano-analogy may be a good one: an uninstructed person picking out single notes could never believe that the greatest music of the world could be produced from them. We must suppose, however, that some of our bodily experiences can be obliterated, or at least

omitted. The piano keyboard contains no notes that are in themselves "good" or "bad"—though certain combinations produce sounds that the trained ear regards as harmonies or discords. The Christian cannot regard each experience as its own explanation and its own justification, which is the view of the atheist school of Existentialists. These are matters which need to be considered, but the theory in general seems to be capable of Christian acceptance.

Perhaps the greatest value of Serialism is for the exploration of prophecy, vision, and mysticism. The concentration of the mind on the momentary extrapolation made by the brain, is abandoned in sleep and destroyed by death. If this dissociation can be achieved in the waking-state, we have some explanation of the gift of prophecy. The prophet is he who can withdraw concentration so that the whole of his time-line is before him. He may even be able to intervene in other time-lines and foresee what is to come for other persons. Here there may be something more than the power of the individual prophet or mystic. It is often remarked that many primitive religions show signs of the Christian type of theology: virgin birth, the dying god, vicarious atonement, and so on. The opponents of Christianity make great use of this fact to discredit our Faith and dismiss it as "just another mystery-cult". Christian apologists regard these similarities as a foreshadowing, imperfectly received and understood, of the true revelation. Christianity is the only world-religion which fulfils these early archetypes. It has already been suggested that the Incarnation may be regarded as a concentration of divine power within the limitations of a human time-line, thereby sanctifying even these limitations. In the Serialist view, so great an interference would impinge on another time-line, whether regarded, in human terms, as "before" or "after". The point of time is apparent only to bodily perception; the Christian truths, which themselves are not thus limited, may make contact with any time-line at any point.

It was explained that Dunne came to his theory largely through prophetic dreams. The great importance attached to the dream in Biblical narratives need not be stressed. Freud has taught us to regard dreams as symbolic representations of waking frustrations and repressed desires. No doubt the dreamer does arrange his waking experiences in these ways; but there is no need to abandon the older belief that dreams may foreshadow what is, in waking terms, in the future. The evidence that people do sometimes dream of the

apparent future seems to be overwhelming, and Serialism offers an explanation of how this may happen. The Biblical view is that dreams are sometimes the result of divine intervention, either as warnings or as part of the revelation of purpose. Joseph and Daniel among others were specially favoured in the interpretation of dreams. God may also speak directly to the dreamer: "For God speaketh once, yea twice, yet man perceiveth it not. In a dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, in slumberings upon the bed; then he openeth the ears of men, and sealeth their instruction." (Job. 33. 14-16.)

Any discussion of time and prophecy always comes back to the old problem of free-will. Does Serialism imply predestination? Is everything fixed for ever, so that our apparent interference is mere illusion? Now if God is the ultimate Observer, to whom all is eternally present and under attention, we might at first seem compelled to accept the grimmest kind of Calvinism. Yet this continual observation is the necessary consequence of belief in prophecy and in divine foreknowledge. God must be outside our time-sequence unless he is as ignorant as we of the apparent future.

There has been a great deal of needless distress and even despair about this problem. People often regard divine predestination in the wrong way. They visualize a narrow, unattractive pathway, down which the individual is dragged, kicking and protesting, with the exercise of his free will denied to him. In fact, it is surely the exercise of free will that makes the path what it is. God knows what we will become, and what will become of us; but he knows it because he knows the whole quality of our individual wills. A man's life in this world is the intersection of his will with the phenomena that make up his environment. The retreat from time is not a retreat from personal responsibility. To argue otherwise would be to claim that the order of the details is of more importance than the total achievement.

Serialism is a theory that deserves attention from the Christian theologian. It reminds us of the unique value of every action, and that nothing which has once existed can be completely destroyed. Most of all, it shows that the ways of God are greater than we can comprehend, and that attempts to understand him in our finite terms must be incomplete. We know that he has intervened in history and that a perpetual meeting exists between his infinity and our limitations. Dunne was a great man, and a humble one, whose

thinking took him into spiritual realms that he had not expected. I believe that full appreciation of his work is yet to come.

NEWMAN AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BELIEF

B. M. G. REARDON

I

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN'S was a mind of many facets. To this day his writings can perplex, even dismay, but the personality which they unfailingly reveal never loses its compelling interest. Yet the qualities for which posterity now praises him were for long the cause of misunderstanding and distrust. The Church of his birth and upbringing—and upon whose life the movement which he led has exerted so embracing an influence—failed utterly, in his time, to comprehend him. That of his adoption, after at first greeting him with acclaim, grew to regard him with an increasing suspicion. His career as a priest of the Roman obedience was largely covered by the pontificate of Pius IX, for whom all breath of "liberalism", in theology as in politics, was noxious; and with liberalism Newman's own fame had somehow become tainted. That this should have been possible is sheer paradox. At Oxford he was the very apostle of anti-liberalism; nothing had so repelled him as the vain pretension of the human intelligence to be the single norm of truth. "Liberty of thought", he wrote later in a note to the *Apologia*, "is in itself a good; but it gives an opening to false liberty. Now by Liberalism I mean false liberty of thought, or the exercise of thought upon matters, in which, from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to a successful issue, and is therefore out of place." Opposed to it was the knowledge of divine revelation as taught by Scripture and the universal Church. Nevertheless his perception of the actual workings of the human mind was extraordinarily luminous. He could enter with sympathy upon points of view the antithesis of his own. He was acutely aware of the difficulties even in positions to which he himself held tenaciously. Mere prejudice and opinions ready-made he regarded with contempt. Upon the just rights of reason in pursuit of the truth he was tirelessly insistent. However great the respect with which he

viewed the prerogatives of authority, he remained to the end an "intellectual". But it was a temper and an outlook bound to antagonize those for whom faith was identical with adhesion to a dogmatic formulary, and free critical inquiry of any kind a step, if not a leap, towards the Avernus of infidelity.

At Rome, then, Newman's name was not, for some years, among the most favoured. He was considered unreliable. Happily he lived to see his prestige restored by Pius's urbane and scholarly successor, Leo XIII, and the cardinal's hat was universally approved as a due recognition of outstanding merit. Yet within little more than a decade of his death the clouds again descended. In 1908 Pius X formally condemned Modernism; and the Modernists, to whom were imputed both a "fideist" apologetic grounded in an anti-intellectualist and sceptical philosophy, and a conception of dogma according to which its meaning and value were to be assessed in the light of a theory of evolutionary development based on the accepted methods of scientific historical research, had themselves expressly claimed the inspiration of Newman's teaching. Loisy, as early as 1896, was reading him with avidity. "Ce doit être", he wrote to von Hügel, "le théologien le plus ouvert qui ait existé dans la sainte Eglise depuis Origène."¹ The *Essay on Development* particularly impressed him.² For others it was the *Grammar of Assent* and the *Anglican University Sermons* which were of primary interest. Here, it seemed, as a welcome break with the old and ineffective scholastic rationalism, was a new and attractive philosophy of faith. "Intuition" might yield a vivid sense of the immediacy of a God whose existence mere logic was powerless to demonstrate.

The upshot of this fresh appraisal of Newman's doctrine—with which the name of Henri Bremond is especially connected—was a return, in official or at least more timidly orthodox circles, of the former distrust. That sweet utterance, it was felt, had always nursed a dubious intention. In recent years however a more balanced judgement has prevailed. Time has given us perspective. Moreover, unlike so many of the eminent figures of his age, he still "lives". His own closest associates, whether Anglican or Roman, are now remote and wraith-like, and their works are unread; whereas he, by some subtle virtue of his genius, no less than by the beauty of his prose, cannot be forgotten, as the continuous flow of Newman literature, on both sides of the Atlantic and not only in the English-speaking world, clearly proves.³

The truth is that, despite the neo-medievalism the propagation of which is supposed to have been his life's aim and achievement, he addressed himself to what may perhaps be described as the characteristic problem of modern, and notably contemporary, thought, viz. that of *subjectivity*, of the part of the knower himself in the constitution of knowledge. Always intensely aware of his own *ego*, his work is a prolonged study, manifold in its nuances, of the pervasive strength of the subjective in religious belief. Yet recent Newman scholarship has served to dispel some recurrent misconceptions. The Modernist picture of a radical anti-rationalist has had to be corrected. In his Anglican days Newman stood firmly for the dogmatic principle. He remained to the last convinced that truth is an objective reality and that men may become possessed of it. But it is no less certain that Newman was not an "intellectualist", if by intellectualism is meant the identification of truth with the conclusions of an articulated process of reasoning. Rather is it that the intellectual factor is indispensable to faith, as part of a larger and more comprehensive act—an essentially personal apprehension in which the whole psychic entity finds itself engaged.

Reason, as Newman well understood, has its necessary, and in some sense primary, function in theology—a function at once of explication and justification; but rational arguments have due force only for a mind already disposed, by a preceding orientation of heart and will, towards the goal to be attained.

Thus a more discriminating appreciation of Newman's characteristic contribution to the philosophy of belief has now become possible. It can be seen both that his alleged attacks on reason were in fact nothing of the sort and that his own way of thinking was at once a reaction—and a legitimate one—against the facile rationalism of the Enlightenment and a protest—necessary and timely—against the scientific agnosticism of his own age. He was not proposing to substitute "intuitions" for coherent argument or to solve the intrinsic problem of belief by appeal to sentiment. On the contrary, he held that "faith" must be rational and in a measure verifiable. Where he differed from the conventional type of religious apologist, content merely to copy the methods of his opponents and pit one false rationalism against another, was in his consideration of what reason itself is. He distinguished between an impersonal, abstract conception of it and what he called the "concrete intelligence". The task of verification, and *a fortiori* that of making

the first moves towards truth, were the work of the latter. It is to the analysis of this distinction that much of Newman's most original and fruitful reflection is directed.

Upon this theme his mind plays with an admirable insight and lucidity. But not, it has to be allowed, very systematically; at least his views were never set forth in schematic form, for the *Grammar of Assent*, impressive though it is, is not a balanced exposition of a comprehensive doctrine.⁴ Unfortunately it is this lack of system which is partly responsible for the misconceptions to which we have referred. Newman's was not a schematic mind; his best thinking needed the stimulus of an occasion. "I can never write well", he told a correspondent, "without a definite *call*." He preferred to confront a particular issue, addressing himself to a public whose interests and predisposition he could take for granted. He could then concentrate on whatever aspect of the matter especially moved him. It is for the modern commentator to assemble the various elements of the design without forcing upon them a too rigid uniformity. Sometimes his text will facilitate this by its very copiousness; at others he must make what he can of little more than brief indications. Yet if we are to grasp the real meaning of some particular *aperçu* we must interpret it by reference to the background of Newman's thought as a whole. And we must beware of reading into it a significance which, in the writer's intention, it could not have possessed.

My purpose here is simply to indicate, following the lead of the best Newman scholars of recent years, the main lines along which, in this respect, Newman's mind travelled. Two guiding ideas become apparent. The first of these is the necessity of an initial and fundamental choice between two moral attitudes, either of which is an expression of the "whole man": not a blind choice, therefore, but one to be justified by the extent to which it succeeds in revealing to each individual his own true nature (not hitherto clearly known to him) and in commending itself as offering the only authentic means to personal self-fulfilment.⁵ The second is the importance of "natural reasoning" in illuminating the path which the would-be believer must take in order to reach the point of decision. By this natural reasoning Newman understands the mode of operation of the "concrete" intelligence, which is both distinguishable from and more comprehensive than the "abstract" reason employed in either mathematics or the Aristotelian logic, but which nevertheless is as

effectively probative for its own purposes as are the methods pursued in these narrower if more rigorously disciplined studies.

2

The truth, in matters of religious conviction, was never, to Newman's mind, dependent merely on correct reasoning. The determinative factor is our antecedent presumption in face of life. This it is which governs the whole bent of our thinking. Men's logic may be impeccable, but if their antecedent presumptions differ so too will their subsequent convictions. Thus at the very outset we have a parting of the ways, religious faith becoming a possibility or not according to which of them we take. On the one hand there is the "natural" non-believer, the rationalist, who cannot doubt that reality in general is transparent to reason and that the means are available to us—or at least may in time become so—for the elimination of every area of obscurity. For him the unknown merely awaits discovery, and the road to truth, in whatever field, is for the human reason alone to decide. On the other hand there is the man *naturaliter pius*, who senses that the ultimate reality is a mystery whose depths will always remain impenetrable, even though he welcomes such light as may appear from time to time to aid him in his apprehension of it. The confidence he has in reason is not such as to permit him to lay down *a priori* conditions under which alone truth can be affirmed. The rationalist position rests on the assumption that man is fully capable of working out his own salvation in this world; its temper is humanist, its perspective anthropocentric. By contrast, the religious man, aware of limitations and defects in his nature simply as man, feels the need of what Christianity calls divine grace. His outlook is theocentric.

In Newman's view this latter attitude is alone the truly reasonable one. It certainly, he thinks, is the natural and the normal. That of the rationalist so-called is abnormal and springs from a refusal, moral responsibility for which cannot be evaded, to follow the spontaneous prompting of the unsophisticated intelligence. Newman undertakes to prove his point by an examination of the facts of the moral consciousness. This, he says, comprises at once "a moral sense, and a sense of duty; a judgement of the reason and a magisterial dictate".⁶ The first connotes no more than the speculative determination of moral distinctions. It conveys a judgement upon actions regarded simply as such: *this* type of act is right, *that*

wrong. The second, the sense of duty, is specific: it is wrong (or right) for *me* to act thus or thus. Here the action is no longer envisaged in the abstract but concretely and personally. The sense of duty, or *conscience* proper, is concerned, that is to say, with actions "mainly as viewed in their doers, or rather with self alone and one's own actions, and with others only indirectly and as if in association with self". It is marked by the fact that one feels oneself responsible to another, and according to one's actions to be either approved or blamed by him. In this respect conscience differs radically from taste—the aesthetic sense—or the sense of honour; an error of taste or fault of honour primarily offends oneself, not someone else. But where morality is concerned one has instinctively "a lively sense of responsibility and guilt", though the act itself be no offence against society and may have no witnesses. "Conscience does not repose on itself, but vaguely reaches forward to something beyond self, and dimly discerns a sanction higher than self for its decisions." Newman continues:

If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong, we feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind, the same soothing, satisfactory delight which follows on our receiving praise from a father, we certainly have within us the image of some person, to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and waste away. . . . If the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which [our] perception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine; and thus the phenomena of Conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive, and is the creative principle of religion, as the Moral Sense is the principle of Ethics.⁷

It is as simple as saying that, when we hear a knock at the door, we immediately conclude that someone is without. In the same way what we fittingly call the *voice* of conscience reveals to us the living presence of One above whose servants we are. This interior monition we equate indeed with the voice of God. In the child first reaching years of discretion the feeling is spontaneous: if he has offended his parents he will place himself instinctively, "as if it were

the most natural of acts", in the presence of him who is able to set him right with them. He is conscious that this invisible Being exists, that nothing escapes him, and that he can address him whenever he himself chooses; and he knows that his benevolence towards him is assured. By contrast, the hesitant belief or open disbelief of the adult represents an attitude of mind which is subsequent, derived, and critical. It implies that one has closed one's eyes to certain vital elements in the natural reaction of the child, on the assumption that it is possible, and in truth "philosophic", to reduce conscience to the level of a mere recognition of moral values, to be applied in any given instance by the reflective reason. It is further evidence of man's inveterate tendency to make himself the measure of all things.

Newman has tellingly analysed this gradual secularization of morality. But in thus stressing the transcendent reference of our moral experience what really is he attempting to do? Is he offering us a psychological study, on the evidence furnished by morality, of the genesis and growth of the idea of a personal God, or does he seek, beyond this, to present a form of proof or demonstration of the divine existence alternative to the familiar metaphysical arguments? Newman was not himself a *philosophe de métier* and had no great confidence in the metaphysical approach to religious questions. For him the existence of God, like his own, was "luminously self-evident". Yet he seems to have regarded this analysis of conscience as an objectively valid proof. Can we agree with him?

Newman's views as touching the psychological matrix, so to say, in which intimations of the divine occur merit the closest study. He has in this field no superior. But how far can a psychological analysis do duty for an ontological argument? It is immediately obvious of course that he lays himself open to ready criticism. His real meaning, however, lies deeper. He is not merely casting about for a likely cause to explain a given effect. He does not say that conscience, or the sense of duty, requires us to *postulate* the existence of a personal Deity, as if the idea had not at first presented itself to the mind. His whole way of thinking, which in some respects anticipates the "phenomenological" method of Scheler, is removed from this type of argumentation. His claim is that the nature and implications of the moral consciousness itself are at once and essentially religious. The simplest moral act refers us to a personal God, not merely inferentially, but concretely, as a matter of psychological fact. For

when the dictates of conscience—feelings whether of satisfaction or remorse—are examined, one finds that the thought of God is actually inseparable from it. Conscience is thus “a connecting principle between the creature and his Creator”. We apprehend the divine *in* our moral experience.

3

But turn, says Newman, to the outside world and to human history—in a word, to our environing situation—and our serene assurance is at a stroke destroyed. “There”, he confesses, “I see a sight which fills me with unspeakable distress.”

The world seems simply to give the lie to that great truth, of which my whole being is so full; and the effect upon me is, in consequence, as a matter of necessity, as confusing as if it denied that I am in existence myself. If I looked into a mirror, and did not see my face, I should have the sort of feeling which actually comes upon me, when I look into this living, busy world, and see no reflexion of its Creator.⁸

Were it not, he declares, for this voice of conscience speaking within, “I should be an atheist, or a pantheist, or a polytheist when I looked into the world”. He argues, therefore, that, “if there be a God, *since* there is a God, the human race is implicated in some terrible aboriginal calamity. It is out of joint with the purposes of its Creator”. It would seem indeed that the concrete reason—men’s actual exercise of thought and will—leads away from God and towards unbelief. Its outcome is rationalism, and to it religion is either offensive or meaningless.

But if such in truth is the condition of man in this world, it is apparent that the voice of conscience alone, in each separate individual, cannot be a sufficient guide to action. All too easily is it dimmed by the passions, or sophisticated and corrupted by errant reasoning and false ideals: Inevitably, in a world whose ways are not God’s, man, to a greater or less degree, is the creature and victim of his social environment, and powerless to realize the virtues of his own nature, such even as they are. Any serious consideration of our predicament must convince us that God only can deliver, and that the means of our delivery will consist in a special *revelation*, whereby conscience is clarified and volition strengthened—a revelation, moreover, which, though given once and for all, is perpetuated in the living tradition of a society recognizable, by its

marks, as God's appointed agency here below, and therefore as the medium of the "grace" which fallen man needs for the conquest of his wayward instincts and affections. Thus the dialectic of conscience—"the essential sanction and principle of religion in the mind"—is an anticipation and earnest of revealed truth. Obedience to it is itself the primal act of faith. When at length the credentials of revealed truth—the manifest signs of its supernatural origin—have been accepted by the believer he embraces it with gratitude and joy.

Among these manifest signs, not the least significant to Newman's mind was the ineluctable fact of that sacred history to which the Scriptures and the life of the Christian Church bear witness. Here was a chain of events so closely and securely linked as to form a unity the more striking by contrast with the seemingly aimless flux of happenings of which human history is otherwise composed. Perception of this is like the gradual discernment, in the weaving of a tapestry, of a clearly defined figure from what at first are only random shapes and colours. As, in this instance, one assumes the hand of a designer, so, in history, one must conclude the operation of a Providence.

4

To the questions of the essential nature of religious faith, and the possibility and means of its rational justification, Newman returned ever and again. From the early days of his ministry in the Church of England they had closely occupied his attention.⁹ As he grew older, and the circle of his acquaintance widened, he became increasingly aware of, and distressed by, the underlying scepticism, the spirit of negative criticism, in the science and much of the scholarship of the day. Was there no certitude open to us, other than that of mathematics and the exact sciences? And was "faith" indeed no more than an emotion, directed toward an Object that remained indefinable and elusive? The celebrated *Apologia pro vita sua*, written in the spring and early summer of 1864, is a deeply moving account of the author's own spiritual odyssey and of his personal reasons for believing. Some however among his friends suggested to him the desirability of a work of more ambitious scope, conceived as a systematic justification of faith in general.¹⁰ If the grounds of belief—as it might be said—amounted to no more than a probability, then a substantial element of doubt could not be excluded;

but how far was this to be reconciled with that absolute assurance of possessing the truth with which the convinced believer seems always to be blessed? Newman braced himself for the task and in the summer of 1866 committed certain views and arguments to paper. These, repeatedly revised, became the nucleus of *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, published in 1870. It survives, for all its faults of construction, as his outstanding contribution to the philosophy of religion.

Here, once again, Newman demonstrates his extraordinary skill in laying bare the actual configuration of men's minds. In the second part of it he grapples with two commonly voiced "rationalist" objections, namely, "how it is that a proposition which is not, and cannot be, demonstrated, . . . nevertheless claims and receives an unqualified adhesion"; and how the faith of countless believers in all ages, who "having but little intellectual training, have never had the temptation to doubt, and the opportunity to be certain", can yet be regarded as justified. In order to meet these difficulties Newman bates nothing of the demand that belief should be reasonable and capable of reasonable defence. What he proposes is no "inner light" instead of reason, nor an impulsive leap in the dark. Nowhere does he describe faith as subject only to principles or laws specifically its own, but, on the other hand, assigns it as its due a place in the entire scheme of human knowledge. Procedures therefore which are applicable to the whole must apply also to the part.

These may be illustrated from many fields of investigation. When the lawyer, for example, assesses the reliability of a witness, when the literary critic determines authorship on the evidence of style, when any one of us divines a man's motives or "reads" (as we say) his character, then reason, in such concrete instances, although not amounting to a strictly rational demonstration, is nonetheless effective and cogent. The case will be "as good as proved", the conclusion admitting, in fact, of little or no doubt. This type of "natural" or "concrete" reasoning, when analysed, is seen to be far more complex than the "artificial" or "verbal" reasoning familiar in text-books of logic. Rather is it "the cumulation of probabilities, independent of each other, arising out of the nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under review; probabilities too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too numerous and various for such conversion, even were they convertible".¹¹ Apart from the special

case of mathematics, in which the mind has to deal with pure abstractions, the concrete reason embraces a multitude of factors, many of which derive their essential relevance and weight from personal experience, the particularity and complexity of which make any exact analysis exceedingly difficult. Indeed we have no method at our disposal which would render the attempt feasible. Yet, if, on the other hand, we limit ourselves to the statement of no more than a selection of the relevant factors, then obviously an argument purporting to be founded upon them can be said to go beyond the premisses and to yield an unwarrantable conclusion. Assiduous examination of as many considerations as possible may doubtless enable us to produce reasons more or less plausible, so that, to an impartial judgement, our case will seem firmly grounded; but even so we cannot conceal the fact that it rests upon assumptions which themselves are not demonstrable by process of logic. No less true is it, however, that these assumptions usually commend themselves to us as matters self-evident, or at any rate not for practical purposes to be denied. And if this holds good of the expert dealing with his own subject, how much more so is it with the simple and uneducated, for whom *analysis* of their reasoning is out of the question? Such persons can at best give only a very partial explanation of their beliefs and opinions; they express themselves clumsily, introduce irrelevancies, misrepresent their own meaning. Are their conclusions worthless, therefore? The strict rationalist, the stickler for definitions and syllogisms, will contend that they are; but not many are likely to agree with him. That men do not always, nor most commonly, fully understand their own ways of reasoning does not prove them fools.

A peasant who is weather-wise may yet be simply unable to assign intelligible reasons why he thinks it will be fine tomorrow; and if he attempts to do so he may give reasons wide of the mark; but that will not weaken his confidence in his prediction. His mind does not proceed step by step, but he feels all at once and together the force of various combined phenomena, though he is not conscious of them. Again, there are physicians who excel in the diagnosis of complaints; though it does not follow from this, that they could defend their decision in a particular case against a brother physician who disputed it.¹²

Instances such as these show plainly that there is here no question of an "intuitive" light, of some heavenly inspiration. The intelligence either of the peasant or of the doctor focuses itself upon various

data which, when apprehended together, give rise to a conclusion definite enough, although no formal mode of reasoning has been invoked. It is valid and reliable reasoning, but spontaneous and unreflective. In any attempt to formalize it it would appear unsatisfactory. Yet this, Newman submits, is how the mind does in fact and most commonly work. It reaches out to conclusions which it adheres to on grounds that seem to it clear and adequate, but the whole complex process of inference remains obscure and to express it both precisely and in detail would prove impossible.

The simple and unlettered may, then, believe what they believe for perfectly good reasons, and the learned, in demonstrating how good those reasons are, add nothing which will make the belief itself either firmer or deeper. Moreover, as already observed, even the experts do not succeed in unravelling every thread in their actual reasoning. They may understand the interconnection of their ideas better than do the uneducated, but for them too a point is reached where any final explanation seems unattainable. This being so, if the scientist or the scholar finds himself holding views which, although strictly not proven, admit of no serious doubt, why should he demand a more rigorous practice in the field of religious knowledge? We may indeed go further. Not only is it evident that there almost always is this discrepancy between "natural" reasoning—the actual motions of living thought—and their formally exact articulation, but it can readily be shown why it *necessarily* must be so: first, because of the inevitable presence, at the very outset of all reasoning in matters arising from the concrete facts of life, of assumptions, determined by personal attitudes and individual experiences, which cannot be proved to be of abstract and universal validity; and secondly, because of the very range and intricacy of the kind of reasoning which men bring to bear on their every-day affairs.

We must conclude our short survey, therefore, with a brief consideration of two important elements in Newman's philosophy: the significance, in the quest of knowledge, of antecedent presumptions, or First Principles; and the function of what he calls, in a term which he has made his own, the *Illative Sense*.

5

All our reasoning, Newman holds, proceeds on the basis of the former—fundamental convictions or assumptions which serve as our intellectual and moral frame of reference. When we strike out

in search of new truth these inevitably are our starting-point. Unless men are agreed in their first principles—their “postulates”—mere argument, however scrupulous, will never bring them to a common conclusion. Such postulates may be entirely reasonable, yet fail to satisfy the resolute sceptic. They are not inferences that please logicians, but inductions resting on the broad and varied foundation of experience. We all know how, say, a man’s visible behaviour may mislead if we do not understand his character or have not learned that actions not seldom disguise feeling and motive. Newman himself gives some instances. He shows, for example, how it is that no competent literary critic would accept a theory of the medieval origin of works attributed to classical antiquity. Experience has taught us what in fact are the characteristics of the classical mind and what of the medieval—sufficiently at least to convince us that no writer of the middle ages would have been capable of producing deceptive imitations of Virgil or Horace. “We do not pretend to be able to draw the line between what the medieval intellect could or could not do; but we feel sure that at least it could not write the classics.” The feeling seems indeed instinctive. Actually it is an inferred opinion, arrived at after long acquaintance with the literature of the two epochs.

But considerations which apply to human knowledge in general are no less applicable to religious knowledge in particular. How, then, are we to judge the evidences of a divine revelation or recognize the marks of a true Church? Argument here not only would fail to convince but might well appear meaningless apart from the antecedent probabilities. The points in favour of a given religion as an authentic disclosure of divine truth derive their evidential value, in the long run, from conviction of the reality of a providential Power whose wisdom and goodness must be assumed to preclude the possibility that the signs in question are deceptive and misleading. *Domine, si error est, a te decepti sumus*. It is the divine will, Newman believes, that our reasoning in so great a matter should not betray us into falsehood. Moreover, without a latent sense of man’s need of salvation and divine aid, the evidences of such redemptive intervention would probably remain unrecognized. Only so in fact could the objection be met that a “redemption” is antecedently improbable because contrary to the constituted order of things. Those very indications, which the religious man reads as proof, of special divine action, at once

revelatory and salvific, might otherwise be explained as merely occurrences natural and normal to this world. Any distress that the typical rationalist feels at the human condition is only on account of the widespread ignorance for which man himself is responsible and which it lies within his power to abolish. Not feeling the need of redemption, nothing that he sees about him, or retrospectively in history, is interpreted by him as manifesting supernatural activity. The religious man, however, does feel this need. It is a conviction of which he cannot rid himself. He is acutely aware of God's actual intervention in his own *conscience*. But "if he has longed for a revelation to enlighten him and to cleanse his heart, why may he not use, in his inquiries after it, that just and reasonable anticipation of its probability which such longing has opened the way to his entertaining?" We are too well inclined, Newman adds, "to sit at home", instead of stirring ourselves to ask whether a revelation has been given. We expect its evidences to come to us at no trouble to ourselves. We behave, "not as suppliants, but as judges".¹³

Thus it is that identical arguments will vary *toto coelo* in the impression they make on different minds. To some they will appear strong, to others unconvincing, not through any absence of logical consistency, but because the necessary personal disposition for appreciating their cumulative force is absent. First principles, Newman holds, have a part in men's ordinary thinking analogous to that of the *hypothesis* in scientific research. They determine the real weight and persuasiveness of an argument, or the relevance and significance of a fact. There is no truth to be discovered except on the basis which they provide.

But what next must be observed is that, in respect of our religious beliefs, these primary affirmations upon which the force of subsequent reasoning depends, are in turn the expression in intellectual terms of a fundamental *moral* attitude. The consequences of this truth are of signal importance. Our first principles, not being purely rational—not, that is, the self-conscious work of reason—but a spontaneous reaction of the moral consciousness, are essentially personal to us and cannot in their integrity be "objectified" and appropriated for the use of others. Furthermore, since it is only by virtue of the moral consciousness in us that we come to make our characteristic assumptions, we are as responsible for the one as for the other. Thus the degree of reasoned conviction which faith, to be intellectually respectable, must presuppose, depends not merely

upon ratiocination but upon moral insights and decisions. Faith, indeed, like every other significant human choice, must summon the activity of *the whole man*.

The second reason by which we explain the failure of any precise attempt at articulation to do justice to the actual workings of the mind—why a discrepancy exists between the formal statement of propositions and the living matrix of thought in which ideas occur—is regard for the great complexity of the very nature of proof itself. Our reasoning does not in fact proceed by a simple process of deduction. With the historian studying his data, the politician determining a course of action, the detective following a clue, or simply one man judging the character of another, the method pursued is selective and *inductive*, the scrutiny and appraisal of a variety of factors none of which, considered separately, can suggest more than a measure of probability, but which, taken collectively, may well produce an unshakable conviction. And the conviction would be justified: in a chain of *deductive* reasoning, for all its logical exactitude, the validity of the final conclusion depends on the strength of each link; if only one be faulty the end remains unattained. With induction, on the other hand, every additional probability increases the strength of the others: a silken cord will easily support a weight by which any one of its component threads would be snapped in an instant. The certitude thus reached will moreover be still further enhanced from the circumstance that the inductive method may be able to show not only that probabilities co-exist but that they converge. It is after this manner, Newman points out, that the human mind actually proceeds when seeking to determine truth in religion. We are led to our conclusion by the cumulative and consentient witness of a whole range of facts. Proof, in the most rigorous sense, we have not; but certitude is complete.¹⁴ What is necessary, however, is that these various signs or evidences should, for the appreciation of their convergence, be taken together and viewed as a whole. To deploy the argument in full detail would, as we have said, be difficult to the point of impossibility. But although it may be wanting in strict logical force, yet to a given individual, for reasons in greater or less degree particular and personal to *him*, it may be entirely convincing. It is one of Newman's outstanding merits as a religious thinker that he had the perception to grasp how, in the act of assent which we call faith, there is an unconscious dialectic out of which comes a

certitude that precedes any clear understanding of the grounds on which it rests. Subsequent recognition and articulation of these grounds are in fact no more than an effort to impart system to a type of reasoning which, although felt to be sound, lacks coherence and clarity.

It is this unconscious dialectic which Newman describes as the work of the Illative Sense, "the personal action of the ratiocinative faculty." "It combines and disjoins", it has been said, "all sensations, perceptions, thoughts which I call *mine* together as *mine*, no matter how little logical or generally intelligible connections they may have with one another. It divides all sensations, perceptions, thoughts of *yours* from all of *mine*, no matter how closely they resemble mine. If by communication through speech or writing or otherwise, my thoughts are conveyed to you or yours to me, they must be reckoned twice over, as yours and as mine, although their content be identical."¹⁵ It is thus the *personal* principle of unity in our thinking, and as such we may speak of it in a variety of ways—as "common sense", in the affairs of daily life, as "psychological penetration", when we judge a character, or as a particular "flair" or "insight" or "grasp" or "genius", when referring to this or that other field of interest or activity. But all these terms imply a distinctively *individual* mode or reasoning, that "illative" sense for which Newman goes so far—too far, evidently—as to claim that it "supplies no common measure between mind and mind", and that it is "nothing else than a personal gift or acquisition".¹⁶ Yet it is not a matter of intuition, in the stricter meaning of the word, as the immediate grasp of an object by the mind. More nearly is it a form of inference, a method of reasoning *componendo et dividendo*, in large measure unmeditated, in which conclusions emerge from a whole complex of observations and impressions and deductions. In fact when the average man talks about his "intuitions" we may almost invariably take him to mean his unconscious reasonings. That such reasonings must so far rely upon personal experience, exact account of which is difficult to render, makes an "intuitional" explanation of it all the more plausible.

Newman as a thinker, for all his unwavering hostility to liberalism and "advanced" opinions generally, was in many respects ahead of his times. We now can see that, like Kierkegaard, he anticipated certain views and attitudes characteristic of our own, which in part explains the continued interest which his philosophy arouses. Much

of his work is of course read by few beyond professed students. Controversies, however brilliantly conducted, quickly date, whilst the occasional nature of his writings has meant that with the passing of the occasion the work produced to meet it has fallen out of view, irrespective of its intrinsic worth. Newman's ideas on the psychology of faith, on the other hand, seem to have lost nothing of their point and to be able to enter the current of our own thinking more easily than that of his contemporaries. Moreover, the "existential" character of his apologetic method has of late been especially noted. Newman is a "modern" in that he makes no attempt to solve the problem of religious belief merely by appeal from the "evidences" offered by the external world to a postulated First Cause: "it is indeed", he once wrote, "a great question whether atheism is not as philosophically consistent with the phenomena of the physical world, taken by themselves, as the doctrine of a creative and governing Power." What he prefers is to contemplate the interior universe of mind and conscience, the dynamism of personality, in order to discover what in the final resort this must imply.¹⁷ His regard is focused on man's own consciousness of the human state, including its spiritual indigence and moral failure. Undenially it is this psychological approach that wins the readier response to-day.

¹ *Mémoires*, I, pp. 421, 426.

² Loisy expounded Newman's theory of development in the *Revue de Clergé français*, 1 December 1899, maintaining its superiority to that of either Harnack or Sabatier. "La théologie catholique", he claimed, "a eu de nos jours le grand docteur dont elle avait besoin. . . . Il lui a manqué peut-être quelques disciples."

³ The intensive study of Newman's philosophical outlook has been the work mainly of Continental scholars. Apart from Bremond's well-known book, *Newman: un Essai de Biographie psychologique* (an English translation of which, with an introduction by Fr Tyrrell, was published in 1907 under the title *The Mystery of Newman*), mention should be made of the following: E. Przywara, *Einführung in Newmans Wesen und Werk* (Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1922) and *Religions Begründung: Max Scheler und J. H. Newman* (Freiburg, 1924); A. Karl, *Die Glaubensphilosophie Newmans* (Bonn, 1941); J. Guittou, *La Philosophie de Newman* (Paris, 1933); M. de Nédoncelle, *La Philosophie religieuse de J. H. Newman* (Strasbourg, 1946); and H.-H. Walgrave, *Newman: le développement du Dogme* (Paris, 1956). Among studies by English-speaking authors are those of P. Flanagan, *Newman, Faith and the Believer* (London, 1946), and A. Dwight Culler, *The Imperial Intellect* (London, 1956).

⁴ His one attempt to present anything like a *schema* of his ideas on the subject of Faith was in the *Theses de Fide*, first edited by Fr Tristram in *Gregorianum*, 1937, pp. 219-60. These were compiled during his stay in Rome in 1847, and employ the technical scholastic phraseology. His special aim was to consider the relationship of faith and grace.

⁵ The nearest Newman comes to regarding faith as a bet is, perhaps, in one of the *Parochial Sermons*, when he says: "If it is but slightly probable that rejection of the Gospel will involve [a man's] eternal ruin, it is safest and wisest to act as if it were certain."

⁶ *Grammar of Assent* (ed. 1947), p. 80.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 83-4.

⁸ *Apologia* (ed. 1947), p. 219f.

⁹ See *Sermons, chiefly on the Theory of Religious Belief, preached before the University of Oxford* (1843).

¹⁰ Cf. Gordon Huntingdon Harper: *Cardinal Newman and William Froude, F.R.S.: a Correspondence* (Baltimore, 1933).

¹¹ *Grammar of Assent*, p. 219.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 252.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

¹⁴ "Certitude", Newman reminds us, "is a mental state: certainty is a quality of propositions." (*Ibid.*, p. 262.)

¹⁵ C. C. J. Webb, *God and Personality*, p. 114. Cf. the same author's *Religious Thought in the Oxford Movement*, pp. 131ff.

¹⁶ *Grammar of Assent*, p. 275: "It is a rule to itself, and appeals to no judgement beyond its own."

¹⁷ Nowhere does Newman envisage a sustained ontological inquiry like that undertaken, for example, by the late Maurice Blondel, whose indebtedness to Newman is sometimes urged. Much of Blondel's attention is given to the phenomenology of the dialectic of Action, but if his starting-point is the condition of finite being, his purpose in interpreting this is rigorously metaphysical.

THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE IGNATIAN EXERCISES

F. L. HILLIER

HUYSMANS in his book *En Route* says of his hero Durtal that "on taking up a copy of the Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius, and turning over the pages afresh, he did not change the harsh, almost hostile, opinion which he had retained" of it. "The fact is", writes Huysmans, "that these Exercises leave no initiative to the soul; they consider it as a soft paste good to run into a mould; they show it no horizon, no sky. Instead of trying to stretch it and make it greater, they make it smaller deliberately; they put it back into the compartments of their wafer-box, nourish it only on faded trifles, on dry nothings. This Japanese culture of deformed toes; this Chinese deformation of children planted in pots, horrified Durtal." Something of the same sort of horror, or at any rate of dislike, colours the rather vague ideas that many people still have about these famous Exercises. They are thought of as being very rigid—"cast-iron" is a favourite word. Now there is no doubt that a retreat purporting to be Ignatian may, like any other kind of retreat, be conducted in a manner that is quite unproductive of good fruit. But the falseness of the accusation of over-rigidity when brought against the Exercises themselves soon becomes apparent if the text be carefully studied, and if St Ignatius be allowed to speak for himself, especially through his Annotations, which are a kind of introduction to the Exercises proper.

St Ignatius is quite conscious that there are things in the Exercises which may not at first be clear, for immediately after the title he writes: "In order that he who gives as well as he who receives the spiritual Exercises may the more help and profit one another, it should be presupposed that every good Christian ought to be more ready to give a good sense to the doubtful proposition of another than to condemn it; and if he cannot give a good sense to it, let him inquire how the other understands it . . ."¹ The following of such

¹ Quotations in this article are taken, by permission, from W. H. Longridge, S.S.J.E., *The Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius of Loyola* (A. R. Mowbray and Co.).

sane counsel would make a great difference to controversy generally, and not only in the matter of spiritual exercises. St Ignatius himself knew well what it means to be misinterpreted—more than once he found himself a prisoner of the Inquisition, under suspicion of heresy, and at least in one instance as a laxist rather than a rigorist in doctrine. This important piece of advice, which stands as a sort of foreword to the whole book, indicates the essentially charitable atmosphere in which the Exercises ought to be made. It also reminds us of something that is most necessary for the proper understanding of the Exercises—that they were not designed to be delivered as “retreat addresses” to a number of people together, but to be “given” by word of mouth to one person by himself. It is in this way that the Exercises can be found to serve their purpose best—in private retreat with a conductor who will put himself entirely at the disposal of the retreatant. Such an arrangement makes it fairly sure that any “doubtful proposition” can be promptly dealt with. He who gives the Exercises and he who receives them are to be in partnership, to “help and profit one another”; they are to be workers together on the important matter in hand—for a man to conquer himself, and to seek and to find the divine will in the ordering of his life with a view to the salvation of his soul. (Annotation I.) Further, only the giving of the Exercises individually allows for the full observance of the direction of St Ignatius that they “ought to be adapted to the disposition of those who wish to make them, that is to say, according to their age, education, or capacity, lest to one illiterate or of weak constitution there be given things which he cannot bear without inconvenience, and by which he cannot profit. In like manner, according to the desires and dispositions of each there should be given him what may most help and profit him.” (Annotation XVIII.)

Throughout the book St Ignatius is most concerned that he who gives the Exercises should be overflowing with true pastoral spirit, having “compassion on the ignorant, and on them that are out of the way”. If he sees that he who receives the Exercises is in desolation and temptation, “let him not be hard or severe with him, but kind and gentle, encouraging and strengthening him for the future, pointing out to him the wiles of the enemy of human nature, and exhorting him to prepare and dispose himself for future consolation.” (Annotation VII.) It is related that on one occasion, in order to restore a retreatant who found himself exhausted, St

Ignatius entertained him by performing one of the old Basque dances—and the retreatant was Pedro Ortiz, who had once reported him to the Inquisition. "If he sees"—the conductor is not to wait to be told, although it is very advantageous that he "should be faithfully informed of the various agitations and thoughts which the different spirits excite in" the retreatant. He is to be always on the watch, not as wishing to pry into secrets but with tender concern for the retreatant's well-being, "because, according to the greater or less profit he finds, his director may be able to give him some suitable spiritual exercises adapted to the needs of a soul thus agitated". (Annotation XVII.) Here again is the matter of adaptation to individual needs, which can be given full scope only in private retreat; and a good conductor should be able to "change course" in accordance with the reactions of his retreatant. He is not to break the bruised reed nor to quench the smoking flax—the feebly-burning wick. On the other hand "if he sees"—again the note of watchful concern—"that he who receives the Exercises goes through them with consolation and much fervour, he must caution him not to make any promise or any inconsiderate and hasty vow; and the more he may find him to be of a light and unstable disposition, the more must he caution and admonish him. For . . . the peculiar character and condition of the exercitant must be carefully attended to, as also what amount of help or hindrance he may hereafter find in the accomplishment of the thing he would like to promise." (Annotation XIV.) As the low-spirited are to be encouraged, so those who are easily excited and impressed must be held back from promising what they may not be able to perform.

"Outside the Exercises", writes St Ignatius, "we may lawfully and meritoriously urge all who are probably fitted for it to choose continency, virginity, the Religious state, or any kind of evangelical perfection." But when the Exercises are being given in the seclusion of retreat, then quite a different line is to be taken. "He who gives the Exercises must not move him who receives them more to poverty or to any other promise than to their contraries, nor to one state or manner of life more than to another . . . , for in these spiritual Exercises"—as distinct from outside them—"it is more fitting and much better, in seeking the divine will, that the Creator and Lord himself should communicate himself to the devout soul, embracing and drawing it to his love and praise, and disposing it for that way of life in which it will best serve him for the future."

(Annotation XV.) Here is one of the richest treasures of the Exercises; in the search for the divine will—and to find this is the declared purpose of the Exercises—the Creator is to be allowed to take full charge, to be himself the conductor, embracing the soul and drawing it to his love and praise. As he who gives the Exercises is not to force his own will on the retreatant, still less is he to presume to dictate to God. In such a matter as a special vocation “he who gives the Exercises should not turn or incline himself to the one side or the other, but, keeping in the middle like a balance, should allow the Creator to work immediately with the creature, and the creature with its Creator and Lord.” The work of retreat is, up to a point, to be done by the conductor and the retreatant together, but always with a view to the direct contact of the retreatant with God.

So when it comes to the making of meditations, again the conductor is warned not to obtrude himself. “He who gives to another the method and order of meditating or contemplating ought faithfully to narrate the history of the contemplation or meditation, merely running over the points with a brief or summary exposition: because when the person who contemplates, taking the true groundwork of the history, and discoursing and reasoning for himself, finds something that makes the history a little clearer or more deeply felt (whether this happens through his own reasoning, or through the enlightenment of his understanding by divine grace), he thereby enjoys greater spiritual relish and fruit, than if he who gives the Exercises had fully explained and developed the meaning of the history: for it is not the abundance of knowledge which fills and satisfies the soul, but to feel and taste the matters interiorly.” (Annotation II.) A long sentence both in the English translation and in the original Spanish, and packed with spiritual riches. “To feel and taste the matters interiorly”—that is to be the fruit of the meditations, and they are to be made by the retreatant himself. He is to be given the subject, “the history”, in outline, and then he has to set himself to work it out on his own, always intent on “seeking that which he desires”. This is a favourite phrase with St Ignatius—part of the preparation for every meditation is the prayer “to ask for that which I desire”. The retreatant is to be very practical and purposeful. And “in the point in which I find that which I desire, there I will rest without being anxious to proceed farther, until I have satisfied myself.” In spite of what is considered by so many people to be the over-elaborateness of the Ignatian method of

meditation, with its preludes and points, St Ignatius himself makes it quite clear that, if in one point the retreatant finds something that seems to be specially meant for him, there in that point he is to stay until he has satisfied himself, until he has sucked all the juice out of it. He is to be like the sailor's wife with chestnuts in her lap, who "mounch'd and mounch'd and mounch'd". He is not supposed to hurry on from point to point, breathlessly trying to get through it all. And even when the meditation is to be repeated, it is not, as we might have supposed, the points left out before that we are to consider; on the contrary we are to mark and dwell on the very same points again in which we first found "greater consolation, or desolation, or greater spiritual relish". Great responsibility rests upon the conductor not to do all the work for the retreatant; and great responsibility rests upon the retreatant to find what it is that God is wanting to teach him.

Here again it is easier to strike the right balance in private retreat. In giving the outline of a meditation to a number of people at once the conductor has to provide more material than would be necessary for one person alone; but even so the tendency is for the conductor to provide too much, to make the meditation himself, so that there is hardly anything left for the retreatant to do. This is all against both the letter and the spirit of the Exercises. One of the reasons that St Ignatius gives for coming apart into retreat is that a man enjoys a freer use of his natural powers when he thus separates himself from his ordinary surroundings. The retreatant is not to be passive but active; retreat is not meant to be a spiritual rest-cure but a time for devoting our natural powers—reason, memory, understanding, will—to the things of God who bestows those powers on us. All the retreatant's solicitude "is to be placed on one thing only, namely, on the service of his Creator and the profit of his own soul"; and "the more our soul finds itself alone and in solitude, the fitter it renders itself to approach and unite itself to its Creator and Lord; and the closer it thus draws to him, the more it disposes itself to receive graces and gifts from his Divine and Supreme Goodness." (Annotation XX.) Again and again throughout the Exercises the same note is sounded—the humble yet direct approach of the soul to God. Before every meditation St Ignatius directs that the preparatory prayer shall be made without change—"to ask God our Lord for grace that all my intentions, actions, and operations"—i.e., all my activity of body, soul, and mind—"may be ordered

purely to the service and praise of his Divine Majesty". This title, "his Divine Majesty", is used very often in the Exercises; "the call of the eternal King" is the theme of one great meditation; and the spirit in which the Exercises may best be studied is the spirit in which St Ignatius wishes them to be made—"it will greatly benefit him who receives the Exercises to enter upon them with a courageous heart and with liberality towards his Creator and Lord, offering him all his will and liberty, in order that his Divine Majesty may make use of his person and of all he possesses according to his most holy will." (Annotation V.) Liberality, generosity, largeness of heart—this is not only the spirit in which the retreatant is to come to the Exercises, but it is also the spirit that he will find in them if they are given to him according to the mind of their author.

ATTIC DRAMA AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

J. JACKSON

THE Church is a Teaching Church, *Ecclesia Docens*. If therefore its ministers are to teach, their reading must be, as our Ordination Vow insists, first the Holy Scriptures supported by "such studies as help to the knowledge of the same". One of these studies I venture to suggest is the Attic Drama. Of all the rich inheritance which is ours—how large a part of it derives from Ancient Athens in history, philosophy, architecture, sculpture, poetry—indeed in the whole realm where intelligent understanding holds sway.

It is, I suggest, a standing miracle that during a flowering time of hardly 150 years Athens contributed so much to European culture—in every department in which the mind of free men finds sustenance. That contribution has not even yet run its course. The Attic Stage seems still able to throw some light upon the path along which mankind pursues its toilsome way.

What does Drama set out to do? What is its aim and purpose?

We might begin with Aristotle's well-known definition. "Tragedy", he says, "is an imitation of an action that is weighty, complete, and of a proper magnitude; it proceeds by action and not by narration expressed in graceful style [which varies in the several parts of the piece, to be acted, not merely narrated]; and it effects through pity and terror a *purgation* of these passions in the minds of the spectators." This definition has caused great difficulty for commentators. It turns upon the meaning of the word *katharsis* (purgation) which tragedy is supposed to effect. Perhaps he would say the function of the Tragic Drama is to appeal to our deepest sympathies and strongest passions, to arouse them and at the same time to pacify them, and, as it were, to draw off the dangerous stuff that lies upon our soul—in a word to resolve the perturbation of mind in some way: to re-establish a mental peace or harmony by contemplation of a transcendental truth.

Milton, in the closing lines of *Samson Agonistes*, the perfect example of a Greek Play in English, expresses the doctrine of *katharsis* thus:

His servants He, with new acquist
Of true experience from this great event
With peace and consolation hath dismissed
And calm of mind, all passion spent.

In a word the effect of Tragedy, witnessed in action or read in manuscript, is to re-establish a man's scale of values in relation to the outside world. Fundamentally this is the problem which confronts not only the Church, but the statesman and the educationalist. the parent and teacher, and in fact everyone who thinks with understanding on the contemporary scene to-day.

The cardinal idea of Greek Tragedy is—it has been said—the sense of an oppressive destiny, a fate against which the will of man blindly and vainly dashes. This conception of hereditary destiny seems to be strongly illustrated by many plays. Orestes, Oedipus, Antigone, are unable to escape their doom. Beautiful human heroism and exquisite innocence are alike sacrificed to the fatality attending a house upon which a curse is laid. But this inflexible fate is set in motion by a superior power; it operates in the service of offended Justice. Antigone, the best of daughters and most loving of sisters, dies miserably, not dogged by Fate, but having of her own free will exposed her life in obedience to the pure laws of the heart. Behind the notion of Fate there lies a profound sense of the Divine Government of the world, of a righteous power, punishing pride and vice, pursuing the children of the guilty to the tenth generation, but showing mercy to the contrite. It seems a mysterious and almost Jewish ideal of offended Holiness—this Nemesis which pervades the work of the tragedians. Guilt if unavenged at the moment brings calamity upon the offspring of the evil-doer. The Deity is jealous of all towering greatness and of all insolent prosperity. Nemesis punishes the pride of wealth and the lust of life. The ideal is that man should recognize his place—in moderation, modesty, the right proportion, the due mean.

The sublime illustration to the Greeks of the truth of this was the overthrow of a haughty and insolent race, cut off in all its pomp and power by the victories of Marathon and Salamis. It would, I think, be true to say that the conquest of the Persians by Athens in 480 B.C.

impressed itself upon the Greek mind and was never erased, just as the Jewish nation led by Moses out of Egypt and through the Red Sea regarded this deliverance as the Magna Charta of its divine destiny. The Jewish singer (Ps. 106) says: "He rebuked the Red Sea also and it was dried up: so he led them through the deep as through a wilderness. And he saved them from the adversary's hand: and delivered them from the hand of the enemy. As for those that troubled them, the waters overwhelmed them: there was not one of them left."

Aeschylus in 472, eight years after this—one of the very few decisive battles of the world—composed the *Persae* to illustrate the all-powerful, unerring course of Nemesis. Put briefly it is this. Pride begets impiety, impiety produces an insolent habit of mind which culminates in blindness. The fruit of this blindness is crime. It is only when the righteous man appears who performs an act of retributive justice, in obedience to divine mandates, and without the indulgence of any selfish passion, that the curse is stayed.

Aeschylus in all his tragedies is concerned to exhibit the irresistible power of the Moral Law. Sophocles fixes his attention upon the error of the guilty man. He interests us in the qualities by which he was betrayed into sin, and makes us feel that suffering is the inevitable consequence of arrogant or wilful acts. The weakness of the offender is more prominent than the vengeance of the outraged deity. In the *Antigone*, as we have already noted, he places alongside each other the claims of the State and the dictates of the human heart, and decides between them in what is perhaps the greatest tragedy of all time.

The problem of evil, it has been rightly said, has no solution on the intellectual plane at all. What for the Christian is the problem? It is to harmonize three axioms. (1) The absolute sovereignty of God—"I believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth and of all things visible and invisible." One will, and one only, creates, sustains, and orders all things: "Almighty and Everlasting God, who dost govern all things in heaven and earth." (2) The nature of God as all loving, all good, and all holy. (3) The reality of evil in God's world. Fundamentally it is this triangle that lies at the root, as I believe, of much of the apathy which besets the Church in its endeavour to proclaim its gospel. Quite frankly the goods we seem to offer are not wanted. In the minds of people when we preach the word there seems to lurk a prior question which the

average artisan, or rustic, or indeed instructed Church-goer, feels but is not at all ready, or perhaps even able, to formulate.

I have myself been amazed when I contemplate it, how in an ordinary congregation so few ever recite with conviction the Apostles' or the Nicene Creeds. I say—with conviction. Few seem to recite it as if it were—as indeed it is—the battle song of Christendom handed down to us across the centuries. It may be that the average Church-goer will not commit himself in a realm where his mental grasp seems so far behind the dictates of his heart. He feels he is on ground of which he is not quite sure: and although he knows that as a Christian he is committed to the truth of the Creed he is not quite certain upon what grounds he dare boldly and unreservedly make a declaration where his knowledge is not commensurate with his deepest desires. In a word, he is wont to confuse faith with credulity. Consequently, when his reason bids him hesitate, he is apt to become passive and mute lest he should appear to himself and to his God to utter more than he can support by his reason.

Or again, in the recitation of the psalms, he hears: "I have been young and now am old and yet saw I never the righteous forsaken nor his seed begging their bread." But the point is that we *do* see the righteous forsaken. St Paul in 2 Thess. 2. 7 speaks of *to musterion tes anomias energeitai*. The mystery of evil is still at work. Evil or lawlessness or breach in the Divine plan of the created world is a fact, and since intellectually it is insoluble, men have tried to find some solution on the emotional plane. Shakespeare raises the question in *King Lear*. Why should Cordelia's lack of tact lead to such appalling punishment? Or again, why are Romeo and Juliet star-crossed lovers? Why does Desdemona die at her husband's hand without one opportunity of explanation? Greek Tragedy, unlike its modern counterpart, does undertake to supply the solution, though I think, on occasion at least, Shakespeare also tries to lift the veil. But generally modern drama exhibits humanity in conflict, enlists our sympathy on the side of what is noble, or arouses our pity by the sight of innocence in misery—and leaves it at that. So in turning to Tragedy—great Tragedy—the underlying impression is that the theme is concerned with great characters, and, whatever befalls them, the order of things is not indifferent to them, but they do in fact approach the heart of reality. As I write these words I am reminded of a passage in Dr Iremonger's biography of William

Temple. Temple was rebuked in *The Times Literary Supplement* for a sentence of his in a lecture delivered before the National Book Council. He passed judgement on Hardy's *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*, suggesting that the general impression given by Hardy was that, although on the title page *Tess* is rightly described as a pure woman, *it did not really matter* whether she was or not. That, he said, was much more disastrous than if she had been, quite frankly, an impure woman. This is a shaft which goes directly to the heart of the matter and brings out in strong relief the great and divine quality of Greek Tragedy. It is true, of course, as Temple goes on to say, of Shakespeare. Far from ending on a note of despair or of complete indifference to human qualities, there is nothing in Shakespeare which leaves the gloom unrelieved. He mentions Hamlet: "O I die, Horatio. The potent poison quite o'er crows my spirit . . .", with the final: "The rest is silence." But even here Horatio immediately caps it with at least the gleam of future hope: "Now cracks a noble heart. Good night, sweet prince, And flights of angels sing thee to thy rest." Hardy pulls down the curtain on the statement that the President of the Immortals had only been having a game and now it was finished.

The Greek drama did deal with great persons and great themes—particularly in the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles; and even Euripides, who has been accused of making religion ridiculous and laughing up his sleeve, has in his delineation of Iphigeneia come as near to the Christian need of Divine Redemption as perhaps any pre-Christian writer could. Aeschylus' fundamental contribution is that the Moral Law—Nemesis—is part of the divine government of the world. The word Nemesis may strike as something impersonal—a power that restores the balance and brings back equilibrium. Can it not rather be contemplated as the Power of Deity which brooded over the face of the waters to bring order out of chaos, and harmony for discord? Aeschylus expresses it first as abstract and ideal, mythologically in the *Prometheus*. The offence of Prometheus against Zeus, though unselfish and generous, must be expiated by suffering. The rebellious demi-god must be brought at last to merge his will in that of Zeus. The same law is expressed typically in the *Oresteia*. Here a whole family is vitiated by the offence of their first ancestor. The hereditary curse is renewed and fortified from generation to generation until at last a reconciliation is effected between the purifying deities and the infernal powers of vengeance.

In the *Persae* the same law is exhibited as a fact of contemporary history—a matter of actual experience that the godless man should suffer and involve the innocent in his disaster. Thus the law of Nemesis is displayed first as an eternal verity; second it is actualized (in the *Oresteia*) and humanized within the region of heroic legend and third in the *Persae* it is used for the explanation of everyday events.

Let me in brief outline sketch the story of the *Oresteia* in the three plays of Aeschylus.

Agamemnon, the reigning king of the guilty house of the Pelopidae, had slain his daughter Iphigeneia, by divine order, to appease the angry Artemis, who was detaining wind-bound at Aulis the Greek fleet. The ships thus were able to start for Troy, which they took after ten years. Agamemnon returned with a princess and prophetess, Cassandra, and was received by his wife Klytemnestra with insincere welcome. With the aid of her paramour Aegisthos she kills treacherously both the king and Cassandra. (*Agamemnon*.)

After some years Orestes, his son, who had been sent away as a child for safety to Phokis, returns with his friend Pylades and makes himself known to his sister Elektra; and the three contrive a plot of vengeance. Disguised as a Phokian stranger, he is received by Klytemnestra and tells a tale of Orestes' death. She sends for Aegisthos, who enters the house and is immediately killed. Klytemnestra is told the news. Orestes comes out and drives her in to kill her on the same spot. (*Choephoroi*.)

Orestes is driven forth by the Furies and after years of wandering returns for refuge and sanctuary to the sacred store of Apollo at Delphi. The Furies pursue and fall asleep in the temple. Apollo sends Orestes, escorted by Hermes, to Athens and drives the Furies from his temple. They pursue Orestes and each side pleads before Athena, who summons the court of Areiopagus to settle Orestes' guilt or innocence. Orestes is acquitted and Athena, by fair words and promise of worship and honours, appeases the anger of the Furies, who are escorted by the Athenians and the goddess to their new shrine. (*Eumenides*.)

This great tragedy (*Eumenides*) is the drama of Completion and Reconcilement. The moral problem comes to the front and is solved. The powers of light, Apollo and Athena, are active to protect the morally innocent against the powers of darkness (the Erinyes). The lower view that *guilt lies in the deed*—this is fundamental to the

Greek mind—is embodied in the pursuing Furies; and here it conflicts with the higher view that *the innocent heart must be saved*, which is embodied in the rescuing Apollo, expressly representing the Will of Zeus. The gods of light fight with the gods of darkness and overcome.

Destiny, or the Cosmic Law, or, as I have hitherto described it, Nemesis may be thought a somewhat frigid concept upon which to base any kind of solution to the problem of evil. But it is well to point out that even in Homer there is a perceptible advance from a Power to which even Zeus is compelled to yield, to the conception of it as a quality of Zeus himself. *Moirai*, which was originally an ultimate fact in the constitution of nature, later appears as a law enacted by the personal will of the Supreme God, and the course of the world's history becomes the working out of his "counsel" or purpose. This all-controlling sway of Zeus is nowhere more strongly emphasized than in Aeschylus. He is addressed as the King of kings, most blessed among the blessed, of perfect power most perfect—the all-seeing, all-powerful father, the cause and accomplisher of all things, without whose will nothing either good or evil happens to men (*Suppliants* 524-6).

E.g., in the *Suppliants* ll. 86 ff:

Though the deep will of Zeus be hard to track
 Yet doth it flame and glance,
 A beacon in the dark, 'mid clouds of chance
 That wrap mankind. . . .
 Smitten by him, from towering hopes degraded
 Mortals lie low and still:
 Tireless and effortless, works forth its will
 The arm divine!
 God from his holy seat, in calm of unarmed power,
 Brings forth the deed at its appointed hour.

Here surely we are near the heart of the matter. For Aeschylus, Zeus is the upholder of the Moral Order: Justice, he says, poetically, is the daughter of Zeus, and divine justice is seen pre-eminently in the punishment of sin. This is his recurring theme. Dr Farnell in his *Outline History of Greek Religion* points out how the sculpture of the fifth century reveals to us how the Greeks at their best imagined their deities. The Olympian Zeus of Pheidias, wrought in gold and ivory, impressed later centuries as the supreme embodi-

ment of divine beauty, benignity, and calm. Livy tells us how Aemilius Paulus, the Roman general, when he visited the temple of Elis "was moved in spirit, seeming to see the very God before him" In the words of Aeschylus there is more than a ray of light:

To Zeus, whoe'er he be.
No power I know,
Save only Zeus, if I aside would throw
This burden of distress.

If we go a step further, and clothe the idea underlying and struggling to emerge, shall we not call it the need for Redemption? For this is the Christian answer—that evil is faced and overcome by a God who is all-great and all-loving. Its problem is solved in the desolation and in the triumph of the Cross.

It is significant how even this necessity—the necessity of sacrifice and even of a redeemer—is adumbrated by Euripides. He, as we know, failed to reach the divine plane of his great predecessor, yet in his delineation of noble, self-sacrificing character, in sheer contempt of life, when life has to be accepted on dishonourable terms, he is unsurpassed. Let me in brief outline recall two episodes which display first the unexampled human greatness of Polyxena, demanded as a sacrifice by the Greeks returning from Troy. The fleet is held up by want of favouring breezes on the shores of Thrace, and the life of Hecuba's sole surviving daughter is demanded by the shade of Achilles. Of course, on the Greek stage, the tragedy as always occurs within, and Ialhythius the herald narrates to Hecuba how her daughter has died:

. . . Breathless stayed the crowd.

But he: "O son of Peleus, father mine
Take these libations pleasant to thy Soul,
Draughts that allure the dead: come drink the black
Pure maiden's blood, wherewith the host and I
Sue thee: be kindly to us: loose our prow,
And let our barks go free: give safe return
Homeward from Troy to all, and happy voyage."
Such words he spake . . .
Then from the scabbard, by its golden hilt,
He drew the sword, and to the chosen youths
Signalled that they should bring the maid; but she:
"O men of Argos, who have sacked my town

Lo, free will I die! let no man touch
 My body: boldly will I stretch my throat.
 Nay, but I pray you, set me free, then stay:
 That free I thus may perish: 'mong the dead
 Being a queen, I blush to be called slave."
 She, when she heard the order of the chiefs,
 Seizing her mantle, from the shoulder down
 To the soft centre of her snowy waist
 Tore it, and showed her breasts and bosom fair
 As in a statue. Bending then with knee
 On earth, she spake a speech most piteous:
 "See you this breast, oh youth, if breast you will,
 Strike it: take heart: or if beneath my neck
 Lo! here my throat is ready for your sword,"

.
 And she, though dying, still had thought to fall
 In seemly wise hiding what eyes should see not.

That I think most exquisitely illustrates the *eupsychia* of Euripides.

The other episode, strange to say, is also concerned with the Grecian fleet on its way to Troy and hindered by unfavourable winds. The fleet was at Aulis, in Boeotia, and was about to set sail when Agamemnon, the commander-in-chief, had the misfortune accidentally to kill a stag which was grazing in a grove sacred to Artemis. The offended goddess sent continuous calms which delayed the departure of the fleet, and Calchas, the soothsayer who had accompanied the expedition, declared that nothing less than the sacrifice of Agamemnon's favourite daughter, Iphigeneia, would appease the wrath of the goddess. At these words the heroic heart of the brave leader sank within him and rather than consent he would give up his share in the expedition and return home. In this dilemma a council of the great chiefs was called and a decision was made that private feeling must yield to the welfare of the State. At length Agamemnon was persuaded that it was his duty to make the sacrifice. He therefore despatched a messenger to his wife Klytemnestra begging her to send Iphigeneia to him alleging as a pretext that the great hero Achilles desired to make her his wife. The daughter arrived at Aulis, but discovering to her horror the dreadful fate which awaited her she threw herself before her father and with tears entreated him to spare her young life. But alas! her doom was sealed,

and her heart-broken parent was powerless to avert it. The unfortunate victim was bound to the altar and already the fatal knife was raised to deal the death blow when suddenly Iphigeneia disappeared from view and, in her place, on the altar lay a hind of wondrous beauty ready to be sacrificed. It was Artemis herself, who pitying the youth and beauty of her victim, caused her to be conveyed in a cloud to Taurica, where she became one of her priestesses entrusted with the charge of her temple.

Tragic Conflict seems to me to attempt—and with some success—what pure intellectualism is powerless to do: to unravel the mystery of evil. The intellectual or Rational approach by its Theory of Dualism leads to Stoicism or despair. It presupposes rival camps in Heaven. God has withdrawn some of his Omnipotence. It recognizes a free and malignant evil in the world. This obviously denies the sovereignty of God. If we go a step further and deny the existence of God, the problem becomes just as acute, but it becomes the problem of good. This theory has appealed to some and underlies for example Hardy's complete pessimism. To him the world being completely purposeless and chaotic has no mystery of evil at all.

The Christian answer is profoundly difficult to formulate—except on the ground of Divine Purpose in an evolutionary process. We see not yet all things put under him. In the age-long process of human education into the perfection of the sons of God—*faith* tells us that perfection of character is only achieved by conquest over evil, pain, sorrow, and all the bitternesses which beset the upward path. God, the embodiment of Law, Justice, Right—dimly conceived by the greatest minds of antiquity—was hidden from the ages until by his Incarnation he himself entered into the lists, himself met, faced up to, and conquered evil, plucked the heart out of it on the Cross, and vindicated his triumph by the Resurrection. It is by this unique disclosure of Infinite Power combined with Infinite Love that the Christian Faith eclipsed, or shall we say, transformed, the lantern beams of pagan thought into the dazzling rays of Divine Revelation.

The process which I have tried to point out, is illustrated very wonderfully in Browning's lyric "Saul". David is summoned to minister to his beloved master King Saul in one of his mental depressions. His harp has usually brought refreshment and renewal to the Warrior King: full of hope therefore, David enters the royal pavilion where the King stands in great mental agony but in the trappings of kingship, an object of real devotion that stirs to the

depth the princely mind of David. He takes his lyre and begins to play the kind of music that the Shepherds and sheep know well when penned each night, of the music by which birds are attracted and tamed, of the harvest-home, at the burial of great heroes, the wedding songs or the grand diapason as the Levites in procession go up to the altar in glory, enthroned. But all to no avail. He tries again with songs of manhood, of monarch, and the joys of living, of the seasons of life in all its varied manifestations, of Saul's own prowess. The whole round of Creation he encircles, but alas! nothing but a sigh or a momentary stir. Finally David lays down his lyre and looks into his own heart; it almost breaks with emotion as he tries to measure his own great love for Saul. And then like a flash the secret lies revealed. "'Tis not what man does that exalts him, but what man *would* do!" David reflects upon his own limitless desire to save and restore his kingly friend. How much more then the Godhead for the work of his own hands?

Would I suffer for him that I love?

So would'st Thou, so wilt Thou,

So shall crown Thee, the topmost, ineffablest, uttermost crown.

'Tis the weakness in strength that I cry for. My flesh that I seek

In the Godhead. I seek and I find it, O Saul, it shall be

A Face, like my face that receives thee; a man like to me

Thou shalt love and be loved by, for ever: a Hand like this hand

Shall throw open the gates of new life to thee! See the Christ
stand!

“NO ROOM FOR THEM IN THE INN”

E. F. F. BISHOP

THIS phrase is generally taken to mean that there was an inn in Bethlehem too crowded for the expectant Mother and her husband or that the inn-keeper made this an excuse for turning them away.

J. B. Phillips renders the phrase: “no place for them inside the inn”. The Lukan context, however, seems the only place in the N.T. where *topos* is rendered *room* in the “official” versions.¹ This translation-fact in itself lends unfortunate justification to the slant all too often given to the words as related to an historical situation and leads to an application, which, though true in itself, should surely not be based on a false assumption. Yet how often in 1956 at Christmas-time was this phrase quoted in sermons or broadcast talks, as if it intimated that the Holy Family were refused admission to the *kataluma* and so were forced to go and fend for themselves elsewhere! The much later Johannine statement, based on the rejection of the Lord by his contemporaries, that he was “not received by his own”,² is read back into the scene at Bethlehem at the time of the Nativity. This is a gratuitous calumny on the indigenous hospitality of Palestine, of which there is no reason to suppose the Jewish inhabitants of, and visitors to, Bethlehem on that memorable occasion were devoid.

Whether or not *kataluma* should be translated “inn” or “guest-house” does not alter this fact. Christmas cards too are not blameless in this interpretation, when standing in the doorway of the “inn” is pictured a quite imaginary inn-keeper (there is no warranty of scripture for bringing him in) who raises his hands in attitude of indication that the building is “full up”. This is as western an idea as that which the hymn presupposes, when reference is made to “that poor lonely stable”, for anyone familiar with oriental ways would know this to be out of the question, especially in such circumstances as recorded by St Luke. It appears to be generally conceded that the material in the two opening chapters of Luke is in the debt of the Lord’s Mother. She in rehearsing the experience would surely expect her words to be taken at their face value. There was no available

spot in the inn for the expectant Mother, so recourse was had to a cave³ (perhaps connected with the *kataluma*),—but where there would be privacy; and no one can doubt that necessary ministrations would have been available through Hebrew women near at hand. It so happens that in some Arabic versions the Greek word is rendered *mawdi'*, one of several for "place", while the root in both Classical and Colloquial is used for "bringing forth a child".

Topos occurs in Luke in other contexts (as in other books⁴) and is consistently translated "place", implying a place or spot that could be occupied. It is the "place where" the narrative occurred, as with the "sermon on the plain",⁵ or where something happened, as when the Levite passed by the spot where the wounded traveller was lying,⁶ or when the "pushing" guest was required to vacate his "place".⁷ There seems to be something definitely geographical in the references to *topos*. It *might* mean "a room" rather than "room" in given circumstances. This is unlikely in the Nativity story. Whether we render "inn" or "guest-house", Bethlehem was a small place, two miles off the main road south to Hebron, and its buildings may well have consisted of a single room, though large enough to accommodate several travellers. If only it had been more "roomy"! But it was not so.

There is another word in the N.T., *chorein*,⁸ which in some contexts may have the implication of "room" as heard too often in sermons at Christmas-time. This is what the particular *topos* may or may not provide. Thus Peter's house in Capernaum did not have the requisite space available for accepting any further guests;⁹ the water-pots at the Feast at Cana had room for "two or three firkins" each;¹⁰ while the world itself would not have room for all the things that Jesus said and did.¹¹ There were sayings of the Lord which he realized some people would not have room for;¹² while St Paul asked his Corinthian friends to make room for him (and others) in their hearts.¹³ In these contexts the implication seems to refer to something spatial whether in fact or metaphor, while *topos* is more material, something reducible to measurement and geography. R.V.M. translates the third Johannine passage: "My word hath not place in you".¹⁴ *Topos* could hardly be employed in any of these contexts.

The main issue, however, is not philological but human. We must get away from western assumptions about eastern ways and customs. We must refuse to read back the great rejection into the

simple story of the birth of Messiah and accept the words of his Mother for what they say, without inferring improbabilities. If it be only too true that there is "no room" for Messiah in the human heart as was the apostolic experience in Corinth, it must not be allowed to rest on questionable exposition, so far as the Lukan statement of fact is concerned.

This experience of the Holy Family in Bethlehem should never be compared with any refugee situation in the world, not even the Palestinian tragedy, much less be used as a lever for rousing of emotions or raising of charitable funds. The relief of human suffering has its Christian vindication as one outcome of the Incarnation, as St Peter saw, of him who "went about doing good".

Perhaps, then, the Lukan passage might be paraphrased to mean that, no spot in the local inn or guest-house being available, recourse was had to a cave (so Justin Martyr) in the vicinity, where both privacy and assistance would be forthcoming; and where, as all through the history of the country, there would be accommodation for people and animals—hence the mention of the manger.

¹ Luke 2. 7.

² John 1. 11. Bernard mentions Mark 6. 4; Matt. 13. 57; Luke 4. 24 (John 4. 44) in this connection; but not the Nativity passage.

³ So Justin Martyr. (Cf *Jesus of Palestine* 41, 42).

⁴ E.g. the references in the Fourth Gospel (4. 20; 5. 13; 6. 10, 23; 10. 40; 11. 6, 30, 48; 14. 2, 3; 18. 2; 19. 13, 17, 20, 41; 20. 7, 25).

⁵ 6. 17.

⁶ 10. 32.

⁷ 14. 9.

⁸ Thayer: *Greek-English Lexicon*, 674. There are two passages where this translation can scarcely hold (Matt. 15. 17; 2 Pet. 3. 9).

⁹ Mark 2. 2.

¹⁰ John 2. 6.

¹¹ John 21. 25.

¹² Matt. 19. 11, 12.

¹³ 2 Cor. 7. 2. See Moulton and Milligan: *Vocabulary*, 695.

¹⁴ John 8. 37.

THE PARISH ACTION GROUP

An Experiment in Parish Evangelism

W. E. BEVERIDGE

THERE is a growing conviction among many Church people to-day that evangelism is properly the task of the Church in the parish.

Neither evangelistic campaigns on the grand scale nor the occasional parish mission are of themselves sufficient to draw those who are outside the life of the Church within its love and fellowship.

What is needed above all is the day-by-day concern of the Church in the parish for the people of the parish, a concern extended through weeks and months and indeed years.

The life of the Church must be a perpetual mission. The Christian who is not a missionary is a contradiction in terms, and the Church which is not an evangelizing Church is disobedient to its Lord's clear command.

The vast majority of people to-day are unrelated to the Church and its message. We must begin to meet that unrelatedness by realizing first that the Church is not a social clique which spends its members' time and energy in arranging religious services for the few on Sundays and an intricate programme of self-entertainment—parties, socials, drama groups, badminton clubs, music circles, and so on—during the rest of the week.

The Church is an evangelizing agency. Its task is to bring the Love of God to the people of the parish in which it is placed.

And so we start simply by doing that—showing our care and concern for the people of the parish, mediating to them the Love of God through our own human love.

This means not primarily inviting them to come to Church or to parish activities but helping them in their problems and difficulties, visiting them when they are in hospital, tiding them through an emergency like looking after a child when its mother is ill, mourning with them when they mourn, and rejoicing with them when they rejoice.

This kind of Christian concern for people is not merely the task of the clergy or a few particularly enthusiastic Church folk. It is the

task of the whole Church. It is the whole Church which is the Body of Christ. It is the whole Church which brings his Love down into the commonplace of the everyday needs of the people who live in the parish.

This article aims briefly to set down how this was attempted in one suburban parish and what happened as a result.

I

The parish of The Ascension, Preston Road, Wembley, only became a parish in 1951. Before that it had been a Conventional District of the London Diocesan Home Mission and had been established in 1937.

In the early thirties the district around Preston Road consisted mainly of fields and farmland. The Metropolitan Railway ran nearby and stopped, by special request only, at a wooden halt. To-day the spread of London has enveloped the fields and open spaces. The parish of The Ascension consists of almost sixty roads of semi-detached villas erected in the middle thirties on housing estates or council houses put up since the war. More than ten thousand people live in the parish. The wooden halt has become a modern concrete station which disgorges each evening workers from the City and the West End not only returning to their homes in Preston but catching buses that take them on to Kenton, Kingsbury, and other parts of Wembley.

There are no factories at all in the parish though there are large concerns like G.E.C., Wrigley's, the British Oxygen Company, and so on in neighbouring parishes and many of our people work in them. Even the local schools are all outside the parish boundaries. The parish is just houses, houses, and more houses with some good modern shops in the station area. But houses are the places where people live and our concern is with people all the time, though we recognize of course the influence upon them of their working environment.

The parish church has only just been completed. The experiments carried out in the parish have been done while we were compelled to use a temporary church which was normally intended to hold about two hundred people but has sometimes been made to hold half as many again at several services on the same day.

We began our approach to the parish by appointing a number of people we called *Road Stewards*. The Road Stewards were, as far as possible, hand-picked by the Incumbent and they were asked by him if they would undertake to do four things on behalf of those who lived in their road.

These were that they should (a) notify him of sick or hospital cases in the road, births, deaths, new arrivals, and so on, (b) visit the sick and invalid as directed by him, (c) distribute the parish magazine each month in their road not by pushing it through people's letter boxes but by making a brief personal call each month, (d) exhibit a church poster both to give news and as an act of witness. The posters were not about jumble sales but showed times of services and the message that "Your Road Steward, who lives here, will be glad to give you all information". A number of the Stewards erected boards on which to display their posters.

To help the Stewards let their neighbours know of their new task in the street we had three thousand letters printed for distribution to families throughout the parish.

The Stewards were asked to deliver these letters personally. It was suggested that they say something on the lines of: "Good evening, I am from the Church of the Ascension, your parish church. This is a letter from the Vicar." At this the Steward handed over the letter and departed unless the neighbour showed an inclination to talk.

At a Parish Meeting afterwards when the Road Stewards presented their reports on the manner in which their parish visiting had gone, it was amazing—and exciting—to discover just how many people were in fact prepared to talk further. The letter had been refused only by a few Roman Catholics. Everybody else, including our Free Church parishioners, had accepted it. In many cases the new Steward was invited to come inside. As a result some Stewards took several nights instead of one in visiting their streets. One of the things that surprised them most was the number of people who not merely were not unpleasant but who actually welcomed a visit from someone linked with the Church. The experience of calling upon their neighbours, about which several of them had felt uneasy, turned out in the end to have been for most a pleasant and rewarding piece of work.

The letter itself, which was written to some extent so that the Road Stewards might have an excuse for paying their visits, was short and straightforward.

It said simply:

A LETTER FROM THE VICAR OF YOUR PARISH

Dear Parishioner,

You will readily understand that in a parish the size of The Ascension with 10,000 residents, it is simply not possible for me to call on everyone or to know of every case of sickness or need.

Often parishioners enter hospital and leave again without a visit just because I have never been told. Newcomers arrive in the neighbourhood and are not given a welcoming call because I have not known about their coming.

To help me in my work in the parish therefore I have appointed a number of Road Stewards who will let me know of cases of illness, etc., in their road.

Your Road Steward is
who lives at

It would help tremendously if you ever wish for the Church's help because of illness or for any other reason if you would inform your Road Steward.

Needless to say, we are always delighted to see you at the Church of The Ascension any time you come. You will find a list of services on the other side of this letter and there will always be a notice of any special events posted at your Road Steward's house.

As a result of this parish visitation numbers at the services began to improve and the magazine circulation grew steadily from 400 copies each month to its present level of over 1,000 each month. This means that one home in every three in the parish now takes the parish paper.

We had already changed the title from *Ascension News* to *The Preston Messenger* and had had a two-colour cover designed to illustrate the theme, "The Church brings the Message to the People of the Parish". The magazine had not only this cover, together with eight pages of copy and seven of local advertising, but contained also the paper of the London Diocese, *The London Churchman*, as an inset. We tried to set out our news and views in an attractive manner. The steady growth of our circulation was a great encouragement.

3

At this point we felt it time to make further plans for our parochial life at two Parish Meetings.

As a result we took the difficult step of altering the schedule of our Sunday services. We had had the usual 8 o'clock Holy Communion, 11 o'clock Mattins, and 6.30 Evensong, with a Sung Eucharist at 9.30 on the first and third Sunday mornings.

We now introduced what we called the *Family Eucharist* at 9.30 every Sunday. This is sung simply but with a full choir. Children are welcomed and are invited to come to the Altar rails with their parents. As the priest moves along the line of communicants he is able also to lay his hand in blessing upon the head of each child.

A brief Instruction follows the singing of the Creed, and Sunday by Sunday the Bread and Wine are brought from a table at the West End of the Church by two members of the congregation.

This simple Offertory Procession is most effective. The Bread and Wine are arranged beforehand on the table where there has also been placed the alms dish. The Sidesmen put the alms-bags upon this dish and one of them carries it to the Sanctuary, following the couple with the Elements.

The two people to bring the Bread and Wine are always chosen with wisdom and care by the Vicar's Warden from among those at the service. On one Sunday they may be a newly-engaged couple, on another two National Servicemen home on leave. One of the most moving occasions was when a father and mother were chosen whose little boy had gone into hospital for a serious operation only the day before.

The said Celebration at 8 o'clock has not been in any way altered.

On the first Sunday morning of each month, however, we combine the two Celebrations into an 8.30 *Parish Communion*. This is followed by a Parish Breakfast. The Breakfast is largely attended by the teen-agers of the parish and forms a useful "Post-Confirmation" meeting place. A sufficient number of adults loyally attends each month to prevent the Breakfast becoming entirely a teen-age preserve.

Mattins had never been a satisfactory service. The Senior Sunday School children, in company with a couple of dozen older people, were accustomed to be present for the singing of the Office. During the second hymn they clattered noisily out to their instruction

classes and left the priest to complete the service with a very limited congregation indeed.

This now was changed to *Young People's Mattins*. After some experiments we settled down to the routine of singing the Office with only the boys of the choir to lead us. We use the same easy chants each Sunday. This may sound a little dismal but the young people soon became so familiar with them that the singing has gained a new enthusiasm.

The Second and Third Collects are said by everyone together. A hymn follows, then a brief instruction and some prayers which end with the Grace, again said by everyone. A hymn and the Blessing bring the service to a close.

Thus we have altogether three hymns, the full Office, and an address. The service lasts about three-quarters of an hour and the young people stay for it all. The priest has also the opportunity to instruct his younger teen-agers himself every Sunday morning.

No roll is called, but the boys and girls are given membership cards which are stamped at the door as they come in to the service. The name "Sunday School" has been set aside and each youngster is enrolled into membership of the "Preston Pioneers" on being presented with his or her "Pioneer" card.

Junior wardens have been appointed and junior sidesmen give out books, take the collection, and tidy up afterwards.

As was only to be expected, some of the adults did not much like the new arrangements and a few of them left and went to Mattins elsewhere. But most of them stayed faithfully on. The number of young people attending has jumped from about sixty to more than three times that number. Several parents have also started coming with their children, so that the number of adults present is now greater than in the days before the rearrangement of the service took place.

Evensong we did not change except that to the first Sunday evening of the month we gave the title "Good Neighbour Evening", and marked it by explaining the service simply as we went along, giving out the page numbers in the Prayer Book and inviting everybody into the Youth Centre afterwards to "meet and greet their neighbours" over a cup of tea. We ask Churchpeople to bring to this service their neighbours who may not be accustomed to Prayer Book worship.

The parishioners at the Parish Meeting felt that Evensong, explained simply in this way, was a better introduction to public worship than a "home-made" service held at another time. Evensong is our best attended service and we felt that any difficulties the stranger might have, if they were not fully overcome by the giving out of page numbers and the simple explanation of what we were doing, were at least compensated for by the newcomer's being present with a larger number of the Christian family at worship than would have been likely to come to some alternative service such as an Epilogue held later in the day.

Our success, without being in any way spectacular, was sufficient to encourage us to take our Road-Stewarding even more seriously than we had been doing.

Quite soon, however, we felt the need for some kind of fellowship among ourselves. There were disappointments as well as rewards. We felt we needed each other's strength to help us tackle our failures again as well as an opportunity to pass on our ideas and criticisms and so on.

Road Stewards, as they began to know their neighbours a little better, found they were being asked questions to which they did not always know the answer. They wanted advice, help, encouragement, the opportunity to air their views and, above all, Christian fellowship.

Already from time to time we held a Parish Meeting, when we met to discuss our common action on the parish or to listen to a speaker giving the Christian viewpoint on some problem of the day. But the Road Stewards felt that something more was needed.

So was born the idea of the *Parish Action Group*.

We replanned our parish activities with the slogan, "Wednesday night is Church night". A parish activity (Parish Meeting, Parish Social, etc.) was put on the second Wednesday of each month, the Church Council meeting on the fourth.

This left the first and third Wednesdays for the Action Group, and we immediately began to make plans as to how we could use them best.

4

To begin with, we felt we needed to know more about our Bibles. So we set aside the first half-hour to be used in Bible study. The Bible study had however, we were sure, to be related to our daily life and

not to become merely academic. So the devotional approach would be used.

Secondly, there were the questions that had begun to be asked of Road Stewards. We had to find time to discuss these as well as affairs of the day about which the Stewards might be asked to give the Christian view-point.

Thirdly, as the Stewards got to know their neighbours more and more they discovered so many things that needed praying about—the particular needs of someone in the street, a situation they did not know how to deal with and about which they wanted guidance, people sick or in distress who came in time to ask directly for the prayers of the Group. So for the last part of the evening we decided to meet in the Chapel to pray together for all our parish needs.

Our aim all through was to make our Bible study, our discussion, and our prayers real by keeping them closely linked with our daily lives.

When the Action Group was being formed there appeared in the parish magazine this statement of its aims :

For the first half-hour we shall have a brief Bible study. For the second half-hour we shall discuss the problems that we have actually met—perhaps as Road Stewards in our street, perhaps just as ordinary Christians in our offices or workshops or wherever we spend our working day. Then for a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes we shall go into the Chapel and be silent, seeking to make our prayers a living reality in our lives.

Bible reading, discussion, prayer—all linked up, you see, with the life of the places where we live and work.

The awful danger about so many Church organizations of the devotional sort is that they become pious cliques, cut off from the ordinary daily life of our world and all its problems and opportunities.

This we aim to avoid by linking our Bible study, our talk, and our prayer in a very real fashion with our ordinary daily life.

It is still the street, the office, the workplace, the schoolroom that remains the scene of our daily witness. But on these two Wednesdays each month we meet that we may find together fellowship at a deeper level than mere social activities are able to provide, and in order that we may be strengthened to bear our Christian witness more faithfully in our world, in order that through us as the Church of God our Lord may go into action in the parish where we are set.

In another issue of the magazine a few months later it was claimed that the Action Group was becoming a "training ground for those Church people who are not content to regard their Christian Faith as a matter of private consolation but see in it a challenge to the whole community and are prepared to take their share in offering that challenge to the community".

Readers may be interested to hear briefly just how the Wednesday evenings are conducted and what sort of things are discussed and prayed about.

We begin in the hall with a few moments' silence, then a prayer. Someone reads over the passage of Scripture that we are to think about, usually from one of the modern translations. The priest expounds this simply and devotionally, trying to relate it to our own vocation as twentieth-century evangelists to the parish. Occasionally a question is asked. The tone of the first half-hour is at once devotional and practical. The first book we studied was the Epistle to the Ephesians. We then read St John's Gospel and shared round one or two copies of William Temple's commentary. We are now reading the Acts of the Apostles.

In the discussion half-hour we have dealt with such queries as: "I called on a new family in the road. The lady who opened the door said the family had never been attached to a church as they had no belief in anything like that. I did not know what to say so simply murmured, 'I'm sorry'. What should I have said?" "One family in the road say they don't come because we are too high church but another family say they go elsewhere because we are too low church. How did all this business of 'high' and 'low' start?" "A man in the road said he didn't believe in a God of love because his wife died of cancer." We have ranged from Divorce to Disestablishment, from Ritual to Rationalism. There is no lack of topics to discuss. The only difficulty is to get them all in.

Obviously, in every discussion the aim is to get the Stewards expressing their views freely and then to try to lead the talk towards a positive Christian approach to the problem.

For our prayers we gather in silence in the Chapel. The priest reads out the list of names of those who are sick at home or in hospital. He pauses after each name to explain how the patient is progressing, then all pray in silence. Road Stewards' requests follow—a prayer for a family which is in danger of breaking up, a prayer for a young mother who is considering preparation for

Confirmation, a prayer for a Road Steward that she may be guided in her dealings with a neighbour who half wants to come to church but has not yet plucked up the courage to take the decisive step, a prayer for a Jewish lady who has asked the Steward for the Group's prayers on behalf of her husband who is dangerously ill in hospital, a prayer for someone who has to undergo a severe operation and is afraid.

After the silence we dedicate ourselves anew to our Lord's service, we join in saying the Family Prayer, the Evening Collect, and the Grace. Then out once more into the roads and streets that make up the parish to bear more strongly our witness for our Lord and to mediate his Love to his children who live as our neighbours in the same streets and roads and avenues as ourselves.

5

You cannot easily assess the results of an experiment like this. We can say, however, that our Communicants have almost trebled in number in the past six years, that we have never before had so many Confirmation candidates and particularly adult candidates (they all do an eight-month course—separate for adults and juniors—ending with a week-end spent at Whan Cross, the London Diocesan Retreat House), the Church is well filled for the Family Eucharist at 9.30, for Young People's Mattins at 11 o'clock, and again for Evensong.

There is a new sense of responsibility amongst the Road Stewards, and many who are not Road Stewards, and a feeling of solidarity in many of the streets, a feeling that rises from the awareness that somebody cares.

Two examples may illustrate this.

An elderly man from one road in the parish has been in hospital for almost two years. He has no relatives in London. The Road Steward, in spite of being a busy housewife with a husband and two children, has given up almost every Wednesday afternoon during those two years to going to the hospital to visit that man. He had never been closely linked with the life of the Church but in his need it is the Church, through the action of the Road Steward, that has shown care and concern and love.

A young mother went into hospital leaving her husband to look after their nine-year-old daughter. The Road Steward received the child into her home each day after school and looked after her until her father returned from his work. Not only that, but she did the

shopping and added the man's laundry to her own Monday washing until his wife came out of hospital.

As an example of how this Love catches we may mention a young woman, a school teacher, who said : "You haven't got a Road Steward for such-and-such a road. I'll visit there if you like." She did, and in a few months had made contact with a family that once had had a Church link. They were won into the life of the parish church. They took over the stewarding of their own road. The young school teacher tackled a second road and did exactly the same thing there. A family was won into the life of the Christian Family and in due course took over responsibility for their road. A third road has just been put into the care of the young teacher.

The writer is firmly convinced that what has been done at The Ascension can be done in any suburban parish or new housing area. The laity are only too anxious to do their part. All they ask is to be given a lead, to be shown what to do and to be offered some advice on how to set about it.

We are convinced at The Ascension that Road Stewarding and the Parish Action Group have been used of God in our parish. We believe that this method may well be the means of enabling other parishes to find something of the excitement and joy of witnessing to our Lord that we have been privileged to find here.

REVIEWS

ETHICS

THE SPRINGS OF MORALITY. Edited by JOHN M. TODD. Burns Oates. 30s.

THIS book had its origin in a conference held at Downside Abbey in 1955, each chapter arising out of a particular paper and the discussions which followed it. Except for Nana Nketsia IV, paramount chief of the English Sekondi State, who writes on the morality of the Akan people of the Gold Coast and of the Nuer of the Southern Sudan, all the contributors are Roman Catholics. But everyone can welcome the book for its honesty in raising searching and awkward questions; for its courageous readiness to indulge in a frank criticism of certain viewpoints circulating in its own communion, and for its display of a theological empiricism such as is generally to be found only outside the Roman fold. Altogether, the book is characterized by a superbly empirical approach, and a desire to grapple with morality as concrete practical behaviour.

The book opens with a discussion of moral philosophy in general and argues that "the apprehension of God is the recognition of moral obligation and vice versa" (p. 17). Alternatively, "the experience to which people refer when they speak of being *obliged* to live up to a moral standard and the experience to which people refer when they speak of discovering God in his action upon them, are the same experience". It is true that what Dom Illtyd Trethowan means here by "the same experience" needs and deserves a great deal of elucidation. But I am sure he is on the right lines for explicating the connections between morality and religion, and he usefully refers us to what he has said in other places.

Then follow four chapters which survey something of the historical setting of Christian morality: its basis in the Bible; its relation to Greek and Roman morality; the moral issues of the Middle Ages; and there is lastly a chapter which, while titled: "The English Protestants", might be better called "English Evangelical Morality as typified in John Wesley, the Methodists and William Booth".

The next four chapters discuss those "Secondary Sciences" which contribute to the concept and practice of morality, i.e. psychology, medicine, economics, and international relations. Chapter XIII, by Dr John Marshall, who is Senior Lecturer in Neurology in the University of Edinburgh, and who sets out the bearing of recent medical research on morality, is among the best in the book, and if any one wishes to see the crucial questions which recent medical research raises for morality, he could not do better than read these eight pages. What of those actions,

for example, which at first sight we should unquestionably call "sinful", which turn out however to be "compulsive" and due, for example, to the disturbance of the biochemical contents of the body? Contrariwise, though (to mention a case raised in a later chapter), what of those summoned for assault and shop-lifting, who say: "I did not know what I was doing. I acted automatically." Must crime be only a form of lunacy, and sin a mental aberration?

Here are issues presented to us in such a way that their challenge is unmistakable; and a similar challenge reappears in the next six chapters which sketch typical moral problems as they present themselves to a schoolmaster, an employee, an employer, a man of letters, and a confessor. Though only one chapter is specifically concerned with problems of sex, there are in these chapters and elsewhere in the book some refreshing comments on sex and marriage generally. We can see how, as in the Anglican Church, discussion is coming to be directed more and more towards a positive theology of marriage rather than towards legal niceties about divorce or validity.

The concrete moral problems which are developed in this section of the book are so well sketched, and so well discussed, as to make it perfectly evident that there are no easy solutions. In a chapter which introduces the book we are told that the group would like to see "established in England an Institute of Theology at which it would be possible to study the inter-relation between doctrine and the concrete experience of the life of the ordinary layman" (p. 3). Especially in relation to the moral problems that concern employees and employers would the kind of all-round co-operation provided by an Institute of Theology be beneficial, as the editor notes in a separate comment to the relevant chapters. In such an Institute, too, doctor and priest could learn those close contacts which recent developments of medicine would seem inevitably to demand. The desirability of such doctor-priest co-operation is raised again in Father Gerald Vann's chapter on "The Confessor's Problem". A word of special praise is due to Father Vann for the mixture of practical insight, self-criticism, and spiritual discernment which this chapter combines, and I wish all priests could read it.

The book concludes with seven chapters on moralities outside the Church: the morality of primitive societies; Buddhist morality; Judaic morality; a scientific-humanist morality; a purely secular morality; and a Communist morality. All through there is a desire to be accurate and well-informed about what is being discussed, and I liked especially the discussion of Buddhist morality, where Dr David Snellgrove makes the important point that the only way to begin to compare Buddhist and Christian morality is to look at the actual lives of Buddhists and Christians. Faced with the devoted contemplation and generous charity of a Buddhist monk, let us ask: "Is it likely, is it even humanly possible, that all this should in fact be founded on a pure nihilism?" (p. 257). It is true that important questions are then raised which demand long answers, but if we start in Dr Snellgrove's way, the answers will be worth waiting for. Meanwhile, even if Buddhism and Christianity name two

separate mountains, "there are still grassy slopes that lead across, if one has but the will to follow them" (p. 252). All through these chapters there is a most admirable endeavour to be fair to non-Christian viewpoints and to be critical of Catholic misrepresentations. Let us only remark that not all Catholic misrepresentations roost at Rome.

The book is called "The Springs of Morality", but it treats rather of streams and rivers with all the problems and challenges they bring. Fortunately it never takes us to that ocean of platitudes and principles which has so often passed for ethics. The book displays a vigorous empiricism, a desire to study morality in the concrete, an honest self-criticism, a rejection of all easy solutions, and many penetrating insights. For myself I can only hope that if this Downside group ever founds an Institute of Theology, its desire to foster "communication" (p. 1) will not exclude two-way traffic with Anglicans. For many of their problems are ours, as the William Temple College at Rugby in part bears witness.

I. T. RAMSEY

LAW AND MORALITY

THE MORAL DECISION: RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN LAW. By EDMUND CAHN. Mark Paterson for Indiana University Press. \$5.00.

THE distinction between a Court of Law and a Court of Morals is more often made than examined. Some have spoken as if legality and morality were entirely separated. But has the law no moral authority behind it? Can morality never express itself in any social rules? Others have spoken as if legality and morality were identical, so that any one who has been legally convicted must inevitably have done wrong. But the multiplication of the most complex regulations, and the development of legal interpretation so far that common words, e.g. "vehicle", "vessel", "obstruction", take on something other than their ordinary meaning, make the law not only seem to the moralist silly, but on occasions positively immoral.

Professor Cahn has some interesting points to make about the relations between law and morality, and concludes that while there are moral values in the law, there are certainly moral values outside the law, and that the main practical difference between law and morality is in the respective methods by which their demands are enforced. He has (p. 57) a useful summary of how the "good" may be modified when it makes its appearance as "the good-in-law", and how this modification, while it can be practically useful, brings also with it certain risks which can bring the law into moral disrepute.

Thereafter, and for most of the book, he illustrates the general relation between law and morality by examining concrete legal decisions (and the moral judgements they display) from the point of view of a more-than-legal morality. The decisions may well serve (and perhaps in most cases do serve) as moral guides; but sometimes (as he shows) they can misguide. Anyway, every one of some twenty cases is used as a model by which to sharpen our moral insight, and around which to develop a more informed and reasoned moral judgement.

Most of the examples are from the Law of Rights—though some are from the Law of Procedure, and all of them epitomize a particular slice of life in all its complexity. For the most part his cases would seem to be admirably chosen. They portray situations of extreme peril, accidents to the young, marriage and divorce, honesty in business, the problem of poverty, cheating on income tax, loyalty to a government, social righteousness, suicide and death. The discussion varies in quality and character, but there is very little that is banal. Taken over all, indeed, Professor Cahn raises many important points; there are many shrewd reflections; and one has the impression of a genuine humanity without sentimentalism, and of a courageous integrity. One of his best discussions centres, I think, around marriage, whether or not one agrees with his somewhat novel line that while “the bond of marriage is not in and of itself sacred, yet man and wife may together sanctify it for themselves”. He has a forthright condemnation of that “mercantilism” which views marriage as though it were no more than a commercial transaction with merchandise. He also criticizes “the puritanical emphasis (whether Protestant or Roman Catholic) on reproduction as the sole end of marriage”, when reproduction is considered to provide a sort of “excuse for intercourse” which otherwise would be wholly sinful. “If you weave the warp of puritanism across the woof of mercantilism, you have our earlier (Anglo-American) law of the matrimonial status”. Against all this, he seeks a law which recognizes to the full the “innumerable harmonies, gratifications and fulfilments” which marriage is capable of bringing, and which views marriage—in all its richness—as a relationship of the highest personal and religious significance. I would also select as specially notable his discussion of relations with the government, the place of magnanimity in social relationships, and capital punishment.

The book certainly shows the particular need for a judge to rise above the law with his own intuitions. Otherwise, as the author says, a judge will be in great danger of displaying only moral obtuseness—and, we may reflect, this is something which preoccupation with more and more refined definitions might in any case inevitably bring with it. If this happened, it would not only be the law which seemed to the onlooker to be an ass.

Altogether this is an entertaining, provocative, and thoughtful book; sometimes exciting, and always of interest to the general reader. It will be enjoyed by all those who wish to ponder critically the relations of morality and the law, and it cannot help but develop moral wit.

I. T. RAMSEY

INTRODUCTION TO LESSING

LESSING'S THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS. Edited by HENRY CHADWICK. Adam and Charles Black. 8s. 6d.

IT IS GOOD that nine selections from Lessing's "theological" (they are equally "philosophical") writings, should have again been put into English. Lessing is largely known as a dramatist, art-critic (witness his splendid "Laocoon"), and classicist. A great poet he was not, and said so. He was born in 1729, when Germany, still prostrate from the effects of the Thirty Years' War, and utterly enslaved to French literary fashions, had as yet scarcely any national literature, and certainly no national drama of its own. Lessing was one of the pioneers who began giving his country these things.

But occupied as he long was with the stage, Lessing always had theological interests. The English Deists were already questioning orthodoxy, and Lessing began doing the same. "The Christian religion is not something which a man can accept on the word of his parent", he once said to his father, an orthodox Lutheran pastor. The words indicate the working of an independent mind.

When in 1769 he went to the quiet little town of Wolfenbüttel to be librarian of the great library of the Duke of Brunswick, he had ample opportunities for theological and philosophical studies. He made himself conversant with the Church Fathers, and with theology generally, and so became a weighty spokesman in these fields. At Wolfenbüttel he published *inter alia* some fragments from Reimarus's startling and unorthodox "Apology for Rational Worshippers of God"; adding modifying comments of his own. These Fragments aroused immense controversy. Within two years, thirty or forty works had appeared, and innumerable pamphlets and articles. Lessing replied to Hr Schumann, one of his opponents, in a tract entitled "On the Proof of the Spirit and Power" (No. 1 of Mr Chadwick's translations). Its importance has been enhanced because Soren Kierkegaard chose its key word *Sprung* (Leap) to designate one of his central doctrines.

Translation 2 is "The Testimony of John". It asserts that the Apostle's phrase, "little children love one another", expresses the essence of Christianity, which is a spirit and not a set of dogmas. Other religions too possess something of a right spirit, and we must be tolerant to all. Nowhere is this thesis more poignantly exemplified than in Lessing's play, *Nathan the Wise*.

Translation 8, "On the Origin of Revealed Religion" asserts that all religions are equally true and false. True because they have benefited mankind, in spite of their unavoidable formulation of dogmas; false because the dogmas get exalted to the place of essentiality.

In "The Religion of Christ" (Translation 9) Lessing draws a distinction between Christianity, wherein Christ is accepted as God and worshipped, and Christ's own religion.

Goeze, head pastor of Hamburg, was Lessing's most vociferous opponent. "What does Lessing mean," he asks, "when he speaks of the Christian religion?" To this Lessing replied in the tract "Necessary Answer to an Unnecessary Question" (Translation 3). The Creed, not the New Testament, which was written later, formed the *regula fidei* of the earliest Church, says Lessing. (One is reminded of Grundtvig, who propounded the same doctrine in Denmark half a century later.)

Perhaps the most valuable contribution to Biblical literature in the eighteenth century is Translation 4, "New Hypothesis regarding the Evangelists". Lessing puts Matthew first and John last; the former being (to quote the phrase of the early Church) the Gospel of the flesh, the latter of the Spirit. Between the two came Mark with a Petrine emphasis, and Luke with a Pauline. But to Lessing John is the most important, since he gives to Christianity its true consistency.

Translation 5 is the famous tract "On the Education of the Human Race". Deists and rationalists had taught that a religion of reason would supersede that of revelation. No, says Lessing. Just as in the individual, education develops the natural powers, so in the race, natural powers are developed by the positive religions. Lessing is the morning star of the doctrine of evolution.

Translation 6, "The Christianity of Reason", shows Lessing deeply under the influence of Leibnitz. Like that writer, and Shaftesbury in England, Lessing found ours the best of all worlds; suffering (of which Lessing had a great deal) being part of the perfecting thereof.

Lessing never wholly abandoned this Leibnitz-like position, though in translation 7, "On the Reality of Things outside God", he has moved towards Spinoza, who substituted a doctrine of logical necessity for Leibnitz' *harmonia praestabilita*. Logical necessity abandons, in Spinoza's hands, the doctrines of God's transcendence and man's free will; and Lessing follows.

But Lessing's writings are often cast in the form of dialogues, which do not necessarily give his own opinions. They do stimulate inquiry and cause his readers to look to their defences and examine their positions. He is no opponent of religion or of Christianity; and had he but seen it, the key to the dilemma Reason—Faith lies, as Kierkegaard saw, in his own words "Leap". Faith does demand that leap of the mind which in the first translation Lessing questions. But it is a leap to something not contrary to reason and therefore silly, but to something above and beyond reason and therefore sublime.

Mr Chadwick's Introduction is packed with information, but is not easy reading. Two suggestions in the translation itself may be made. Surely Lessing does not say the Jews were sensual but sensuous (see p. 97). And on p. 58, line 9 from the bottom, the words "Is it", should be "It is".

T. H. CROXALL

INTRODUCTION TO PRAYER

THE SCIENCE OF PRAYER. By MICHAEL BRUCE. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

ONE opens yet another book on prayer somewhat apprehensively especially when it bears a title like "The Science of Prayer", and it is a pleasure to be able to recommend such a book with few reservations. The reader of the present volume need have no fear that it will merely say again what has been better said before or claim to teach a new and infallible way to contemplation; it is in fact a concise and comprehensive study of what we would prefer to call the theology of prayer, written in untechnical language for beginners, though many who are by no means beginners may well find it will take them further than they have already gone. In spite of its brevity, it is not a book to be read rapidly but should be ruminated upon at leisure. Mr Bruce wastes no words and, apart from a few logical lapses, the book hangs together well and forms a complete whole. It may be remarked that it is a revision of a book written for Chinese students twenty years ago, a circumstance which in no way detracts from its value.

Prayer, of whatever kind, is essentially the uniting of the will and mind to God, demanding concentrated attention. Mr Bruce insists forcibly on this fact throughout his book, though it may be noted that when he expects us never to let our mind wander for a second ~~in~~ half an hour's praying he is asking an impossibility which may well cause great discouragement.

Starting from this point Mr Bruce's sequence is admirable—confession leading naturally to petition, thanksgiving, guidance, adoration, intercession, life; it is, however, unfortunate that praise, to which thanksgiving should lead, finds no place in this series, and two other criticisms suggest themselves. 1. Under the heading of "guidance" (rather a suspect term) no mention is made of the divine law; this is a serious omission which may well lead to a dangerous illuminism. 2. Adoration gets mixed up with contemplation, though it is in fact the very heart of prayer for all praying people, contemplative or otherwise. Mr Bruce's thought is unclear on this point.

The best and most original part of the book, which has obviously been long thought out, is the central chapters: "Prayer and Fellowship", "No man cometh to the Father but by me", "In Christ", "Prayer, Mission, and Unity", and "Prayer and the Life of the World". It is impossible to comment adequately on these within the limits of the present review, one can but commend them to the careful attention of readers.

There is a good deal of practical wisdom in the chapters on methods and the appendix of examples which follows them. This is a book to be read with discrimination.

F. P. HARTON

THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

FAITH, REASON AND EXISTENCE. By JOHN HUTCHISON. Oxford University Press. London: Cumberlege. 27s. 6d.

JOHN LOCKE AND THE WAY OF IDEAS. By JOHN W. YOLTON. Clarendon Press. 30s.

DR HUTCHISON'S book is described as "an Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy of Religion", and it deals with an astonishing range of the problems which arise when a Christian theologian finds himself compelled to justify his language about God, man, and the world. He deals, though briefly, with most writers of any consequence on these topics over the last thirty years from Barth and Brunner to Maritain, all writers who, whatever their differences, took the problems and mysteries of theology seriously and did not by-pass them. He also furnishes an admirably comprehensive bibliography.

His general attitude could be called existential. The theologian is attempting to give a rational articulation of what he believes, as a participant and not as a spectator. The religious attitude is one of ultimate concern, based on a decision; yet the theologian's utterances are not privileged, but liable to criticism and to correction from our understanding. The revelation which gives the theologian his material is not given in propositions, but in events in which the Christian sees the encounter of God with man; and the arguments with which rational theology has sought to make clear the existence of God are all in essence "ontological"—that is they display man's apprehension of God, transcendent and immanent. This apprehension moreover sheds light on the dark corners of our existence, on the predicament of man in the world.

Much of this is well said: but "revelation in events", or revelation in "events and their interpretation" needs to be buttressed by a clearer statement of the place and authority of Holy Scripture in theology. If the "events" so often mentioned in these contexts are revelatory, we shall still want to know what they reveal, and we shall still need to say which formulations of the revelation are the least unsatisfactory. Some sentences in fact will still be privileged in their relation to divine truth. It will hardly be convincing to most readers to represent St Thomas' variations on the cosmological argument as forms of the ontological argument. Dr Hutchison says (p. 153) that the biblical view of deity, transcendent and immanent, finds its expression in this argument. But it is in fact the cosmological argument, grasping obscurely at once the finitude of the world and its dependence on God, which springs from the Biblical tradition.

Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and IX deal with History and Biblical Faith, Religion and Culture, Science and Religion Reconsidered, and Religion and Ethics. They are full of stimulating suggestions and illumination. The admirable discussion of scientific method is followed, however, by what appears to be an alarming division of the field between religion and

science: science deals with facts—any facts; the field of religion is to be ultimate valuation, which gives meaning to reality as a whole (p. 259). Or again later (p. 263), we are told that the relation of religion to science is that of ends to means: religion tells men where to go, science tells them how to get there. This is perhaps susceptible of explanation. Christians must no doubt choose certain goods to be realized in this world and use their scientific brains to achieve them when such aid is relevant. But their journey is not limited to this world: and the choices they make are based on fact, on what God is and on what they are.

Dr Hutchison's book, in fact, raises many questions, as he intended that it should, and should serve a critical reader as a useful guide to longer and deeper discussions of these problems, I noticed one mistake of fact on p. 247: Plato in the *Republic* divided the line into four parts.

Mr Yolton's monograph on Locke sets him firmly in the context of his times, discussing with copious quotations from the sources his predecessors in England and illuminating the discussions of the fifty years or so which followed the publication of the *Essay*. He begins with a convincing demonstration that the doctrine of innate ideas with which Locke dealt in the first book of the *Essay* was taken to be a pillar of Christian orthodoxy in seventeenth-century England, so that we need not suppose either that Locke was chiefly concerned with the Cartesians, or that he was destroying a doctrine that no one held. It seems plain that many English theologians held the doctrine to be necessary for our knowledge of God and the foundations of morality, and that Locke's critics believed him to be making morality unstable and undermining the foundations of religion. The doctrine indeed admits of subtler statement than the form in which Locke demolished it.

In a long and well-documented discussion of the scepticism which the critics detected in Locke's epistemology Mr Yolton shows, I think, clearly the penetration of Locke's more moderate critics, and Locke's own comparative insensitivity to criticism. It is interesting to see how far Locke was the inheritor of two traditions: the scientific analysis of the age of Newton (he took the corpuscular theory of sensation as almost axiomatic) and the common-sense assumptions which were part of scholastic realism (assumptions about the causes of our ideas). His critics saw, and rightly, that a consistent adherence to the strict empiricism of Book II made traditional Christian discussion impossible and offered no way out of the closed circle of particular ideas of sensation and reflection.

Chapter IV, under the title of "Religious Scepticism", is of great interest to theologians. Locke's doctrines were thought of as giving aid and comfort to Unitarians, Deists, and Socinians, and the controversy reached its height in discussions on the rôle of ideas in religious knowledge, the doctrine of substance, and the controversy about "thinking" matter. A strict adherence to the doctrine of "clear and distinct" ideas makes it difficult to use the word God other than in a crudely anthropomorphic sense. The critics argued also that, if we could not know the real nature of things, and substance is a "nescioquid" supporting

attributes, about which no more can be said, then orthodox teaching about the Trinity and the Incarnation becomes unintelligible or impossible. Locke discreetly kept silent about his own views on the Trinity, and one has the impression that neither he nor his critics nor, indeed, his supporters were at all clear about the distinctive way in which the words "substance" and "Person" are used in Trinitarian doctrine. Locke's casual suggestion that God might give matter the power to think caused a great stir. Locke himself made the suggestion as an illustration of the limits of our knowledge; his contemporaries took it, many of them, almost as a denial of immortality, though one or two adopted it and considered the soul as the activating power of the body, in almost a medieval style.

Locke's Essay in fact caused most English theologians to reconsider their position. He did not consider himself a Deist, but many of his positions in Book II were taken over by Deists. Those who were not Deists often used and modified his teaching to attack Deism (e.g. Berkeley). It became almost normal to accept Locke's view of sensible knowledge, and to talk of trans-empirical knowledge by means of analogies drawn from sense. Mr Yolton deserves our gratitude for his lucid and comprehensive account of an important era in English thinking, relating Locke to the religious difficulties of his day. There is also a comprehensive bibliography.

PHILIP CURTIS

PHILOSOPHY BEHIND DOCTRINE

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH FATHERS. By HARRY A. WOLFSON. Harvard University Press. London: Cumberlege. 80s.

A CAREFUL consideration of the philosophical pre-suppositions of the early fathers has long been needed. The normal histories of Christian doctrine do not go far beyond a few references to the Logos and generally admit an element of uncertainty even in that limited sphere. In this book of six hundred pages, which is only the first of a two-volume work, Dr Wolfson sets himself to fill the gap in the grand manner. It is a welcome addition to theological literature, and on the philosophical side should give us all that we need. It does not, however, seem nearly so reliable in the spheres of New Testament and early patristic doctrine.

The topics dealt with in this volume are Faith, Trinity, and Incarnation. In the first part the Professor concludes that faith means acceptance of doctrine as taught in the Scriptures or the Church whether with or without attempt at rational demonstration. This appears to leave out the idea of personal loyalty to Christ. In the second he discusses the relation between the Trinity, the Logos, and the Platonic ideas, insisting among other things that St Paul identified the Holy Spirit with the pre-existent Christ, and that it was only gradually that the Holy Spirit was

differentiated from the Logos. In the third he discusses the three "great mysteries" of the Trinity, the Generation, and the Incarnation. In a fourth part he deals with some of the heresies, devoting most of his attention to Gnosticism, which is a combination of Christian with "foreign" elements. Here he divides sharply and properly between a false gnosis, which was "mythology sprinkled over with a few philosophic terms", and a true gnosis, which was a combination of genuine Greek philosophy with Christian theology.

Belief in the Virgin Birth he thinks arose from Paul's identification of the pre-existent Christ with the Holy Spirit, "which originally in Paul revealed itself in Jesus by means of a natural human birth and then became the super-natural begetter of Jesus". The glibness of this solution of a knotty problem is equalled by the calm dismissal of the Diophysite case as having eliminated the possibility of conflict between the two natures by giving to the Logos "complete mastery" over the humanity. One would have thought that on the contrary the complete voluntariness of the acceptance by the human will of the impulses of the divine was the very essence of the Diophysite case. Again from the opening statement of the Quicunque he concludes that it was written "under Augustinian influence", when most of us probably have judged from the second half of the document at least that it was a reply to Apollinarianism. True, the two positions are not incompatible, but to say that the Quicunque is an anti-Apollinarian manifesto is probably nearer to historical fact than to say that it is a pro-Augustinian one.

All this is not to deny that the Professor is capable of meticulously careful scholarship. He is able in at least one instance to correct an unguarded statement by Prestige. That is in regard to the precise use of the term *perichoresis*, a subject on which Dr Wolfson is very enlightening. But for the most part he seems too much at the mercy of anti-orthodox presuppositions. One can accept with gratitude the light he throws upon the philosophical element in Christianity's attempt to explain itself while retaining one's preference for the traditionally factual basis of its belief. Only one wishes that the learned professor would not so often use the phrase "different than".

W.W.

BARTHIAN THEOLOGY

THE TRIUMPH OF GRACE IN THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH. By G. C. BERKOUWER. Paternoster Press. 18s.

DR ERIC MASCALL has recently protested against the inordinate length of Barth's own writings. But to these we must add the still increasing volume of literature *about* Barth, and we seem now to have reached a situation in which it is almost impossible for a student who wants to specialize in Barth and his theology to read anything else. The student

who does not want to limit himself in this way will probably be content with selections from the original writings together with the occasional book of interpretation by one who can claim to be a Barthian specialist.

Of such books of interpretation Professor Berkouwer's must surely be one of the best. It is written in a fine charitable spirit, it stays close to Scripture without being wooden in its use of texts, it does not hesitate to put forward constructive criticism, and above all it clarifies the central theological issues with which Barth is concerned. So far as I can judge the translation from the Dutch original has been done with great skill, and we are indebted to the publishers for producing a book of this size with so many detailed footnotes at so reasonable a price. One of its most valuable features is a long bibliography of works consulted, together with a list of English translations of Barth's writings: there is also an excellent index.

Dr Berkouwer is the Professor of Systematic Theology at the Free University of Amsterdam. For more than thirty years he has been a student of Barth's writings, and he has himself written extensively on the issues arising from them. Now at length he takes one crucial concept "The Triumph of Grace", and seeks to show how in general Barth magnifies this concept, how in some particular instances his exposition fails to do justice to it. Perhaps the most attractive feature of the book is its strong and ringing emphasis upon the wonder of God's grace. On the other hand its chief danger may lie in its failure always to recognize that "Grace" is not a self-defining word and that it needs constantly to be interpreted in concrete rather than abstract terms.

Whatever criticisms may have been levelled against Barth's theology, the consensus of opinion about the man himself is that he is full of humour, courage, friendliness, faith. Without a shadow of doubt he has stood for the triumph of God's grace in the midst of a Europe which for thirty years has been in travail and often despair. So Berkouwer characterizes Barth's theology as "a form of theological thinking in which, in ever broadening reflection and in consciously Christological concentrations, the triumph of grace stands central. Barth wants to stimulate the preaching of the gospel in the somberness of a catastrophic and depressing period of human history and to infuse new life into the witness to Jesus Christ as Victor. He wishes to do this in sharp antithesis to every kind of triumph that can be found in man or in the world." This is finely said, and it is the purpose of the author in the first part of the book to show how this triumph is set forth in Barth's doctrines of Creation, of Election, of Reconciliation, and of the End. These four chapters contain many quotations from Barth himself, and this could easily lead to disjointedness and dullness. But it seems to me that Dr Berkouwer is more successful than most commentators in keeping the interest of the reader while he presents his summary, and at many points he brings illumination to his text.

Half-way through the book the author turns to consider doctrines of grace associated with other systems, and then frames four questions

which need to be examined in relation to Barth's own doctrine. These concern the *nature* of the triumph of grace, the *extent* of the triumph, the divine *character* of the triumph, and the final *realization* of the triumph. A chapter is devoted to each of these themes, and the author while dealing fairly with Barth, submits his teaching to the closest scrutiny. The final chapter celebrates in almost lyrical terms the triumph of grace in the Kingdom of God.

Let me in conclusion give a few of the impressions gained from a study of this book. First, this is a notable piece of *theological* exposition and criticism. It does not hesitate to tackle the great questions about God—his nature, his activity, his relations with the world and with man. Secondly, it throws a great deal of light on some of the more difficult elements in Barth's theology—his teaching on history, on the *analogia entis*, on sin, on election, on the "eternalizing of human life". Thirdly, it stirs the heart as well as the mind as it proclaims with such conviction the triumph of God's sovereign grace. Fourthly, and on the negative side, it leaves one with an uneasy feeling that much of the debate is carried on in the realm of words and abstractions which do not come very near either to the world of the New Testament or to the situation of men and women to-day. It is true that we may, through words, bear witness to the glory of God; but words can be pressed too far into the mysteries of the Divine nature, and it may be that words should rest content with defining the two pillars of the entrance through which men may pass into the Kingdom of God. Be that as it may, Dr Berkouwer is to be congratulated on a labour of exposition which is also a discriminating critique of one of the great theological systems of our time.

F. W. DILLISTONE

THE FLESH OF CHRIST

TERTULLIAN'S TREATISE ON THE INCARNATION. By ERNEST EVANS. S.P.C.K. 32s. 6d.

ALL THE gusto of the man who sits down to demolish the arguments of an opponent in a letter to *The Times* must have belonged to Tertullian as he penned *De Carne Christi* in answer to the Christological teaching of Marcion, Apelles, and other Gnostics. Tertullian is at his most incisive without often descending to the invective, and with but few instances of the bad taste, which often mar his writings. "On the Flesh of Christ" was intended to clear the ground for a later treatise, "On the Resurrection of the Flesh", against these same "kinsmen of the Sadducees" (chapter 1). Tertullian throws the treatise into the form of a speech by counsel delivered in court against an adversary, thus giving a liveliness to the rhetorical devices of which he was so great a master, the objection put into the adversary's mouth and at once answered,

scathing references to the intelligence of his opponents, his pointed asides, and his paradox. Of the last *De Carne Christi* provides the best known example: *certum est, quia impossibile* (c. 5). The subject of the treatise, as Dr Evans explains, comparing the meanings of *soma* and *sarx* in the note on the title, is "not the Body of Christ in either the natural or the mystical or the sacramental sense of that phrase, but his Flesh: that is, the substance, nature, attributes, and origin of the whole of that human nature which the divine Word assumed at the Incarnation" (p. 82). Against Marcion the reality of Christ's flesh is maintained by reference to the plain sense of Scripture, because of the impossibility of attributing to God a deceitfulness which gave Christ a phantom flesh which nevertheless appeared to be real, and because to believe otherwise would rob the death and resurrection of Christ of their saving efficacy. Against Apelles, who admitted the reality of the flesh but denied its nativity, Tertullian argues that since Christ came to die he had to be born: "nothing dies except what is born" (c. 6). He proceeds to examine various Gnostic speculations that Christ's flesh was composed of sidereal substance, of soul, and of elements from the spiritual world, remarking that "one who has refused to believe it human can fashion it into anything he likes" (c. 15). Finally, in expounding the Church's teaching positively, he points to the appropriateness of "the founder of the new birth" being himself "born in a new manner" (c. 17), and discusses a number of scriptural passages which show "that the flesh of Christ was both born and was human" (c. 25). He claims a decision in his favour, and declares himself ready to argue his second brief (*De Resurrectione Carnis*), namely that Christ's resurrection is the pattern of ours.

In this book Dr Ernest Evans adds to his previous works on Tertullian a carefully edited text with apparatus criticus, introduction, translation, and commentary, and lays English students of patristics further under his debt. While the ranks of the English parochial clergy can produce a Dr Evans, *stupor mundi* may still be a not undeserved compliment. This volume ought not to rest only on the shelves of the technical scholar, for it has much of value for any thoughtful Churchman. Evans' lucid translation of Tertullian's not always easy Latin gives access to one of the earliest treatises on the Person of Christ. The parish priest will discover much in it to help him in his teaching, and will not find it difficult to distinguish between what remains valid apologetics for to-day (a surprisingly large proportion of the whole) and those arguments which, while both legitimate and effective in the third century, would be neither in the twentieth. He will also find material to answer the assertion now commonly made by Jehovah's Witnesses and other sects that orthodox Christology is the invention of fourth and fifth century "religionists". Here is a full statement of a doctrine of the Incarnation which, apart from a phrase or two like the *hominem deo mixtum* of c. 15, which would have been rejected by the Church in the light of later questions, is in accord with the Nicene and Chalcedonian Faith. It is also, as Evans shows both in the Introduction and in his notes, in accord with that of earlier writers like Justin Martyr and Irenaeus. It is the

doctrine which they all received from their teachers in the faith, and which they all verified by reference to Holy Scripture. Tertullian's work has also a useful application to the contemporary situation in that it reveals that some of the central tenets of certain prominent new sects are but the recrudescence of errors held long ago by Marcion and his like. At the same time it provides us with many of the answers.

Dr Evans' Introduction includes a useful précis of Tertullian's argument, account of the teaching of Marcion and Apelles, and notes on some of the key words of the treatise, *natura*, *conditio* and *condicio*, and *proprietas*, as well as full information about the manuscripts. The Notes and Commentary are a mine of many metals in which readers at all levels can discover the ore they need. For those who simply wish to follow Tertullian's argument, there is a summary of each chapter (rather fuller than the précis in the Introduction), and the notes will be found to elucidate the difficulties they will encounter. Those who make a special study of Tertullian, or of early Christian doctrine, will appreciate the full references to parallel passages or to similar ideas elsewhere in Tertullian and in other writers. The philologist and the Latinist will derive much from the careful discussion of the meaning of particular words.

This reviewer hopes that Dr Evans will be so encouraged by the reception of this book that he will yet give us out of his profound knowledge of Tertullian more such complete and generally useful editions of other treatises.

ERIC G. JAY

BIBLE AND PULPIT

THE LIVELY ORACLES. By ERNEST MARSHALL HOWSE. George Allen and Unwin. 20s.

ANYONE who has had to preach a sermon on such a subject as "the garden of Eden" or "the book of Jonah" knows that there are still very many people in the Church for whom the Bible is little more than a collection of stories and proof texts. The ordinary man in the pew seems very slow to accept the new understanding of the Bible that has resulted from the Higher Criticism. Perhaps it is the fault of the preachers. It may be that the popular books that have been written to commend the critical approach are still too academic. Certainly many lay people appear to set aside such matters as technicalities for the expert with no importance or relevance for them. For such people Mr Howse's book has been written. It is made up of three courses of sermons which the author, a minister of the United Church of Canada, delivered to his congregations. Their purpose is to explain, in the light of modern criticism, how the books which comprise our Old Testament came to be written; to show how they are related to the historical circumstances of

their times; and how an understanding of these things can make the message of the books more meaningful to us to-day.

Mr Howse begins with the eighth-century prophets, since their writings are the earliest complete books in the Bible. For each prophet a vivid picture of the historical and social scene is depicted and then the prophet's characteristic teaching is expounded. In the second section of the book this is repeated for the rest of the prophets, and in the last section the story of the formation of the Law in the post-exilic period is related together with accounts of the emergence of the various books that form "The Writings". There can be no doubt that Mr Howse has written a useful and interesting book which any one can read with profit and pleasure. The style is vivid; the descriptions of the historical scenes are arresting, though at times some of the phrases may seem to owe too much to Hollywood, as when Esther is referred to as the "brunette bombshell" discovered by the "talent scouts" of the king and made "Miss Persian Empire".

The value and usefulness of the book would have been increased if it had included some discussion of the literary characteristics of Myth and some comment upon the origin and teaching of the early chapters of Genesis. Mr Howse is at pains, and rightly so, to explain the literary type and real meaning of such books as Daniel, Ruth, and Jonah, but surely the Creation stories of Genesis are still the most widely misunderstood parts of the Bible and need explanation both as to their literary origins and their teaching. However, despite this criticism, those who read this book will be helped to a better understanding of the Old Testament and will doubtless be stimulated by the author's enthusiasm to more intelligent Bible reading.

J. ROBINSON

THE CHARACTER OF ANGLICANISM

THE OLD RELIGION. By J. L. C. DART. S.P.C.K. 17s. 6d.

IN A FOREWORD to this book, the Bishop of Coventry explains that he was partly responsible for its appearance. Several years ago he remarked to Mr Dart that the people of this country needed a book to emphasize the fact that the Church of England is the historic Catholic Church of the land, and now such a work appears. When a Romanist calls himself a Catholic, the implication is that Anglicanism is merely one brand of Protestantism. The facts, as the author shows, are glaringly otherwise. Indeed, since the Immaculate Conception and the bodily Assumption have been added as necessary beliefs for salvation, the Anglican Communion can justly claim to have adhered more closely to the Catholic Faith than has Rome.

The author begins by insisting that his book is not destructive, but constructive, not anti-anybody or anything but pro-Church of England. He detests the chaos which he finds within it, yet believes that it holds the secret which must inspire the Church of the future. The method here adopted is first to state clearly the accepted teaching and practice as regards any dogma or custom under consideration, then to examine the words of the appropriate Anglican formulary. The conclusion reached is that these formularies maintain the ancient Faith and make it clear that the historic ministry and Catholic sacraments have been carried on without break. Mr Dart writes Reformation history with clarity and vigour. It is good to be reminded that in the 1552 Prayer Book it was declared that no condemnation was intended of the doctrine contained in the 1549 book, which was "a very godly order . . . agreeable to the Word of God and the primitive Church".

The most telling chapter of all is headed "The New Religions". Here the author sets out in parallel columns the teaching on certain important matters of (a) Calvin, the Westminster Confession etc., and (b) the Prayer Book, Ordinal, and Articles. The result, showing up as it does the controversies of the time, is most striking. Article XVII asserts that predestination to life is the everlasting purpose of God. Here Calvin is contrasted: "For some eternal life is preordained, for others eternal damnation". According to Calvin, "whatever is in man . . . is all defiled" whereas Article IX only says that every man is "of his own nature inclined to evil". The Westminster Confession states that those whom God has accepted "shall certainly persevere . . . and be eternally saved". In the Anglican Burial Service there is a wise prayer: "Suffer us not, at our last hour, for any pains of death, to fall from thee". St Paul himself feared lest he should be a castaway, though none will dare to say that his conversion was not genuine. Mr Dart effectively continues the contrasts, as he goes on to deal with the Church and the sacraments.

In a chapter on the Blessed Sacrament it may be thought that the author tries to prove too much. He himself accepts the Tridentine doctrine of Transubstantiation, and believes it to have won "universal consent". He refers to the consecrated Elements as having only "the appearances" of bread and wine. The implication seems to be that the Anglican formularies teach this doctrine. It may be worth while to consider carefully where the truth lies on this rather thorny subject.

1. It is probably true that Article XXVIII only condemns crude popular teaching about a carnal change, which led to stories about bleeding Hosts and the like. If so, it is permissible for one who has accepted the Articles to hold the Tridentine doctrine.

2. As regards "universal consent", the Eastern Orthodox used the term *metousiosis* at the Council of Jerusalem (1672), but were at pains to explain that they were following their own tradition and not borrowing from the West. Eastern minds work differently.

3. There is a good case for holding that the Anglican formularies require (at least from priests) belief in an objective presence of our Lord in the Blessed Sacrament, which is not dependent on the faith of

the worshipper. But this largely rests on one fact, viz. that Bishop Guest, who finally revised Article XXVIII, left it on record that he inserted the word "given" before "taken and eaten" in order to affirm that the bread and wine became by consecration the Body and Blood of Christ. Nevertheless, as Mr Dart himself is at pains to emphasize, formularies must be interpreted by what they say, and not by the private opinions of any individual, and this Article could be interpreted in a receptionist sense.

4. So eminent an authority as the late Dr Darwell Stone held that "the phrasing of the formularies and the actual course of events left" receptionism and virtualism "tenable within the English Church". Mr Dart is wrong in describing receptionism as a heresy. No ecumenical Council can be quoted against it. A long and distinguished succession of English theologians have held it. Richard Hooker is not generally regarded as a heretic.

5. The doctrine of the Real Presence, as distinct from Transubstantiation, has quite as genuine a Catholic background as has the Tridentine doctrine, and may in fact be more readily seen as parallel to the Incarnation. (See Darwell Stone: *A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*, Vol. I, pp. 98 ff.) Modern scholarship has done much to clarify the issue. Whereas many do not readily think in terms of the Aristotelian metaphysic, the works of Harnack and other great Liberal Protestants have brought out the fact that St Paul (whether he was right or whether he was secularizing authentic Christianity) was a "Catholic sacramentalist". The real objective presence is seen to be a thoroughly biblical doctrine.

In the last chapter the author revives the old theory of territorial jurisdiction, which might be supposed to have been exploded long ago. The fact is that to-day in several places there are four or five bishops all in communion with Rome. When the Church was conterminous with the Holy Roman Empire, the principle of "one bishop in one place" was natural. Since that empire broke up, jurisdiction must be regarded as being over souls rather than over territory. If the Roman hierarchy are "intruders" in England, Anglicans are similar offenders in Canada and elsewhere. If Mr Dart's theory were consistently carried out, an Anglican living permanently in Spain ought to belong to the Church of that country. Yet this book gives convincing reasons against accepting Roman claims.

FREDERIC HOOD

CRANMER

THOMAS CRANMER: TWO STUDIES. By COLIN DUNLOP and CHARLES SMYTH. S.P.C.K. 1s. 6d.

AMONGST the many tributes occasioned by the quatercentenary of the martyrdom of Thomas Cranmer, warm welcome will be accorded to the succinct studies of the Dean of Lincoln and Canon Smyth, the latter broadcast by the B.B.C. and the former delivered in the University Church at Oxford.

Canon Smyth approaches the subject from the standpoint of the historian, seeking to portray Cranmer against the background of his age. He sees in the archbishop an exponent of "the dual principle of maintaining a decent uniformity in the external worship of God as the basis and condition of a generous liberty of theological speculation". Notwithstanding, he holds that "Cranmer's influence upon the English Reformation was in many ways decisive, but it was not definitive", since most of his work "has in fact been mediated to us by his successors". He makes the important point that Cranmer's approach to all doctrinal questions was governed by the threefold strand of Scripture, the Fathers, and reason, in that order; and that he strove earnestly, though in vain, for the convening of a Protestant General Council to unite all who had thrown off the papal yoke. Finally, he expounds and explains the sixteenth-century concept of the Godly Prince. As the reader would expect from Canon Smyth, his contribution is informed by sound historical knowledge, spiced with a characteristic wit and pleasing style. He holds to his opinion that "Cranmer did not really like the revised Prayer Book of 1552 and preferred the original English Prayer Book of 1549"; though contemporary foreign divines whom he had invited to England, held the contrary view and even reported that he had "drawen up a booke of praier an hundreth tymes more perfect then this that we now have" [i.e. the 1552 Book] but that "the same coulede not take place, for that he was matched with suche a wicked clergie and conuocation with other enymies".

The Dean of Lincoln's sermon deals little with the Cranmer of history (it is perhaps significant that only one date is mentioned, that of the martyrdom), and more with his liturgical contributions as used and interpreted by a twentieth-century liturgist of different standards of churchmanship. He observes truly indeed that Cranmer's "Communion Service has been gratefully and devotedly used ever since by men holding very different beliefs upon the nature of this august mystery, with little, if any, sense of strain". Further he emphasizes the comparatively slight changes which the several modern Provinces of the Anglican Communion have made in Cranmer's Book of Common Prayer in adapting it to their varying needs. In part the success of Cranmer's Liturgy is due to its style, "not only beautiful but extremely simple and almost homely"; in part to his use of the Bible in public worship (an especial feature of his work); and partly also to "his refusal to make it an

engine of propaganda". The sermon concludes with a moving autobiographical tribute to the influence of Cranmer's Prayer Book in moulding the preacher's personal religious life. In one respect indeed the Dean fails completely to understand both Cranmer and the several movements constituting the Reformation; namely, in his expression of sorrow for the "almost reckless gusto in severing the links that bound England to Rome". Canon Smyth points out that for Cranmer the Church of Rome was "an apostate Church"; but the Dean ignores what a recent reviewer in *The Times Literary Supplement* described as "that vast rebellion of the human spirit against the authoritarian medieval Church", an authoritarianism of which the modern definition of papal infallibility and magisterium in 1870 provided the logical conclusion. The combination of the studies of the Dean of Lincoln and of Canon Smyth is just and serviceable; for the one provides a religious meditation on the spiritual values of Cranmer's liturgical work and the other a scholarly historical vindication of it in its sixteenth-century context.

NORMAN SYKES

COMPTON

THE PROTESTANT BISHOP: HENRY COMPTON, BISHOP OF LONDON. By EDWARD CARPENTER. Longmans, Green and Co. 35s.

THIS biography completes Dr Carpenter's trilogy of ecclesiastical studies and is a fit and proper companion to his *Thomas Sherlock* and *Thomas Tenison*. In some ways it is the best of the three, for the author has achieved a maturity of interpretation and expression which enables him to thread his way skilfully through the labyrinth of a complicated career such as that of Bishop Compton. It is unfortunate from the standpoint of the biographer that his subject remains an enigmatic figure. None of his private correspondence has been discoverable, and Dr Carpenter has shown great ability in constructing his portrait from contemporary manuscript and printed sources which deal only incidentally with Compton. A glance at the footnotes and bibliography demonstrates the thoroughness of the author's researches and the diligence of his investigation.

Henry Compton was born to the profession of arms, being present at Edgehill and leading the life of a vagrant soldier during his enforced wanderings under the Commonwealth régime. After the Restoration he served for a short period as an army officer before going up to Cambridge, where his residence was characterized by the restlessness of an ex-service man to whom study was hardly congenial. Finally he became a member of Christ Church, Oxford, and was ordained. Preferments fell rapidly to his lot; and within eight years he became Bishop of Oxford in 1674 and was translated to London in the following year, being still only

43 years of age! This rapid promotion he owed to his familiarity with Danby, through whose influence also Compton became Dean of the Chapels Royal, Privy Councillor, and tutor to the two princesses Mary and Anne. With such a flying start his succession to the primacy seemed certain; but he was passed over in 1677 in favour of Sancroft, probably because of his aggressive Protestantism, which had earned for him the active hostility of James, Duke of York, the prospective successor to the throne. When James II became king, Compton naturally was dismissed from his offices in the Chapel Royal and as Clerk of the Closet and Privy Councillor. He became the leader of Anglican resistance to James II's religious policy, suffering suspension because of his refusal to silence John Sharp, who was arming his flock against popish priests and their arguments. When the Revolution of 1688 ensued, Compton assumed martial attire once again in order to ride at the head of a military escort for the safe conduct of Anne from London to Nottingham, and thence to Oxford. In view of his vigorous Protestantism, his relationship to the royal ladies, Mary and Anne, and his quasi-military exploits, he had every reason to anticipate promotion to Canterbury when Sancroft was deprived as a non-juror. Instead Tillotson was preferred, and on his death in 1694, Tenison. Thereafter Compton, who had been associated with the whigs, became progressively more and more of a tory, supporting Atterbury's Convocation campaign and even Sacheverell's outrageous excesses, and falling out of favour in the political sphere.

The first problem for Compton's biographer therefore is to explain this failure to secure the primacy. In 1677 the reason for the preference of Sancroft was Compton's outspoken denunciations of the dangers of popery and his aggressive championship of the Protestant cause, which was entirely creditable to him. But in 1690 the problem is more difficult and complex. Partly the explanation of his being passed over may lie in the mutual opposition between Gilbert Burnet and himself; for Burnet had considerable influence with Mary and some approach to William III; and between Compton and Burnet there was no love lost. Perhaps it may have been due in part to a suspicion of William that Compton's conducting of Anne to Nottingham was a move of doubtful loyalty to himself; though here it should be remembered that Compton alone of the bishops had signed the invitation to William to invade the country. Whatever the cause, the Bishop of London henceforth fell into increasing disfavour in the political sphere.

Perhaps the greatest surprise of Dr Carpenter's biography is the full and lifelike picture which its second part gives of Compton's ubiquitous activity as a bishop. Nothing in his early life had suggested that he would become a model bishop for industry and conscientiousness; but Dr Carpenter illustrates the many and various aspects of his ecclesiastical administration. As a diocesan bishop he was a pioneer in the employment of synodical government, he used the services of rural deans extensively, and carried out parochial visitations. His organization of conferences with his clergy was of particular importance. Furthermore

he took seriously his responsibility for the spiritual welfare of the North American Plantations, appointing Commissaries (particularly Thomas Bray and James Blair) both as a means of obtaining information for himself and as agents of exercising supervision and discipline. He was a protector of the oppressed episcopalian clergy of Scotland and of French Huguenot refugees; and he maintained friendly relations with the Swiss Protestant Churches and with the Greek Orthodox. Indeed he was one of the best-known English bishops amongst foreign churches and churchmen. Dr Carpenter seems at times somewhat puzzled and surprised by this aspect of Compton, especially since the bishop's attitude towards Protestant Dissenters at home changed considerably from his support of Comprehension in 1689 to his support of the Occasional Conformity bills later. It should be remembered that the desire for union with foreign Protestant churches, on the basis of their restoration of episcopacy and their adoption of a version of the Book of Common Prayer, was a characteristic mark of High Churchmen during the reign of Anne; as may be seen from the attitude of Sharp, Atterbury, and Smalridge. Not until these negotiations became complicated by the proximate succession of the house of Hanover to the English Crown and by its quarrels with Prussia, did the High Churchmen draw back. It was as natural for Compton to support these schemes as for Tenison to stand aloof. Moreover the quarter of a century between the Revolution of 1688 and the death of Anne saw a dividing of the forces of Churchmen who had been united in their original support of William III. Tillotson, Tenison, and Burnet moved in a whig and latitudinarian direction whilst their colleagues Sharp and Compton took the contrary line. Hence the differences in Compton's attitude towards a number of questions before and after 1689.

Dr Carpenter has written what will be the definitive biography of a most important and influential episcopal figure. He has exhausted the possible sources, both manuscript and printed, for his subject; and only those students who have tried to grapple with the manifold MSS. and with the voluminous pamphlet literature of an age avid of controversy, can appreciate the magnitude and diligence of his work. It is an occasion of pride that so learned a study should proceed from a dignitary of the Church of England, the more especially at a time when cathedrals are not conspicuously fruitful in erudite works. Dr Carpenter deserves the thanks of all who are seriously interested in English Church history for his valuable life of Henry Compton.

NORMAN SYKES

LOCAL HISTORY, I

ELIZABETHAN PETERBOROUGH. Edited by W. T. MELLOWS and D. H. GIFFORD. Northamptonshire Record Society. 25s.

THIS, the third volume of Tudor Documents relating to Peterborough, should prove invaluable, not only to the future historian of that city, but also to students of the ecclesiastical or social history of the England of Elizabeth I. Its publication owes much to the late Mr W. T. Mellows, who himself contributed the first three chapters of the introduction.

The first part of the book contains a number of miscellaneous documents, largely concerned with the powers and privileges of the Dean and Chapter, their tenants and officers, and their acts and decrees. From one of these documents entitled "The humble peticon of the Inhabitanτες of the cite of Peterborough. To the queenes most excellent maiestie", it is evident that the citizens had fared better in the old days when they were under the governance of the abbot; for under the Dean and Chapter their city had "dayly more and more decayed", so that they were compelled to ask for relief.

Another document gives Dean Fletcher's detailed account of the funeral of Mary Queen of Scots in Peterborough Cathedral, and closes with a note that:

"The master of the wardrobe payd to the church for the breaking of the ground in the quyre and making the grave xli.

And for the blacks of the quyre and church xxli."

It is, however, the second part which forms the longer and more interesting section. This consists of the surviving rolls of the View of Frankpledge with the Court of the Dean and Chapter. These rolls cover the period from 1564 to 1599. They are reprinted here in the original Latin, but a specimen translation, together with helpful footnotes, and the excellent introduction to them contained in Chapter IV, should obviate any difficulty in their interpretation.

The day-to-day life of the people of Elizabethan Peterborough is well brought out by the cases presented in court by the various officers. Thus, the food-tasters and ale-conners were constantly having to report those who were guilty of selling food or drink of inferior quality, such as "fustye" or "faughty" bread, "naughtye fische", "fowghtie otemeale", or "rotten cheese"; the dozers, or chief tithing-men, recorded encroachments upon the city's highways and neglect of street-cleaning; the constables were specially concerned with breaches of the peace; whilst the inhumanity of the age is reflected in an entry relating how a butcher was fined because he had slaughtered a bull without having given the citizens the entertainment of seeing it baited with dogs. Alone, those concerned with the trades of tanners and curriers appear to have had a comparatively easy task, for, with one exception, they were able to report regularly "quod omnia bene".

This useful volume is completed by an appendix, and three particularly full indexes.

GORDON HUELIN

LOCAL HISTORY, II

THE VICTORIA HISTORY OF WILTSHIRE, Vol. III. Edited by R. B. PUGH and E. CRITTALL. Oxford University Press. London: Cumberlege. £5. 5s.

THE appearance of the third volume of the Victoria History of Wiltshire is of particular interest and importance in that, for the first time, an entire volume in this series is devoted to the ecclesiastical history of a county.

Of the five main sections, an opening chapter by Mr G. Templeman on general church history during the period from the year 1087 to the time of the Reformation, is followed by two dealing with the story of the Anglican Church in the county from the mid-sixteenth century until the present day. Dr Anne Whiteman has the earlier and more interesting of these periods—the age of the widow who “still secretly kept her beads under her apron”, and of Henry Sherfield, the Recorder of Salisbury who broke a window in St Edmund’s church because it represented God “in the guise of an old man with a pair of compasses in his hand making the world”; the age of John Jewel and of Gilbert Burnet, two of Salisbury’s most remarkable and distinguished bishops, and of George Herbert, rector of Bemerton and author of *The Country Parson*. Rightly, she devotes some space to Herbert, for he stands not merely as a devout clergyman of seventeenth century Wiltshire, but as the ideal parish priest of every English county and age. Dr L. W. Cowie’s contribution on the Church of England since 1837 reveals the changes in church life brought about by the industrial revolution and the coming of the Great Western Railway, and, from the spiritual angle, by the Tractarian Revival.

A chapter by Brigadier T. B. Trappes-Lomax on Roman Catholicism includes a table giving figures of seventeenth and eighteenth century recusants, and another indicating the progress of Roman Catholicism in Wiltshire, particularly as regards the number of places of worship, since the year 1848.

There follows a very full and thorough treatment of Protestant Non-conformity by Dr Marjorie Reeves, who is herself a native of Wiltshire. The county has the distinction of possessing, at Hornsingham, what has long been claimed as the oldest standing nonconformist chapel in England. Again, at Monk, near Corsham, there is an original Quaker meeting-house, which was taken over by the Independents in 1690, and forms an interesting specimen of early nonconformist architecture.

Each of these five sections admirably fulfils a twofold aim, of bringing out the spiritual life of the religious communities, and of showing their institutional development.

As is customary to the pattern of the Victoria County Histories, the general picture of ecclesiastical history is followed by detailed accounts of all the religious houses of the county. Among those of special note may be mentioned Dom Aelred Watkin’s article on Malmesbury Abbey, a Saxon foundation, famous at an early date by reason of its association with that ingenious scholar St Aldhelm. Two other religious houses,

dating from Anglo-Saxon times, were Amesbury and Wilton, both of which housed Benedictine nuns. The accounts of these have been written by Mr R. B. Pugh and Miss Elizabeth Crittall, joint-editors of this and other V.C.H. volumes on Wiltshire.

But the most important of all these articles, and indeed, the outstanding contribution to the volume, is that which comes from the pen of Dr Kathleen Edwards on Salisbury Cathedral Chapter. It is to be hoped that the fact that it appears in smaller print will not cause this most valuable item to be hastily scanned, or even to be passed unnoticed; for here is contained a description of the growth and development over nearly nine centuries of a Chapter which served as a model for other cathedrals. Dr Edwards tells of the great period of prosperity in the thirteenth century, with the building of a new cathedral, the increasing power, wealth, and independence of the chapter, and the influence upon learning through the stimulus of Dean Richard Poore. One sees those turbulent fourteenth century vicars choral, who were being constantly summoned to answer for their chattering in choir, or for their lateness in arriving for services; for playing ball in the close; for wearing a multi-coloured cape, a square of green, or boots of red; or for going off for the day to Southampton, clad in a striped costume, and carrying arms. One can visualize, too, the extremely ruffled seventeenth century prebendary on that mid-June day, mopping his heated brow and fuming within, because the residentiary canons had so far forgotten their duty of hospitality that they would not offer him a cup of small beer to refresh him. Finally, there is shown a twentieth century cathedral chapter which, although it has lost much of its former wealth, and many of its ancient privileges, is no less vigorous or alive to its opportunities than at any time in its splendid past.

If Dr Kathleen Edwards has made a truly magnificent contribution in her article on the Salisbury Cathedral Chapter, the volume is also enriched by her shorter work on the De Vaux College, founded in 1262, "to maintain for ever one warden, two chaplains, and 20 poor, needy, honourable and teachable scholars", and giving Salisbury for a considerable period the character of a university city. This college, established two years before Merton, at Oxford, might well have made Salisbury a rival to that university or to Cambridge.

A number of excellent photographs and drawings, some of which are here published for the first time, together with a map showing the religious houses and the boundaries of the rural deaneries in the year 1535, add to the value of this superb volume.

GORDON HUELIN

THE CRUCIFIX

ENGLISH AND WELSH CRUCIFIXES, 670-1550. By J. ERIC HUNT. S.P.C.K.
25s.

THE representation of the Crucifixion in Christian art begins no later and is not at the beginning notably rarer than that of any other Gospel episode. The earliest examples are however on a very small scale on carved gems, since the adaptation of the scene for monumental use presented obvious difficulties. Execution by the cross continued into the fourth century, so that there was no reason until then why anyone should be in ignorance about how it was carried out; and the prospect of showing in a prominent position on a large scale a realistic painting of an entirely naked man covered with mud and blood and in the throes of dying of thirst was not an attractive one. It has not in fact ever been done. The so-called realistic representations of the dead Christ on the cross which began to be taken over in the West during the eleventh century from Greece (where they had originated not long before) are just as much stylized as the rest. The body hangs limply from the arms; but in fact the dead weight of a body could not be carried in this way by two nails, and in any case a Roman cross had a projection which came between the thighs and kept the body upright. The figure, too, invariably has an ample loin cloth approaching the dimensions of a kilt.

The Crucifix, then, is a religious symbol into which is introduced whatever degree of realism is required by its devotional context. For most purposes a stylized cross without a figure is sufficient and there have been times and places, notably the Byzantine Empire in the Iconoclast period, when anything more was regarded as objectionable. Other allusive ways of treating the subject can be found on early monuments, for instance the placing of the Paschal Lamb at the centre of a plain cross. However the needs of the disputants in the Christological controversies of the fifth and sixth centuries eventually brought about the generalized use of paintings showing a figure on the cross. Faced with sects which maintained that it was not Christ who had actually been crucified or that only his humanity had been crucified, the reaction of the Orthodox in Syria and Palestine (where the whole tradition of the icon seems to have originated) was to set up for veneration paintings of Jesus crucified, with the implication that one would not venerate a substitute victim or mere humanity. Such paintings aroused considerable scandal in the West. Gregory of Tours records how the Christ shown on one exhibited at Narbonne in the sixth century appeared to a local priest in a dream, and threatened and actually beat him until he draped a cloth in front of his image. This difficulty was met first in the East and then in the West by the wholly unrealistic subterfuge of showing Christ on the Cross wearing a long garment like a dalmatic; and then, in conjunction with the new fashion of representing the dead Christ, by the compromise of the generous loin-cloth. The representation of the dead Christ in this way was held up to obloquy by a cardinal as a typical Greek monstrosity as late as the mid-eleventh century, and the figure

does not regularly have closed eyes in Italy until the thirteenth century though other countries were less fussy.

The various types continued side by side, the fully draped Christ owing a continuing popularity to the fame of particular images of this kind, notably that at Lucca; but the type with the dead Christ soon became predominant. The principal variations in the treatment of the scene from about the mid-twelfth century therefore affect the number, identity, and attitudes of the supporting figures. These may be our Lady and St John, the soldiers with the spear and sponge, the sun and moon, the Church and Synagogue, the Holy Women, Pilate, Annas, Caiaphas, St Mary Magdalen at the foot of the cross, the crosses with the two thieves, the patriarch Adam and angels (including often one catching the blood from the wound in a chalice) in most possible combinations. Whether in any given case the composition has been thought out afresh or merely adapted from some earlier work is always a matter for investigation, made particularly difficult by the enormous number of surviving medieval crucifixion scenes, to say nothing of the no doubt still more numerous ones which have perished. A special place among these is occupied by the painting which in missals later than about 1200 invariably faced the beginning of the Canon of the Mass and by the end of the middle ages was definitely required by rubric. In the Sacramentary of Gellone (a north French book of about 980) the "T" of *Te igitur* is treated as a crucifix which probably points to the origin of the practice; but this example was not rigorously followed during the next few centuries, and even so it was some time before the historiated "T" was definitely displaced by a full page painting. This painting when it does appear, in the eleventh century, was taken over from other service books. It had already gained a certain popularity as the frontispiece to a psalter, but has a much longer history in Gospel books. There is an early oriental example in the Gospels of Rabula (Mesopotamian, written in 586) and it was no doubt from oriental models that it was borrowed by the Irish to pass into such Hiberno-Saxon books as the fragmentary Gospels at Durham and St Gall.

Mr J. E. Hunt's little book of English and Welsh crucifixes attempts to deal with a number of these points, but will be chiefly useful as a collection of pictures. He appears to have overlooked all French writers on the subject, Millet, Brehier, and above all Dom Henri Leclercq; and he is excessively unreliable over dates. Moreover the arrangement he has chosen and the exclusion of foreign examples have unfortunate effects on the clarity of his exposition. As an instance of the kind of trouble which arises, the window shown in pl. 29 is correctly assigned to the mid-fourteenth century; but unhappily the stained glass in it (which is what he is talking about) belongs to the early sixteenth century. I have noticed several other examples of this kind of thing which it would be tedious to list; those unable to spot such mistakes at sight will have to refer to some reliable authority. It does however seem necessary to point out here that the carving at Worcester shown on pl. 27 is from the chisel of a Mr Boulton who was at work about 1860. It is indeed charming, and

Mr Hunt is perfectly entitled to say it shows just the right amount of pathos and commend it for imitation to modern artists. But it must be judged by its own merits, with careful disregard of any aura of romantic age which might attach to it by virtue of Mr Hunt's dating, which is c.1330. Disturbing also is his description of the figures flanking the cross on pl. 16 as our Lady and St John; the possibility that they are Geometry and the prophet Jonah should at least have been allowed for, unless their eccentric attributes are explained by the text of which a fragment is reproduced along with the drawing. The theory, too, that the Wormington crucifix (pl. 8) has a sheep's head is unlikely to find much favour; this appears to be a misinterpretation of a damaged carving. The pictures, however, are an unusual and interesting collection, and the book is beautifully produced.

CHRISTOPHER HOHLER

THE RIDDELL LECTURES

THE LIMITS OF LITERARY CRITICISM. By HELEN GARDNER. Oxford University Press. London: Cumberlege. 5s.

THIS is a fascinating and provoking book. Fascinating, in that phrase after phrase throws a brilliant light on an unexpected aspect of a general problem. For instance, "if anyone had used the phrase 'the world of the New Testament' fifty years ago he would have been expected to have been referring to the conditions in Palestine under the Roman occupation. To-day, the chances are that a book bearing this title would be concerned with belief in the power of demons, on subjects about the destiny of Israel and eschatology." Or again, "The unhappy effect of much literary criticism of this kind is that, although undertaken with great seriousness and intellectual energy, it leaves an impression of intellectual frivolity, as if the critic were concerned with anything and everything except what mattered to the writer and what matters to his readers."

The book is provoking because its author, with vigorous and enlightening judgement, seems unwilling to exercise it, and at the latter end one is left unsure as to what the argument really has been.

The Riddell lectures are concerned with the relation between religion and contemporary developments of thought—in this case this means a critical study of biblical criticism in the light of modern literary method. Its three sections are rather oddly titled "The drunkenness of Noah", "The poetry of St Mark", and "The historical sense". In the first, Miss Gardner compares the various Victorian approaches to biblical criticism. For the school of Jowett this meant, she says, "brushing aside the accretions of time and going back to the true meaning of Scripture, this involving both understanding of the peculiarities of the writer's language and an awareness of his methods of thought." The meaning of the

Gospels was summed up as: "A teacher speaking to a group of serious but not highly educated working men, attempting to inculcate in them a loftier and sweeter morality." Jowett is succeeded by Arnold, "critical scholarship" by "higher journalism". Arnold finds the Gospels full of a "sweet reasonableness. Jesus never troubled Himself with what are called Church matters at all; His attention was fixed solely upon the individual." Although this approach may seem both unliterary and fantastic, it is at least aware of the moral renewal which Christianity brought to the ancient world. The third development opens with Charles Gore, whose analytical approach means the disentangling of historical strands and the discussion of historical truth. The allegorical is entirely foregone, and he quotes with approval St Thomas Aquinas: "That anything necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense of Scripture, which Scripture does not somewhere tell manifestly through the literal sense." The latest school, the last to be treated in these lectures, is summed up in the work of Dr Farrer, of which the writer says that after reading his work she feels that she has been "in contact with the mind and imagination of Dr Farrer. Since it is a lively and fertile mind, and a profoundly poetic and Christian imagination, I am grateful for the experience and for much matter for meditation. I have very little sense after reading him of having come nearer to the mind and imagination of St Mark."

In this development of biblical criticism Miss Gardner sees both gain and loss; gain in that we have become aware of the numinous, of the scarcely perceived movement of mighty powers behind the surface images of the biblical stories. She reminds us that Simone Weil can see, in the strange, primitive story of the drunkenness of Noah, an anticipation of the Crucifixion—"The mystery of the God who speaks in weakness and in nakedness and dies and is dishonoured."

The loss she emphasizes in her account of the Form Critics, with their "Gospel behind the gospels," criticizing them for their disintegration of books which the literary critic must approach as separate entities to be accepted and understood as such; a gospel, that is to say, is a work of art in its own right and not a museum of historical loot. Equally, it is difficult to believe that it is an extraordinarily subtle intellectual riddle, only to be understood by our modern typological critics. After all, without such esoteric knowledge, men have for centuries found in the gospels the dynamic of a living Christ.

Having so analysed the critics, Miss Gardner gives us, in the last lecture, an analysis of the weakness of the symbolist's approach to English literature, an analysis which does not seem quite relevant to her main theme. She ends, however, with a stirring sentence, one of the many memorable ones which make these lectures so quotable: "Much of the literary criticism of the gospels in the nineteenth century may be justly charged with sentimentality. Its authors might well retort upon some of their successors the counter charge of inhumanity. It is a charge which can be brought against much of the art and literature of this age."

STEPHAN HOPKINSON

EPISCOPAL WISDOM

DURHAM ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES. By MICHAEL RAMSEY. S.P.C.K.
12s. 6d.

THIS is a book for any busy parish priest; in it he will find theology, pastoral understanding, and plenty to stimulate and challenge. Dr Ramsey has much to say about Durham and the Durham tradition: and in these days of bitterness and hatred from outside and discord amongst ourselves, it is no bad thing to be reminded that our roots lie in a glorious past.

Here in small compass is a wealth of wisdom and much food for thought. For example, in the Section "On the Ministry" we are challenged by the suggestion that "perhaps the paucity of the ordained is a divine judgement, calling us to put certain things right and to do certain things differently"; and when Dr Ramsey goes on to say what some of these things may be, he claims the attention not only of bishops but of parish priests, for "the parish is the place where vocations *do* happen". In fact, all through this book it is the parish where things happen. His sermons are a felicitous blending of pastoral sympathy, teaching, and theology, and are models of simplicity: and, as the author himself says, "to say of someone 'he preaches simply' is to say 'he walks with God'".

In his paper on Evanston Dr Ramsey records as his own impressions "the primacy and poignancy of Race for the Christian Church" and "the growing leadership of the Church in Asia already, and perhaps of the Church in Africa very soon". He sees a real danger in the ideology, "not confined to Americans but particularly vocal through them . . . that division into denominational sects is not an evil to be cured, but is a good thing according with divine purpose: . . . sects to remain sects but to be embraced within the World Council as a sort of super-Church or Protestant Vatican".

In "The Parish Communion" Dr Ramsey assesses "the gains, the losses, the hopes, the danger, of this movement". The gains are great, the dangers are in connection with the doctrines of sacrifice, communion, and fellowship. He thinks it is a mistake to exaggerate "the physical togetherness of a congregation". But many a parish priest will think that it is just this which is so important: and was it not this which helped to give strength to the early Church? But Dr Ramsey is warning us to distinguish between what may be a *symbol* of fellowship and fellowship in the Christian sense, and he reminds us that "the fellowship which we are building up in our parishes is a fellowship between us who live on earth and the Church in Paradise and in Heaven".

"The Word and the Preacher" is a masterly analysis of different types of sermon and of the different uses of scripture for the sermon. But whatever the type, "the Word is not imprisoned in the sermon; for it is present in its sovereign power before the preacher's mouth is opened and after the preacher's lips are closed."

In "Faith and Society" we are faced with one of the most vital needs of to-day,—“a sound theological basis for the work of the Christian sociologist”. “It is for the sociologists to grumble until theologians serve them better than they are doing at present.” Dr Ramsey’s essay is a pregnant contribution to this problem, but it whets our appetite for more. Is it too much to hope that he himself will find time to help to satisfy this great need?

✠ GEORGE WILLESSEN

THE EUCHARIST

THE SACRAMENT OF THE ALTAR, By MILES SARGENT. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 5s.

THIS book is dedicated to the Headmaster of King’s College, Taunton, and his wife, which recalls the fact that Canon Sargent was for eight years Chaplain of that school. It may be credibly guessed that these chapters are based on instruction frequently given to boys in the upper forms of schools. But the book will be of value to a far larger public than that. It is ideally suitable for sale in tract cases (though a rather cheaper edition is for this purpose greatly to be desired). The Church’s teaching on the Eucharist is here set forth with the utmost lucidity and based soundly on accurate history and generally accepted orthodox theology, the general view point being “Prayer Book Catholic”. The method of the book is expository. After four historical and doctrinal introductory chapters, the Holy Communion service is explained stage by stage from Preparation to Last Gospel. A valuable feature is the clear synopsis at the end of each chapter.

The present reviewer stands firmly by the warm commendation which he gave in a Foreword. But the task of a reviewer is different from that of the writer of a foreword. Certain criticisms may fairly be made, though within a hundred pages it would have been impossible for the author to anticipate and meet all such comments. It is doubtful whether Canon Sargent fully realizes how rapidly the number of churches where there is a Sung Eucharist without an opportunity being given for the Communion of the people is dwindling. On p. 10 St Paul is said to be writing “to the Church in Ephesus” and a quotation from Ephesians follows. Are not almost all scholars agreed that this Epistle was not written specially to that Church? On p. 13 our Lord is said to have used the word “is” (*esti*) when he said, “This is my body”, yet the author himself points out on the next page that in Aramaic there is no copula. On p. 75 it is assumed that the priest will interpolate silently the section of the Roman Canon beginning *Te igitur* (and on p. 87 *Libera nos*), a custom which is pretty certainly on the decrease. On p. 78 there is an inverted

commas a misquotation from the Prayer of Humble Access. On p. 82 the Synoptic tradition that the Last Supper synchronized with the Pass-over is assumed to be correct without reference to the *Kiddush* or other possibilities. Words attributed to our Lord in the Fourth Gospel are quoted throughout as his *ipsissima verba* without proviso.

Despite these and other detailed criticisms which could be made, the book will clarify the minds of many inquirers on a vital matter.

FREDERIC HOOD

CURRENT QUESTIONS

CURRENT PROBLEMS OF THE CHURCH. By A. E. J. RAWLINSON. S.P.C.K. 5s.

IN THIS book of eighty-three pages Dr Rawlinson has brought together his deliverances to the clergy and churchwardens of the diocese of Derby at his Visitation in 1956. There are four main themes, revealing in their titles the Bishop's well-known personal concerns: The Ecumenical Encounter; Episcopacy and the Anglican Tradition; Baptism and Confirmation; The Church and Marriage.

Since the rediscovery of the Biblical idea of the Church there has been a general determination to let the Church be the Church by helping its members—without discounting the necessity for personal religion—to live not as isolated Christians but as the People of God. Such a sense of community can never be realized without an acceptance of obligation as well as of privilege. What is interesting in the modern scene is the varying emphases on what should or should not be obligatory.

The Bishop of Derby is liberal as regards episcopacy, cautious as regards Baptismal reform, rigorist as regards marriage. This is an unusual combination but at least it demonstrates that independence of thought for which Dr Rawlinson has long been noted. All bishops and parish priests in discharging their common cure of souls have to make up their minds where to draw the line between liberalism and rigorism. Somewhere there has to be a notice to say, "Thus far and no further". Happy those dioceses where this frontier is mapped out in consultation and agreement. But readers who are neither clergy nor churchwardens in the diocese of Derby may be allowed to raise their eyebrows (albeit ever so slightly) at the strange course its frontier sometimes follows.

The Bishop has been an enthusiastic participant in so many ecumenical conversations that it is wise to have his own position clearly formulated and published. The first two addresses occupy themselves with his longing for a true *una sancta* to overcome the tragedy of schism and with his conviction that episcopacy is not of the *esse* but of the *plene esse* of the Church.

In "Baptism and Confirmation" he deals with the current investigation of the theology of Christian initiation and, after a brief historical survey,

he writes, "We must continue, I am sure, with our Western practice and Western theology, interpreting Confirmation not as conveying an initial gift of the Holy Spirit, but as a further 'strengthening' with the Holy Spirit . . ." The Bishop views with sympathy the impatience of the Baptismal reformers but urges restraint for two reasons: first, it is unwise for a minority group to adopt stringent rules which are not acceptable to the whole Church; and secondly, it is unwise to act until the present theological discussion of initiation has come to some generally agreed conclusions.

When he comes to "The Church and Marriage" Dr Rawlinson, while urging—as every pastor must—the pastoral care of those who have contracted a second marriage after divorce, plainly states: "It is of the utmost importance that the Church should be clear, plain, and consistent in its own witness: and to this end no permission is given, or will be given, in this Diocese for the re-marriage of divorced persons, whatever the circumstances, in Church."

This brief summary does not do justice to the clarity and charity of the Bishop's addresses. We may express gratified surprise that the churchwardens of Derby are apparently mentally equipped to keep up with the Bishop as he takes them on a tour of his treasury and out of it delivers to them things new and old. But they are fortunate none the less. (It may even account for the fact that those who are Churchwardens are given an initial capital C when the clergy have to make do with lower case!)

One thing alone surprises this reviewer. Dr Rawlinson has been an *enfant terrible* in the councils of the Church for so long that he ought by now to have grown accustomed to the rôle and to wear his mantle lightly. But apparently not. Again and again he is over-anxious to qualify or justify his statements in parenthesis after parenthesis—"so it is claimed", "if at all", "they would maintain", "possible (though by no means certain)", "it is possible to hold (and I myself strongly hold it)", "the acknowledged fact (if it be an acknowledged fact)", and so on and so on. This is unnecessary and a pity. Let the Bishop of Derby be assured that we respect his learning and integrity, that we value his honesty of mind, that we admire his disdain of lipservice and men-pleasing, and that—whether we agree with him or not—we would not have him otherwise.

✠ JOOST CAPE TOWN

ENCOUNTER BETWEEN RELIGIONS

ISLAM AND THE GOSPEL OF GOD. By H. SPENCER. S.P.C.K.-in-India. 3s.

THE BUDDHA, THE PROPHET AND THE CHRIST. By F. H. HILLIARD. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 12s. 6d.

CONFUCIUS. By SHIGEKI KAIZUKA. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 12s. 6d.

THESE are three of a growing number of books which reflect the current interest in the study of world religions and their relationship with one another. The revival in the ancient religions has been largely stimulated by nationalism, but as the claims of nationalism receive satisfaction the focus of interest is surely moving on to the religious and moral content of the religions concerned and to their relationship with each other.

The first of the three books under review is a comparison of the central doctrines of Christianity and Islam, written with the aim of informing and strengthening Christian workers in their approach to Muslims. Its author was until recently Principal of the Henry Martyn School of Islamic Studies at Aligarh in India, a study centre which in the past twenty years or so has produced a number of scholarly books which have radically altered the thinking of Christians about Islam. In his years at the Henry Martyn School Mr Spencer emphasized the need of defining the theological terms used by Christians and Muslims, so that an understanding encounter can take place. In the desire to be understood by Muslims, Christians have to borrow Islamic terms, but "no terms borrowed from Islam can, by themselves, be an adequate vehicle for the expression of Christian truth. We must be prepared to explain the sense in which we use all such words, and cannot assume that the terms alone will convey the truth."

This need of accuracy in definition is worked out by the author in reference to the words "God" and "Allah". Muslims tend to identify the God of the Bible with Allah of the Quran. It may be true that Muhammad believed that he was receiving revelations from the God of the Bible, but the fact remains that the nature of Allah as explained in the Quran is one of unconditional omnipotence: Allah is the creator of evil as well as good, who makes no self-revealing approach to man; as compared with the God of the Bible, who is a God of righteousness, coming to seek and to save men, and revealing himself in Jesus Christ. Self-giving and self-emptying are as impossible to Allah as self-revelation, and the word of the Cross is as much foolishness to Muslims as it was to the Greeks of St Paul's day. With such conceptions of the Deity it is inevitable that the Quran's teaching about man and his destiny should be similarly incompatible with that of the Bible.

In spite of what may seem to be the polemic character of much of his book, Mr Spencer pleads for a more friendly approach to Muslims, urging Christians to abandon "the old-fashioned method of vilification and denigration of Islam and its prophet", and advocating an encounter

of friendly exchange of views. Yet one wonders if he has the same sympathetic understanding of the good points of Islam which characterized some of his predecessors at the Henry Martyn School. This small criticism should not impair the recognition that Mr Spencer has achieved his aim: his book should be of real assistance to Christian workers among Muslims not only in India and Pakistan, but in the Middle East and Africa also.

The Buddha, the Prophet and the Christ brings together passages from the Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian Scriptures dealing with the claims made for these three great religious figures, and suggesting that Gautama and Muhammad were regarded as divine by some of their later followers much in the same way as Christ is spoken of as divine in the New Testament.

The parallel with the Christ is more striking in the case of the Buddha than in that of the Prophet, particularly as manifested in the Mahayana versions of the scriptures and commentaries as preserved in China and Japan. For the Buddha there is recorded a miraculous birth announced by angels, a Buddhist Simeon, a temptation following his enlightenment, miracles of healing and walking on the water, a transfiguration, and a final temptation before his entry into Nirvana. Most of these details appear also in the Theravada Scriptures, where, however, the emphasis is still on the Buddha as a Teacher and Example. In the Mahayana tradition the Buddha has become a Saviour; there is also a doctrine of Godhead akin to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

The evidence for divinity said to be attributed to Muhammad by his followers is not so convincing, though the Quran and the Traditions are quoted in support of his pre-existence, and the latter in support of many miracles, including those of divine protection when he was fleeing from Mecca to Medina. There is an interesting parallel to the Feeding of the Five Thousand, and a popular conviction that Muhammad will be the Intercessor in the Day of Judgement. None of these considerations, however, demand belief in more than a divinely-called prophet.

What is the explanation of these similarities? Mr Hilliard quotes a theory of Dibelius, a Form-Criticism scholar, who deduces "a law of biographical analogy" which suggests that there exists a fixed idea of the life of a holy man, who may neither be born nor die without supernatural portents, and whose life must be characterized by divine support and miraculous powers. He also mentions the possibility of the influence of Christianity on the other two religions, as it came into contact with Buddhism in India and more so in China, and with Islam in the Middle East.

To the reviewer this possibility is more a probability; there is a fascinating piece of research to be done in tracing the impact of Nestorians in China on the Buddhism which they found there, lately arrived from India. Another point which must be made is the need of higher and textual criticism to be applied to the Buddhist and Muslim Scriptures and Commentaries in the same way as it has been applied to the books of the New Testament. Many of the miracles quoted of

Gautama and Muhammad savour rather of the stories of Christ contained in some of the apocryphal gospels which the Church rejected as unauthentic.

A refreshingly critical attitude is shown to Chinese sources and traditions by Professor Kaizuka, whose book *Confucius* was originally written in Japanese. He examines the early documents with a critical scrutiny, both as to the date of their sources and their textual reliability, and has a keen scent for tracking down superstition.

The first half of his book deals with the social and political background of the lifetime of Confucius (552-479 B.C.), with a mass of detail which makes stiff reading. The second half dealing with the views of Confucius and his standing as a scholar, philosopher, and statesman, amply illustrated with quotations from the *Analects*, the *Odes*, and the *Documents*, all critically examined, makes much more exciting reading. There is little religious relevance, for Confucius was a man of culture, and though he observed the conventional ritual of sacrifice to the spirits of ancestors, it was more as a patriotic and traditional duty than as a religious conviction.

It is in his view of man that Confucius is relevant to modern thought, for he valued humanity and human-ness, though tending to rate the "princely man" with his leisure for learning and statesmanship, above the peasant whose whole life was a struggle for existence. Asked if there was a single word to act as guide to conduct for a lifetime, Confucius suggested the word "reciprocity", which he interpreted as the ability to project one's feeling into others, to put oneself into the other's position, not to do to others what you would not wish to be done to you. Here is ethical teaching close to that of the New Testament, but there is little more than this of positive encounter with Christianity.

Yet Professor Kaizuka brings out the sense of despair of the world in the time of Confucius, and the sense of disillusion which overshadowed the great Chinese leader in old age. It is as if the best of men and the wisest of teachers need something more than rational thinking, high ideals, and lofty ethics. Perhaps St Augustine provides the correct diagnosis—"Thou hast made us for thyself, and our hearts shall find no rest until they find their rest in thee." A vague belief in an impersonal heaven is a poor substitute for belief in the living, loving, and redeeming God.

G. APPLETON

OUR CHURCH BUILDINGS

PORTRAIT OF ENGLISH CHURCHES. By A. F. KERSTING and EDMUND VALE.
B. T. Batsford, Ltd. 30s.

A SKETCH may be much more lively and revealing than a full-scale portrait; it may in a few strokes catch a convincing and memorable likeness that escapes the painstaking and detailed work of a finished painting. With that in mind it would be fair to describe this book as a sketch rather than a portrait of the English church. Barely a hundred churches are illustrated, most of them by a single photograph, and nearly all of them country churches; so there is no question of a comprehensive guide to the churches of England. But the fine pictures provide a fascinating reminder of the riches scattered over the country; and the sensitive exile or the intelligent foreigner would surely be thrilled by something so characteristically English, the foreigner indeed acquiring some invaluable help in the difficult task of understanding the Church of England.

The comparatively brief, well-printed, text links the pictures together to give a visual outline history of the development of the parish church from Saxon times to the Regency, gently demonstrates the meaning of a number of technical terms, and focuses attention on some of the main parts and fittings of churches. It would be unfortunate, though, if the scope of the book should give even the faintest suggestion that the Church of England or even church-building came to an end in the last century.

This should not be regarded as little more than a pleasing picture book to be glanced through at leisure. Anyone responsible for or interested in the care of a church can find much to stimulate and enlighten him in a careful study of the illustrations. For example, the many churchyards shown throw light on the difficult and often neglected care of such places. Not all can be treated alike, and each should preserve its true character, never allowing an impression of neglect. A detailed comparison of the picture on the dust-cover with the photograph (presumably taken at an earlier date) on pages 12 and 13 shows a sensitive treatment, while only a few extra flowerbeds would introduce the alien note of a public park, and the ranging of headstones in serried ranks would be fatal. Again, a study of the interiors reminds us how poorly designed are most hymn-boards, and how much better we could do quite simply with a skilled local carpenter working to the design of a competent architect; though it is always an advantage to hide the boards away when they are not in use. There are many other topics on which each reader can enjoy making his own study—the placing of flowers in churches, iron railings in churchyards, different forms of light fittings, are some.

Since the location of everything else illustrated is given, it might be worth while in any future edition to state where the bronze effigy of the Earl of Warwick on page 84 is to be found.

WALTER HUSSEY

THE CHRISTIAN IN SOCIETY

CHRISTIAN SOCIAL WITNESS. By J. CLIFFORD GILL. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

FOR A number of years now Canon Gill, through the S.P.C.K., has been performing for the Church a service the value of which can only too easily be overlooked. He has constituted himself an interpreter, as it were, at the local and parochial level, of Christian sociological thinking such as would be very unlikely to reach or to be understood by the mass of churchpeople without such aid as he has supplied. His latest and most ambitious publication of this sort is indeed something more than this, for there is much that is truly original in his presentation, deriving not from theorizing, however valid, but from his own pastoral and social experience. Here is something for parish or ruri-decanal groups to get their teeth into—and not only “youth groups”: why is it so widely assumed that it is only adolescents who need or want to think about the challenges and opportunities which society offers to them?

Canon Gill is not afraid to be controversial, indeed there is some evidence in this booklet that this is what he prefers to be; but he never tries to meet complex issues with artificially simplified “solutions”, and he is always fair to viewpoints with which he indicates a disagreement. He begins, as such a study should always begin, with the Bible, and effectively demolishes the fallacy (recurrent in the more superficial forms of “evangelism”) that the religion of which it speaks to us is in essence a purely individual matter. “When the atheistic revolutionary decries religion as an artifice to safeguard the interests of the ruling class, he distorts the truth that religion is a social bond . . . This is not to say that the purpose of religion is to provide a social bond. It is, however, one of its effects. . . . On the other hand, those who lay emphasis on a man’s duty to his neighbour, without regard to God as the source of our human relationships, are taking the standards of Christian social behaviour out of their context.”

The other three parts of the booklet, dealing primarily with Faith, Worship, and the relation of the moral assumptions of our society to the Christian culture from which they are derived, contain, perhaps inevitably, a certain amount of cross-reference and even some repetition. Canon Gill makes much of the deleterious influence of the early political economists upon not only the secular but the religious “climate of opinion”, and he rightly emphasizes the significance of Maurice in challenging this, observing that “more and more Christian social thought is being built where Maurice dug”. He is not much happier about “orthodox economics” to-day, and has got into some trouble with critics for his scepticism in this respect, though it is not obvious why Christian thinking should be debarred from examining so eminently disputable a subject with as critical an eye as it should naturally do any body of teaching founded on secular assumptions. This at any rate is what Canon Gill does, making many such shrewd observations as that “one of the devices by which the work and wages system is kept alive is the constant

urging of the public to buy new things. This is called 'Improving our Standard of Living'."

The principal purpose of this publication, however, is not to impose ideas but to stimulate them. Every section is followed by a first-rate set of "talking points". But the discussion it is thus sought to promote is not meant to be an academic one, for the foundations of our society are not secure, and it is only an informed Church which can help to make them so. "It is not enough", Canon Gill concludes, "to assume that Christian ideals will restore a Christian society. Christians must be concerned with what we stand on as well as what we stand for."

MAURICE B. RECKITT

CHRISTIAN PRACTICE

WHAT TO DO WITH YOURSELVES. By GUY H. KING. Marshall, Morgan and Scott, Ltd. 7s. 6d.

THERE are several ways of using Guy King's book, *What to do with Yourself*, but I do not feel that reading it straight through is one of them. Nor would the author wish that. Rather let a chapter be taken at a time by a discussion group or Sunday School teachers' class and worked through Bible in hand.

Here and there I felt there was a slight tendency to what might be called "old fashioned moralizing", but most of his texts leave room for nothing but the best type of virile Christianity.

Many a deacon and young priest who wants to learn the difficult art of saying *one* thing, cogently, with scriptural illustration and foundation, might profitably put this book on his shelves; his next sermon at Parish Communion will probably benefit enormously.

G. E. REINDORP

LIFE IN THE CHURCH

MEMBERS OF CHRIST. By JOOST DE BLANK. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 7s. 6d.

IN MY FATHER'S HOUSE. By RICHARD TATLOCK. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 3s. 6d.

THE first of these books comprises a series of addresses given by the then Bishop of Stepney during October 1955, in a Teaching Week arranged by the diocese of Glasgow. This Teaching Week was part of the Episcopal Church's contribution to the "Tell Scotland" campaign, in which the Church of Scotland also had a large share. It was an attempt

to relate the faith of the Church to the proclamation of the Gospel. And so the general title of the addresses was "Churchmanship and Evangelism". But, as the Bishop states in the Introduction to the book, as he came to prepare the addresses, he realized more and more how inextricably the Church and its evangelistic mission are interlocked. Members of Christ's Church are evangelistic by reason of their membership; and evangelism can be both thorough and effective only within the context of Church membership. Hence, when publishing the addresses the author decided to change the title to "Members of Christ", and we have, in fact, a book about the Church—its nature, its life, and its work. We may be grateful for it. It is a masterpiece of concise and definite teaching, easy to read and easy to grasp; plain and straightforward in its treatment of this all-important subject.

The outstanding feature of the book, for which we may indeed be thankful, is its unhesitating definiteness. This, as the author states, is deliberate, but not in order to be controversial. Rather, because he felt, both when preparing to deliver the addresses and also in connection with their publication, that there was a need to be definite. And so he determined to state his own belief in definite terms. "People in our churches desperately want so to learn their faith as to be able to state plainly what they believe and why. The haziness of the Anglican Church in the past has been part cause at least of some of the craziness of those strange sects and sub-Christian bodies that befog the present."

Chapter I is entitled "The Lord of the Church". Here is indeed the true beginning of any thinking about the Church; and in this chapter the Bishop both sets the direction of his argument and lays the foundation of his teaching, revealing that it is indeed the only foundation: "other foundation can no man lay than that is laid"—Christ himself. Hence evangelism is Christ's own work, carried out by and through his Church. Hence, too, the essential characteristic of the Church is that it is an organism depending utterly and entirely for its life and continued existence upon the grace of God in Christ, mediated by the Holy Spirit. So it follows that life in the Church begins with Holy Baptism, which is not a work of man, but the acceptance by man of divine grace. From this point the Bishop goes on to show the fundamental place of the sacraments and of sacramental grace in the Church's life, and the Church's utter need of this grace for its work.

It has been stimulating and indeed thrilling to read this book. One puts it down feeling encouraged and heartened and with renewed pride in the Church and in our own Church membership as Anglicans; and so with deepened devotion to its Lord.

In my Father's House, by the Rector of St Dunstan's-in-the-East, is an essay on the After-Life. It was written as a consequence of the author's close connection with the B.B.C.'s "Silver Lining" programme, through which he came to know that amongst the questions which puzzle people, the nature of the After-Life is one of the most urgent and perplexing. This knowledge was reinforced when he was invited to speak on this same subject at a lunch-hour discussion group of mainly younger folk

than those with whom he had been in contact through the "Silver Lining".

Mr Tatlock has given us an able and clear statement of Christian teaching based on scriptural evidence. He emphasizes that a subject of this nature is one where speculation can lead to theorizings of a very singular kind. He has therefore rightly accepted the discipline of trying to give a strictly scriptural view and of avoiding as far as is humanly possible the inclusion of any opinion, however plausible or reasonable, for which there is no direct scriptural evidence. In doing this he is loyal to the position of the Church of England. The glory of the essay is that it reveals the strength and positiveness of Anglican doctrine, and the fact that there is clear and definite teaching regarding life beyond the grave in the Bible. It brings home to us that we do not need to go beyond the teaching of Holy Scripture to have our faith in God's ultimate purpose for man and our hope for ourselves in that purpose and in its fulfilment kept strong and stable. We have all that we need in the revelation God has given us in his Word for our guidance and our encouragement in this life and as our hope for the next.

There are many relevant passages of Scripture quoted throughout the essay, and, as the author states, since the study of the Bible should lead to prayer or at least to a devotional attitude of mind, he has added, as a second part of the book, some Bible readings and prayers which he hopes may be of help to the bereaved, and some prayers for general use.

This little book may be cordially commended.

A. J. G. HAWES

THE POETRY OF PENITENCE

RACINE: CONFESSIONS. Translated by WALTER ROBERTS. A. R. Mowbray and Co. 13s. 6d.

THESE hitherto unpublished sonnets have been very long known in the French but under the name of another author. They have now been proved to be the work of Jean Racine and to mark an epoch in his life. In 1677 after producing *Phèdre* he began to withdraw from the theatre. He lived a new life, in close touch with the Jansenists of Port Royal, where his aunt was Abbess. This did not mean the end of trouble, for he later fell out with Louis XIV and was only restored to favour, at the intercession of Madame de Maintenon, shortly before his death in 1699.

The sonnets reflect the penitence of the latter years. His translator says Racine's intention was to enter upon an accurate scrutiny of his past life in order to make and confirm his peace with God, but that "the poetry which he had renounced came flooding back to create a memorial of his deepest convictions" and resulted in these 128 sonnets. Fr Jarrett-Kerr in his charming introduction warns us that we may find here "verse

that is on the surface frigid, studied, and conventional: while underneath will be feelings that are powerful and genuine". Actually the characteristic that is most likely to strike the reader is monotony. This is not the translator's fault. Mr Roberts has done his work with singular competence, but not even his determination to produce something creative rather than a mere schoolboy exercise can reconcile the extrovert Englishman to these long Gallic soliloquizings on one theme.

Conceived in sin, born of a sinful seed,
I am oppressed, O Lord, by carnal woe;
The product of impurity's misdeed,
I am my parents' evil overflow.

Things get a little better when he has found forgiveness and is prepared to rejoice in it a little.

All that the universe contains of power
Provides no basis to redeem one soul;
The stars are but an unavailing shower,
The Lord alone shall be my guide and goal;
At all times, nothing but his tenderness
Has heartened me to rise from my distress.

It is really something of a relief, when towards the end he turns to flattery of his earthly King, to whose favour he has now been restored. There is one sonnet, on page 69, that might well be set to music for a coronation anthem.

W.W.

CONVERSIONS TO ANGLICANISM

MODERN CANTERBURY PILGRIMS. Edited by THE DEAN OF NEW YORK.
A. R. Mowbray and Co. 13s. 6d.

I FIRST saw this book in Puerto Rico in the early summer of 1956. That was, of course, the American edition. Its brilliant title alone was sufficient to bespeak a large reading public, and this it has had on both sides of the Atlantic. Twenty-three men and women wrote in it to tell of the spiritual pilgrimage that brought them home to the Episcopal Church. No doubt the English publishers hoped to strengthen its appeal in a country where many of the contributors are nothing but names by asking Bishop Stephen Neill to write an introduction. But I question its value and decry its pessimism. The peripatetic bishop must have written on a dyspeptic morning. "The Church of England is passing through bad days. Church attendance is miserably low", he writes, and later: "Travelling about as I do, and meeting from time to time with ill-kept churches, a slovenly reading of the liturgy, eccentric and unintelligible deviations from the Anglican norm of worship, vacuous preaching, apparent unawareness of the crisis of our times, I am sometimes inclined

to wonder what arguments, if any, can be adduced in favour of remaining Anglican." Although he writes of his "infuriated devotion" to the Church its glories apparently escape him. But perhaps he is not wholly to blame, for he has never had the privilege of being a parish priest in England; and nothing is more certain than that in the daily life of a parish priest, the looker-on does *not* see most of the game.

If the Church of England were quite as bad as the introduction depicts it would be hard to find any justifiable reason for the pilgrimage undertaken by the contributors to this symposium. But most of them write plainly, some with enthusiasm, and all leave us in no doubt.

As was to be expected in a book of this kind the contributors, men and women such as W. H. Auden, D. R. Davies, Kathleen Bliss, and W. G. Peck (to mention those of English origin), are all to be found among the "intellectuals". They are well-educated, well-provided for, and endowed with that mental equipment which enables them to be adequate spokesmen and interpreters of the middle classes from which they spring. In America a very high percentage of such people are members of one church or another. It has to be remembered that sixty per cent of the total population of the United States has some church allegiance, and it probably reaches as high as eighty or ninety per cent among professional, managerial, and executive groups.

In England the situation is vastly different. Although I take issue with Bishop Stephen Neill over his statement about "miserably low" church attendance, it is undoubtedly true that if anything like the American percentage went to church we should have to enlarge our buildings and erect additional places of worship. But as there is no immediate likelihood of this we are not so much concerned with turning a Methodist or a Congregationalist into an Anglican as with turning the agnostic and the indifferent into Christians. This concern is intensified for us by our parochial system, which does not exist in any comparable sense in America. The parish parson in England receives at his Institution the cure of all the souls in his parish. His tremendous responsibility usually focuses upon two objectives—the pastoral care of the faithful and the evangelistic approach to the non-Christians. Other Christians, though still within the parson's cure, to some extent cease to be a pressing call on his limited time by reason of the provision made for them in the ministrations of their own communions.

Only three of the pilgrims included in the volume started outside the Christian fold—a Hindu, a Jew, and an atheist. For the others their journey was not from non-faith to faith but from some other expression of Christianity to membership of the Anglican Communion. It is this fact that weakens the book's impact in this country. From the British standpoint we wish it contained more testimonies from those who began as "Jews, Turks, heretics, and infidels".

But this is not to deny the book's value. It is good to know why sane, intelligent people find their spiritual home in Anglicanism and why so many of these find it a better and wiser home than other Christian bodies. Further, Dean Pike's symposium can be of service in commending

a *practising* Anglican faith to nominal churchmen who do little or nothing about their religion. And what is more, some of the essayists and their essays are themselves the best refutation of the introduction.

✠ JOOST CAPE TOWN

KING'S COLLEGE CHAPEL, ABERDEEN

King's College Chapel, Aberdeen, by F. C. Eeles, reviewed in the April-June number, is published by Oliver and Boyd, Ltd., Edinburgh.

